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Abstract 
This inductive study explores and explains non-executive directors’ (NEDs) contribution to 
major corporate strategic decisions. It addresses the often undersocialised view of corporate 
boards by recognising boards as complex social systems embedded in complex power 
asymmetries and group identity affects. Drawing from theories in social psychology and 
organisational theory, this study explores the behavioural side of corporate governance and 
contributes to the understanding of the origins, reasons, dynamics and consequences of 
boardroom influence of NEDs. The decision practices of 15 large Australian public 
companies are studied through NEDs’ narrations of their decision experiences when faced 
with the task of shaping strategy—an important aspect of their advisory accountabilities. By 
focusing this study on large transformative decisions, it aims to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the processes of influence relating to value-creating decisions. The findings 
have identified significant variations in the sense NEDs make of their decision experiences 
and their influence attempts in response to their ‘sensemaking’. It also illuminates how the 
effects of group membership, identification and power differentials interact to create a unique 
social reality and how this social reality moderates the use of decision influence. This study 
has implications for scholarship, policy and practice relating to influence in and around a 
boardroom. It contributes a new psychosocial dimension to corporate governance theory, 
which historically has underestimated the role of human dynamics in a boardroom. It also 
contributes policy insights into practices that create strategically active boards and the 
enablers that help a board reach its full potential as a strategic decision-making group. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, company directors, strategy, decision-making, power, 
social identity, influence, board dynamic 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Research into the governing of corporations and the influential role boards play has a long 
history. However, most board research has followed the economic tradition that is rooted in 
agency theory and focuses on a board’s monitoring and control role on behalf of 
shareholders. This research tradition and the studies it has generated over the last three 
decades has brought us no closer to understanding the inner workings or dynamics of a board, 
particularly how the influence of a board and its directors is exercised in the process of 
decision-making (Ahrens et al. 2011; McNulty, Florackis & Omrod 2013; Petrovic 2008). 
This is a vital area of study, as it has implications for how our institutions are governed and 
provides important insights for investors, shareholders, regulators, peak-business bodies, the 
director community and anyone interested in board effectiveness and the process by which 
accountability is created. 
This chapter presents a short outline of the current literature and the reasons why this 
research was undertaken, its aims and the research questions posed, the research context, the 
chosen methodology, the contribution this study makes and the approach and structure of this 
thesis. 
1.1 Current Literature 
Due to the difficulties accessing boards and observing board decision-making ‘live’, the 
study of board-decision dynamics has eluded many researchers. Instead, they have indirectly 
inferred board dynamics from demographic factors such as tenure, age, gender, qualifications 
and experience and relied on surveys and questionnaires. As a result, an undersocialised view 
of board life has persisted. Explorative, inductive studies are few and far between (Maitlis & 
Lawrence 2003; Pettigrew 1992, 2001; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Pye 2002, 2005; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Samra-Fredericks 2003). Moreover, the field has been dominated by 
normative research that describes how boards should behave when enacting their 
accountabilities, rather than how they actually behave. This study relies on the recounted 
experiences of non-executive directors (NEDs) as expert informants, as a way of 
understanding how NEDs describe how they behave. 
This study seeks to investigate how influence is exercised by directors beyond extrapolations 
from demographics and recognises the broader ‘social context’ in which an individual 
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director performs his or her work (Maitlis & Lawrence 2003; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; 
Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). Despite this being a director-level study, it acknowledges 
that a director is a microcosm of a board and a board is a complex social system. In taking a 
socialised approach, the scope of this literature review focuses on current theory in social 
psychology, and organisational and business management to consider what researchers have 
discovered about the effects of group membership on individual behaviour and, reflexively, 
the effects of an individual on group behaviour. The primary question posed by this study is 
how do social factors influence NED behaviour in strategic decision-making? From an 
epistemological stance, this question is approached with the belief that all knowledge is 
socially constructed rather than discovered, especially when trying to understand the role 
experience plays in decision-making. Therefore, this study adopts a phenomenological 
approach in investigating how social factors such as power and identity might affect the 
processes of creating accountability in and around a boardroom. 
1.2 Aims and Questions Posed 
The aims of this director-level inductive study are to explore the human side of the processes 
by which board accountability is created. Particularly, it seeks to extend current 
understandings of the origins, reasons, dynamics and consequences of the use of NEDs’ 
power in a board context by investigating the social dynamics that may influence their 
strategy-shaping behaviour. To understand board dynamics with more insight, one must have 
a better understanding of the experiences, perspectives, orientations, beliefs and dispositions 
that individual board members bring to their work and how they are likely to influence 
behaviour, interaction patterns and the propensity for involvement in strategic debate. The 
NED-recounted experiences of behaviours such as testing, confirming, clarifying, 
challenging, explaining, probing, debating and advocating while shaping strategy responds to 
the primary question in this study, which pertains to how social factors influence decision-
making behaviours of NEDs. 
The primary question in this study generates three supplementary questions: 
1. What are the origins of and differences in an individual NED’s power? 
2. How does a NED’s sense of shared identity with the board group shape the process 
of decision-making? 
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3. How is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the ‘social reality’ 
(of group identification and power distribution)? 
From a theoretical basis, this study aims to investigate if director work is merely an 
expression of rational agency or whether social factors may subjectively shape how power 
and influence are shared, gained and lost through interaction and discourse. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, this study also hopes to offer actionable insights for policymakers, 
practitioners and the director community who are keen to strengthen the processes of 
accountability and improve the effectiveness of board decision-making cultures. 
1.3 Research Context 
The research context is a transformative, potentially value-creating, decision taken by 15 
Australian public companies and each participating NED (one from each company)  
recounting their behaviour during the decision making process. That is, by standardising a 
transformative decision as the research context for this study, it was possible to infer how 
NEDs seek to shape and influence strategy. The focus was not on the decision itself or the 
outcome, rather on the recounting by NEDs of their and others’ behaviour during the process 
of shaping strategy. Such strategy decisions are commercially sensitive and generally 
shrouded in secrecy. Further, due to the size and scale of decisions (such as acquisitions) that 
large listed companies might consider, a decision process typically plays out over an 
extended period, thus, making direct observation methods impractical. 
1.4 Methodology 
Therefore, an interpretive methodology was used as the most effective method to examine the 
social construct of a ‘board system’ within which an individual director works. Through an 
exploration of the subjective experience of individual NEDs and their interpretation of social 
reality, individual case stories provided a lens through which a deeper understanding of the 
whole board system and its parts may be gained. Thus, an individual NED is represented as 
part (microcosm) of that system. Employing a systems-level approach—that is, treating a 
board as a social system—in this qualitative inductive study helped frame an understanding 
of the complex tripartite relations between the discursive practices of various members of a 
board, a board context and a decision-making process. 
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The unique multiphased research design adopted by this study allowed the researcher to 
‘walk’ with the 15 participating NEDs as they recounted their attempts to build, verify and 
modify working models and narratives about their own and others’ influence attempts. Using 
the questions listed in appendix 1 to guide the semi-structured interviews, this study used 
sensemaking theory and narrative analysis to analyse the interview transcripts and to explore 
how each NED interpreted their decision experiences and how they acted on those 
interpretations. Collectively, the experience of influence—that is, the use of power shaped by 
an individual’s construal of their place in a group in and around a boardroom—varied 
between the 15 participating directors, thus, revealing rich variations in the decision 
behaviours recounted. Particularly, it allowed the study to reveal the underlying dynamics at 
play reflected in the recounted influence attempts. This included both the effects and 
consequences of an individual’s behaviour on the ‘social system’ and vice versa. Similarities 
and distinctions between the NEDs’ narratives and the behavioural richness of each influence 
attempt provided the findings of this study. 
1.5 The Study’s Contribution 
The practices by which board members attempted to exercise influence in the process of 
enacting accountabilities through decision-making has valuable insights in a practical sense. 
End users of corporate governance practices, such as long-term shareholders and investors, 
may also have an interest in why the same or similar practices pursued by different boards 
can have such different consequences. Regulators may be interested in how regulatory codes 
are variously practised in different companies due to different behaviours of decision-making 
groups (Ahrens, Filatotchev & Thomsen 2011; Golden & Zajac 2001; Petrovic 2008; Samra-
Fredericks 2003). 
By integrating social identity and power theories with corporate governance literature on the 
process of creating accountability, this thesis provides three contributions to management 
literature. It also builds on the findings of other processual studies that report subtle processes 
of influence in and around a boardroom and how they affect how NED accountability is 
exercised (Maitlis & Lawrence 2003; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 
2005). 
First, it contributes to the body of process research by extending the work of notable process 
researchers in two ways. First, as a processual study it extends the works of other process 
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researchers such as Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995), 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2003), Pye (2002), Pye and Pettigrew (2005), Samra-Fredericks 
(2003) and Pettigrew (1992, 2001) by offering explanations for how actors in a social system 
(such as a board) recount how they adjust to various social pressures. Additionally, from the 
perspective of this being an interpretive and qualitative study of NEDs as expert witnesses or 
informants of board decision-making, it extends the works of Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005), Pye and Pettigrew (2005) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) by proposing a dynamic 
psychosocial framework of boardroom influence. That is, the framework describes the extent 
to which some directors seem to wield more influence than others in a boardroom and why 
this occurs. The framework also provides an explanation for how and why revisions of 
identity and power shifts may occur, potentially creating socialising effects that interfere with 
the opportunity to challenge, elaborate, clarify and question our own and others’ assumptions. 
The findings demonstrate that a director’s work is not merely an expression of agency but 
also an effect of subjectively construed identities and power relationships, as each seeks 
legitimacy, relevance and decision influence in the social system that is a board. In a more 
geneal sense, this study also makes a unique contribution to the assumptions that have for 
some time have underpinned decision making scholarship (Martin & Parmar 2013). 
Second, this thesis contributes to the practical application of theories relevant to the selection 
and development of NEDs. The concept of board capital as the total of a NED’s experience, 
accumulated reputation and embeddedness in terms of connections and networks describes 
the potential that each NED brings to a board. However, NEDs may not be able to fulfil this 
potential because of the identity politics that are an inevitable fact of board life. To overcome 
these obstacles, this study revealed that NEDs need to have certain social competencies, such 
as situational sensing, impression management, articulacy and social adaptability. Further, 
social competence determines how a NED’s board capital is used and, ultimately, how 
influential a NED may become. These social factors lay in sharp contrast to traditional 
corporate governance theory or rational action theorists. Social factors play an important part 
in how a director chooses to engage and, thus, determine the extent to which they can fulfil 
their accountabilities and potential. Both concepts are critical in optimising the strategic 
contribution of directors and, subsequently, critical for informing director-hiring practices, 
thus, enriching new director onboarding and ultimately developing more effective and 
accountable directors. 
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Third, this study makes an important methodological contribution to the current body of 
board studies. By means of the researcher’s professional connections, this study gained 
unprecedented access to NEDs as expert informants and provides board researchers, long 
challenged by access to boards, the opportunity to study in-depth the processes by which 
accountability is created in and around a boardroom. A multistaged research design added 
conceptual robustness to the inductive approach by providing a rich understanding of the 
inner workings of a board—something that is relatively rare in previous board studies. 
Moreover, the multistages’ research design can be adopted by other board researchers. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis has five chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on board studies concerning how boards enact influence and create accountability 
through decision-making processes. It considers the relatively unexplored area of the effects 
of group membership and the role social identity and power plays on individual behaviour by 
drawing on social psychology and organisational theory. This review identifies some 
significant research gaps that are addressed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also poses the research 
questions raised by the research gaps and describes the research methodology and approach 
to data analysis. The research approach facilitates the building of ‘inductively rich’ accounts 
of director reflections embedded in narratives, stories, anecdotes and historical accounts 
provided by participating NEDs in a five-stage data gathering process. Chapter 4 presents and 
discusses the findings as they relate to the influence of group membership on director 
behaviours, as recounted by NEDs across the 15 decision stories studied. The variations 
revealed in directors’ discursive practices are analysed to determine if and why some 
directors may be more influential during decision-making processes. Chapter 4 draws some 
conclusions regarding the social dimensions by which influence is exercised and 
accountability is enacted by discussing how the complex interplay of an influencer (the 
NED), a decision-making process and a board context might shape the processes by which 
accountability is created. Specifically, it provides reflections on how power structures, 
identity effects, stated and unstated goals, and norms and routines play a role in the process 
by which a board makes a decision. Chapter 5 concludes by suggesting opportunities for 
future research by examining how this study may be extended to a deeper understanding of 
group process. A comprehensive list of references is provided comprising both seminal 
research on board functioning, as well as new and emerging research on this topic. The 
		
8 
appendix comprises a list of the semi-structured interview questions used in stage two of the 
data collection process and a profile of the directors who participated in this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The principal-agency framework dominates research on corporate governance … a 
first critique argues that Agency Theory is an ‘undersocialised’ approach that 
remains insensitive to how institutions shape the identities, interests and interactions 
among actors in corporate governance. (Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima 2013, p. 
967–968) 
The body of research relating to corporate governance and a board’s advisory role and 
function in governing corporations is vast. This literature review is focused on research 
concerning how social factors and a social context (as experienced by NEDs) influence their 
decision behaviour and, therefore, their effectiveness and accountabilities in a decision-
making process. In undertaking this literature review, the researcher focused on extensively 
cited research in the fields of social psychology and organisational theory, which has 
historically shaped inquiries into group dynamics. 
To navigate the extensive literature relating to corporate governance and a board’s advisory 
role, as well as how social factors influence NED decision-making behaviour and, therefore, 
arrive at a conceptual framework for the study (as derived from previous research), this 
chapter proceeds in five sections. Section 2.1 reviews governance theories and the role of a 
director and provides a summary of major theories, Section 2.2 examines the role of a board 
and NEDs in strategic decision-making and Section 2.3 discusses literature concerning a 
board’s accountability to shareholders as a relational process accomplished through 
expectations, norms and relationships. These sections position the importance of considering 
a board as a group dynamic by which ‘shaping behaviours’ of individual directors influence 
decision-making processes. Section 2.4 then considers current research in psychology, social 
psychology and organisational theory concerning the effects of social factors such as social 
identity and power on decision-making behaviours and the ‘social reality’ of small groups, 
such as a board. This section also provides the conceptual framework for a study based on the 
literature. Finally, Section 2.5 summarises the literature and gaps in current research to 
provide the basis for the primary and secondary research questions. 
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2.1 Governing the Corporation: Governance Theories, Research Traditions 
and the Role of Directors 
As noted, the effects of group membership on an individual, as studied through the lens of 
social psychology and organisational theory, has long been neglected in board research 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003; McNulty, Zattoni & Dougals 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees 
2012). When interpreted as complex social systems, there is much we do not know about the 
internal workings of a board; to a considerable extent, how board directors enact their duties 
is a ‘black box’ that has eluded many scholars in understanding the human side of 
governance (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003). A better understanding will advance 
management research and promote corporate governance practice and reform (Daily, Dalton 
& Cannella 2003; Forbes & Milliken 1999; Pettigrew 1992; Pye & Pettigrew 2005; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles 2005). Particularly over the last decade, and following the global financial 
crisis (GFC), there has been increasing calls from shareholders, regulators and the broader 
business community to better understand what really goes on in a boardroom (Ahrens et al. 
2011; McNulty, Florackis & Omrod 2013; Petrovic 2008). 
This study is situated in the process tradition—that is, studying NEDs as social actors within 
a board as a social system. However, to validate the necessity for this approach, this section 
reviews the research traditions that have previously dominated the field of corporate board 
function and governance to contextualise this study within extant theoretical traditions. 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) argue that both governance theory and governance 
reform would benefit from being informed by primary qualitative research on key 
governance relationships and their effect on both strategy and performance and rely less on 
archival and secondary data. Other researchers have drawn the same conclusions (Aguilera et 
al. 2008; Huse et al. 2011; Judge & Talaulicar 2017; Petrovic 2008; Westphal & Zajac 1997). 
There are seven major theoretical streams used to describe the role of a board in governing a 
corporation: the agency theory, the stewardship theory, the resource dependence theory 
(RDT), the resource-based theory, the class hegemony theory, the managerial hegemony 
theory and the stakeholder theory (Hendry & Kiel 2004; Hung 1998; Stiles & Taylor 2001; 
Zahra & Pearce 1989). Although the purpose of this study is not to evaluate corporate 
governance theory, Table 2.1 summarises major theories to contextualise the role of a 
director and the many complex theoretical perspectives to which it continues to shape. 
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Table 2.1: 
Summary of Major Theories Describing the Role of a Board 
Theory Underpinning beliefs Assumptions Shortcomings Examples of 
key 
references 
Agency Individuals act on 
economic self-interest 
and a board of 
directors (BOD) exists 
to solve the problem 
that exists between 
diffused shareholders 
unable to control the 
excesses or overreach 
of management 
Assumes 
managerial 
opportunism; 
chief executive 
officers (CEOs) 
will put self-
interest ahead of 
shareholder 
interest; 
individuals are 
motivated 
primarily by 
financial needs	
Focuses on 
control and 
monitoring; 
assumes 
behaviour is 
driven only by 
financial needs; 
de-emphasises 
collaboration 
over the 
development of 
strategy	
Fama 
(1980); 
Fama and 
Jensen 
(1983); 
Zahra and 
Pearce 
(1989) 
Stewardship Individuals are 
motivated by non-
financial needs, such 
as achievement and 
recognition, intrinsic 
satisfaction of 
successful 
performance, respect 
for authority or sense 
of duty, or 
identification with an 
organisation 
Assumes that the 
appointment of 
an executive 
director is 
favoured 
because the 
combination of 
executives’ 
personal 
commitment and 
knowledge of a 
business should 
lead to effective 
management 
with a board 
taking an active 
strategy role in a 
Ignores the effect 
of board 
dynamics such as 
the interplay of 
power, 
ideological 
conflict and the 
effects of board 
leadership 
Hillman and 
Dalziel 
(2003) 
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collaborative 
and mentoring 
capacity 
Resource 
dependence 
Directors provide a 
company with skills, 
credibility, legitimacy 
and access to business 
networks by sourcing 
knowledge and 
resources required for 
a company to achieve 
its goals by reducing 
uncertainty, enhancing 
the status of a firm and 
reducing transaction 
costs	
Assumes that 
boards have a 
broader role than 
provided by a 
legalistic 
perspective. That 
is, boards play a 
cross-boundary 
role by linking a 
corporation to its 
environment. 
Grounded in 
sociology and 
organisational 
theory 
Ignores the 
characteristics of 
the prevailing 
external 
environment that 
itself evolves; the 
stage of a 
company in its 
life cycle and 
whether a firm is 
a for-profit or a 
not-for-profit. 
The social 
network theory 
has supplemented 
this theory and 
shows how social 
networks 
facilitate 
cohesion and the 
exchange of 
information	
Gulati and 
Westphal 
(1999); 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik 
(1978) 
Resource-
based 
More internally 
focused than RDT by 
considering resources 
through directors’ 
networks and their 
competence	
Assumes that a 
firm derives a 
competitive 
advantage 
through the 
professional and 
personal 
qualifications of 
board members 
Ignores the fact 
that specialised 
knowledge and 
experience can be 
bought in the 
market 
Barney 
(1991) 
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Class or 
or institutional 
hegemony 
Board decisions about 
CEO selection and 
compensation will be 
influenced by the 
values of general and 
investor communities 
and, therefore, is 
underpinned by an 
ideology 
Assumes that 
differences in 
values of 
individuals or 
groups are 
fundamental to 
decision-
making, as are 
the institutional 
context and 
framework in 
which an 
organisation 
finds itself 
Does not address 
how a board can 
increase the 
wealth of 
shareholders and 
may ignore 
changing patterns 
of ownership 
Filatotchev, 
Jackson and 
Nakajima 
(2013); 
Judge and 
Zeithaml 
(1992); 
Mace (1971)	
Managerial 
hegemony 
Companies are 
dominated by 
management and 
power to manage a 
firm transfers from 
shareholders to 
management through 
the formal separation 
of ownership and 
control 
Assumes only 
managers have 
the intimate 
knowledge 
required to 
control a firm; 
boards do not 
always fulfil 
their legally 
mandated 
responsibilities; 
management has 
considerable 
influence (if not 
control) over 
director and 
CEO 
appointments	
Many examples 
of boards having 
a higher level of 
influence than 
dictated by their 
legal obligations, 
including high-
profile departures 
of 
underperforming 
CEOs. Higher 
concentrations of 
ownership and 
interlocking 
directorships 
challenge the 
view that 
directors and 
boards are 
without power	
Stiles and 
Taylor 
(2001)	
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Stakeholder 
perspective 
Represents the 
interests of the various 
members of a firm, 
including ‘employees, 
customers, suppliers, 
stockholders, banks, 
environmentalists, 
government’ (Hung 
1998, p. 106) 
Assumes that 
boards need to 
adopt a 
‘pluralistic 
approach’ in 
recognition of a 
complex 
network of 
interest groups	
Widely 
recognised as 
being impractical 
for company 
management	
Donaldson 
and Preston 
(1995); 
Sternberg 
(1997) 
It has been argued that corporate governance is a complex activity and no single theoretical 
perspective can fully explain or capture that complexity; hence, any explanation must adopt a 
multi-theoretical approach (Aguilera et al. 2008; Hung 1998). Others have argued that at 
various stages of a corporation’s life cycle, different perspectives may be more relevant to 
explain what is happening (Aguilera et al. 2008; Hendry & Kiel 2004; Nicholson & Newton 
2010; Petrovic 2008; Zahra & Pearce 1989). In this regard, Hung (1998) describes the links 
between major governance theories and the six roles boards play: linking, coordinating, 
control, strategic, maintenance and support. He argues against relying on any single board 
theory to explain governance functions, acknowledging that a board can have multiple roles 
and that each major theory simply explains the significance of one aspect (Hung 1998). 
There is agreement in the literature that by fulfilling Hung’s (1998) six roles, a board of 
directors faces three interrelated tasks (Demb & Neubauer 1992; Ruigrok, Peck & Keller 
2006). First, a board is involved in setting the strategic context by providing overall direction 
on corporate strategy, mission or vision and overseeing the strategic development of a 
company, including approving strategic proposals. This is often characterised in literature as 
an ‘advisory role’. Second, a board manages succession for a CEO role, both hiring and firing 
a CEO, evaluating performance and providing wise counsel to a CEO and executive directors 
based on their experience and expertise; this is characterised as a board’s ‘service role’. 
Third, a board controls, supervises or monitors progress towards its objectives, including 
overseeing financial and other forms of risk. This role, which is focused on the protection of 
shareholder interests, is often characterised as ‘the control role’. However, there is a fourth 
role in which a board links a company to its external environment and performs ceremonial 
functions to enhance a company’s legitimacy (Pearce & Zahra 1992; Peck & Keller 2006; 
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Ruigrok, Stiles & Taylor 2001). This is sometimes characterised as a director’s ‘resource 
provision role’ and is explained by RDT. 
Adding a deeper understanding of the inherent challenges associated with these board roles 
and tasks, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) proposed a model that elaborated the potential 
tension between a board’s simultaneous need to control and collaborate. They identified 
reinforcing cycles that potentially precipitate ‘strategic persistence’ as a tendency to persist 
with ineffective strategies and subsequent organisational decline (Westphal & Bednar 2005). 
More recently, inductive research by Pick (2007) observed the board meetings of five United 
States’ (US) public companies and conducted interviews with their directors. In her multi-
method study, which included observation and interviews, Pick’s (2007) observations of 
board meetings allowed her to ask more nuanced questions when interviewing directors. She 
identified role and status tensions and concluded that the behavioural aspects of board 
governance should not be ignored because the consequences can affect a board’s oversight 
and the quality of its advisory role (Pick 2007). Evidence was also found of the critical 
balancing role that chairpersons play in managing these tensions by being prepared to 
challenge peer directors while retaining cohesive group management. 
The relatively recent focus in the last decade on institutionally contextualised research, and 
the process research it generated, is a welcome shift from the previously narrow focus of 
input–output, which mainly concerns the composition and demography of board members 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003; Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima 2013; Finkelstein & 
Mooney 2003). Increasingly, researchers have concluded that corporate governance is 
concerned with more than formal structures and should include informal processes that exist 
in oversight roles and responsibilities in a corporate context (Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 
2015). Corporate governance does not occur in a social vacuum (Westphal & Zajac 2013). 
Process researchers such as Pettigrew (1992, 2001), Pye (2002), Pye and Pettigrew (2005), 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) and Samra-Fredericks (2003), among others, adopt a more 
‘social actor’-driven and context-rich explanation of board function to suggest that boards are 
only as effective as the relationships its members have with each other. They argue board 
work is often characterised by uncertainty, incomplete information and interdependency and, 
hence, trust is key (Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Pye & Pettigrew 2005). Both the control and 
service components of a board’s accountability require extensive communication and 
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deliberation, and members must learn to trust each other’s judgement and expertise (Brundin 
& Nordqvist 2008; Forbes & Milliken 1999; Huse et al. 2011; Huse & Zattoni 2008). 
The two research traditions previously applied to board studies—that is, economic and 
institutional traditions—have different theoretical assumptions (Petrovic 2008; Westphal & 
Zajac 1997). An economic tradition suggests that the role of a board is driven by compliance 
with corporate law and regulation, and the rights of the shareholders and owners of capital 
(Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 2015; Nicholson & Kiel 2004; 
Petrovic 2008). An institutional tradition, within which this current study is positioned, 
suggests that the role of a board is largely shaped by the behaviour of individual board 
directors (Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 2015; Huse 2005; Petrovic 2008; Roberts, McNulty & 
Stiles 2005). More recently, researchers have questioned whether such a complex area of 
human agency can be adequately investigated by relying on these narrow perspectives 
(Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Nicholson & Newton 2010; Petrovic 2008). They suggest there is 
a middle ground and their model seeks to bridge the gap between undersocialised agency 
theory and the oversocialised institutionally contextualised approaches. 
Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson (2010) have argued that the actual practice of corporate 
governance can deviate from prescribed principles enshrined in governance codes for various 
reasons. This is because directors develop a history of successful interactions, which, in turn, 
influences the expectations, conduct and routines (heuristics) associated with their board 
activities (Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Hendry, Kiel & Nicholson 2010). Therefore, the study 
of instruments of board governance such as board meetings, strategy days, closed-door 
sessions, board field visits and extraordinary meetings commonly found in most modern 
boards vary widely in the different institutional settings in which they are applied. 
Consequently, director interactions and practices associated with the routine use of such 
instruments of governance are best studied in those institutional contexts. 
Pye (2002) and others (Huse et al. 2011; Westphal & Zajac 2013) also identified a key 
tension in corporate directorships as the relationship between an individual and a collective. 
By law, directors are held to be individually accountable, but their actions at board level are 
clearly part of a collective and, as is well known in the field of social psychology relating to 
the study of group behaviour, people acting together may do things they would never do 
alone (Fritsche et al. 2013). Pye (2002) argues that directing is a relational concept in which 
agency occurs through relationships with others and this process is dynamic rather than 
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additive. Thus, rather than adding the individual ability of each director on a board to 
calculate the total capability of that group, Pye (2002) argues that a board may be greater 
(and sometimes less) than the sum of its parts. She suggests that research should focus on 
teasing out the relationship between an individual and a collective action and how this may 
be evaluated (Pye 2002). However, there is a lack of consensus on methodological issues 
concerning the analysis of board and individual member effects (Petrovic 2008). The 
methodology in this current study recognises these issues and uses a director as a unit of 
analysis. This methodology is discussed in Chapter 3. 
While this review and thesis are primarily focused on the internal context of a board’s and a 
director’s contributions, the external context of a corporation must also be acknowledged. 
This includes the network of stakeholder relationships and expectations, governance codes 
and regulatory frameworks (including differences in national governance jurisdictions), 
financial conditions and crises, and evolving societal norms (Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 
2015; Huse et al. 2011). Other researchers acknowledge that the life cycle of a company, 
transformation within the sector, competitive forces, disruptive technologies and systemic 
sector risk each complicates the research task and that any research design must 
accommodate these factors (Huse et al. 2011; Minichilli et al. 2012; Pettigrew 2001; Seidl & 
Whittington 2014). 
2.2 Board and NED Contribution to Strategic Decision-making 
While the literature has acknowledged the importance and need for adequate board 
control and independence (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Jensen & Zajac 2004), 
both the contributions of boards to strategy and the desirability of such practice 
have remained topics of discussion (Golden & Zajac 2001; Daily et al. 2003). In 
light of a multitude of theoretical lenses and empirical findings in the management 
literature, Zahra and Pearce’s [1989, p. 328] observation that ‘there is controversy 
over the nature of directors’ strategic role’ … still seems to be topical after 20 years 
of research. (Pugliese et al. 2009, p. 293) 
In this section, research relating to a NED’s involvement in a strategic decision-making 
process is reviewed by examining the role of a NED as a board-group member. Specifically, 
it concerns an understanding of how the NED role is currently conceived and perceived 
within academia and practice. The exclusive focus on the NED role is driven by the context 
of Australian public companies in which NED majority in board composition is the norm. It 
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is general practice in Australia that only a CEO and a chief financial officer (CFO) hold 
executive board responsibilities. 
This review adopts the Johnson and Scholes (2002) definition of a strategic decision, that is, a 
strategic decision is one that could potentially and profoundly change the direction and scope 
of a company in the long term. In relation to an advisory role (which is the focus of this 
study), directors may be called upon to provide advice on a range of strategic decisions such 
as diversification, internationalisation, innovation and strategic change (Pugliese et al. 2009; 
Ravasi & Zattoni 2006). 
In relation to the role a board has on firm strategy, a shift has occurred over the last three 
decades. In their extensive literature review of board contribution to strategy since 1972, 
Pugliese et al. (2009) identified a shift in the study of a board’s role from an agency paradigm 
to embrace pluralism. Increasingly, as advocated by Carpenter and Westphal (2001), Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) and Hillman, Nicholson and Shropshire (2008), boards are being studied 
not just as a control mechanism on behalf of shareholders but conceived in terms of how the 
capacity and capability of individual directors and a board develop and refine strategic 
decisions. Particularly, the emergence of RDT and other theories of the board role have 
helped advance understandings of how and why boards of directors engage in strategy (Judge 
& Talaulicar 2017). 
In the last decade, calls for a greater focus on the role of boards in shaping strategic proposals 
(in addition to monitoring responsibilities) has gathered pace and volume, particularly in the 
US and the United Kingdom (UK). This is a consequence of several contributing factors 
including several high-profile corporate failures which that precipitated increased regulation 
(e.g., the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 following the collapse of Enron (Ahrens, 
Filatotchev & Thomsen 2011; McNulty, Florackis & Omrod 2013)). The rise of private 
equity and takeovers, the growing influence of institutional investors and the rise of a 
shareholder activism movement have also been significant factors. Additionally, calls for 
boards to play a greater role in strategy have extended beyond the UK and US to the rest of 
the world, including Australia (Kemp 2006). 
Lapses in corporate governance in the UK precipitated the Higgs (2013) review, an 
independent review of the role and effectiveness of NEDs, which included an extensive 
qualitative study of the behavioural dynamics of boards (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). In 
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the first inductive study of its kind in which 40 NEDs were interviewed in the UK, Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) argued that, at best, board structure and composition conditions 
rather than determines board effectiveness. Instead, they suggested that the behavioural 
dynamics of a board, together with group and interpersonal relationships between NEDs and 
executive team members, has a more far-reaching effect on a board’s ability to perform its 
tasks effectively. 
Australia has also experienced corporate governance issues, as evidenced by high-profile 
corporate failures such as HIH Insurance, One.Tel, Pyramid, Storm Financial, Allco 
Financial Group and Opes Prime. There has been no Higgs-type corporate behavioural 
studies in Australia other than the 1991 Bosch report Corporate Practices and Conduct. There 
have been no corporate governance reviews in Australia, apart from publications such as the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s (2014) Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
While there is recognition that not all corporate failures can be attributed to lack of board 
oversight of strategic decisions, there are growing calls from the academic and the wider 
business communities for studies into NED involvement in strategic decision-making 
processes (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Pugliese et al. 2009; Zattoni & Van Ees 2012). 
These studies are motivated by a desire to ensure a richer understanding of the strategic 
governance function of boards and, therefore, redress a historical focus on a board’s 
monitoring function. 
A board’s role in shaping strategy has also attracted the attention of directors who are keen to 
optimise their personal contributions in an increasingly complex environment (McNulty et al. 
2011; Pick 2007). The McKinsey (2013) Global Survey covering both public and private 
company boards shows that in the two years following their 2011 survey, boards were 
spending comparatively more time on strategy. Moreover, the survey also reported that while 
only a fifth of those surveyed in 2011 demonstrated a complete understanding of company 
strategy, this increased to a third in 2013. The survey also reported that high-impact boards—
defined as those effective in exercising their key roles: control, advisory and service—tended 
to engage more frequently in strategic behaviours such as assessing value-drivers, portfolio 
synergies and evaluating strategic alternatives (McKinsey 2013). 
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While there is general agreement in corporate governance academic literature that boards 
should contribute to corporate strategy (Brauer & Schmidt 2008; Daily, Dalton & Cannella 
2003; Rindova 1999; Zahra & Pearce 1989), how boards should fulfil this role remains 
unclear (Hendry, Kiel & Nicholson 2010; Nicholson & Newton 2010; Pye & Pettigrew 
2005). Brauer and Schmidt (2008) offer three reasons for this lack of consensus. First, there 
is no clear definition of a board role that varies across numerous studies. Second, corporate 
governance research has largely relied on a single theoretical perspective (i.e., agency 
theory), even though, as noted, the complex phenomenon of public corporation governance 
cannot be captured by a single theory (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003; Roberts, McNulty & 
Stiles 2005). Third, scholars’ limited access to board strategic decision-making processes has 
resulted in an over-reliance on proxies rather than direct measurement. 
To meet their responsibilities in the oversight of strategy and optimise outcomes, NEDs are 
required to collaboratively contribute to strategic proposals brought to a board by 
management (McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). During the 
complex process of a board decision, as in the case of an internationalisation strategy (which 
occurs over several months), many micro-decisions are made that synthesise progressive 
NED contributions. This involves the gathering of information, analysis and clarification 
until a workable consensus is achieved (McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; Roberts, McNulty & 
Stiles 2005). McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) concluded that these shaping behaviours of a 
decision-making process included testing ideas, questioning assumptions, evaluating 
(strategic) logic, raising concerns, weighing risks and offering encouragement. Each line of 
questioning posed by NEDs in this process effectively shapes a strategic outcome. Therefore, 
the process of shaping a strategic proposal and providing the required oversight is largely 
determined by NED behaviour and, hence, is the focus of this study. Particularly, the aim is 
to explore and explicate the enablers and inhibitors of strategy-shaping behaviours. In this 
regard, it is significant that Kemps’s (2006) empirical study based on interviews with 20 
Australian NEDs using the McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) framework (shown in Table 2.2) 
found evidence of variations in strategy-shaping behaviour. 
		
21 
Table 2.2: 
The Strategy Involvement of a NED: Behavioural Variation in How Boards Apply 
Themselves to Their Strategic Role 
	 Taking strategic 
decisions (minimalist) 
Shaping strategic 
decisions 
Shaping the content, 
context and conduct of 
strategy (maximalist) 
Definition Influence is exerted 
inside a boardroom at 
the end of a capital-
investment decision 
process 
Influence occurs early 
in a decision process as 
part-time board 
members shape the 
preparation of capital 
investment proposals 
by executives 
Influence is 
continuous, not 
confined to decision 
episodes 
Board behaviour Inside a boardroom, 
boards take decisions 
to either accept, reject 
or refer capital 
investment proposals 
Consultation with 
board members by an 
executive (either 
formally or informally) 
while a capital 
investment proposal is 
being prepared enables 
board members to test 
ideas, raise issues, 
question assumptions, 
advise caution and 
offer encouragement. 
Executives ‘sieve’ 
capital investment 
proposals in 
anticipation of a need 
for board approval 
A board develops the 
context for strategic 
debate, establishes a 
methodology for 
strategy development, 
monitors strategy 
content and alters the 
conduct of an 
executive in relation to 
strategy 
Strategic involvement All boards take 
strategic decisions 
Some boards shape 
strategic decisions 
A minority of boards 
shape the content, 
context and conduct of 
strategy 
Source: McNulty and Pettigrew (1999 p. 55) 
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However, in studying the factors that influence the level of involvement in strategy, Kemp 
(2006) discovered little evidence that external factors such as stakeholder expectations, 
public pressure, preserving a company, board and individual reputations, corporate 
governance policy, company history and performance, informal ties with other board 
members and established board processes influence director-level behaviour. Other 
researchers also suggest that board members’ obligations and motivations were better 
indicators of whether they personally pursued a deeper involvement in strategy (Judge & 
Talaulicar 2017). 
Researchers have argued that the minimalist (passive) and maximalist (active) mode of board 
involvement in strategy (as depicted in Table 2.2) is an oversimplification, in that in any 
given decision, both modes can coexist; further, identification, development and selection of 
strategic options rarely follows a sequential pattern (Hendry, Kiel & Nicholson 2010; 
Nicholson & Newton 2010). 
Other typologies have also emerged (Bailey & Peck 2013; Nadler 2004). Nadler (2004) 
described five types of boards: the passive board, the certifying (or rubber-stamping board), 
the engaged board, the intervening board and the operating board. He suggested that real-
world boards slide back and forth across the scale and their levels of engagement change 
according to issues and circumstances. Bailey and Peck (2013) proposed a different board 
decision-making typology: engaged, adaptive and contested. However, while such typologies 
or archetypes and characterisations usefully describe a board’s ‘frame of mind’ associated 
with their strategic role, they do not explicate how the ‘shaping of strategy’ is performed or 
the ‘inner context’ factors that might moderate shaping behaviour. That is, the actual 
behaviour of an individual board director when enacting their strategy-shaping 
accountabilities remains relatively under-researched. 
In summary, the strategic influence of a board in shaping strategy has increasingly become 
the focus of board studies. Despite this increased attention and acknowledgment that 
corporate governance does not occur in a social vacuum, few studies have described strategy-
shaping behaviours or explored how social context affects these behaviours. Section 2.3 
describes relational and social dimensions associated with the processes of accountability, 
extending this notion beyond formal structures. 
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2.3 Accountability as a Relational Process 
Corporate governance is the process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights 
and wishes of stakeholders (Demb & Neubauer 1992) and accountability is the process by 
which this is achieved. As noted, in corporate governance research, board accountability is 
often described in structural and hierarchical terms, as influenced by agency-prescribed 
definitions of shareholder rights and claims. Other reserchers have studied the directors role 
beyond shareholder rights and claims, suggesting they play a complex role in mediating in 
the needs of all its constituents (not just shareholders) in calculating what is the best for the 
firm as an ongoing concern (Blair & Stout 2001). This section describes research that 
considers informal processes of accountability and takes a social reality approach to 
understanding the process of accountability as one that is accomplished through expectations, 
norms and relationships; further, it has a self-regulating nature. 
The term ‘accountability’ implies the anticipation of an ‘accounting’, that is, having to report 
or explain oneself in response to others’ explicit or implicit expectations. Therefore, 
accountability is contextual and relational and has an impact on a wide range of social 
judgments and choices (Lerner & Tetlock 1999). Despite this, there is little if any extant 
research on board level accountability as a socially accomplished activity shaped by 
individual expectations, routines and norms (Huse 2005; Huse et al. 2011; McNulty, Zattoni 
& Douglas  2013; Nicholson & Newton 2010; Petrovic 2008; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 
2005; Van Ees, Gabrielsson & Huse 2009; Westphal & Zajac 2013). 
Over the last decade, the focus has progressively moved away from a simple analytical utility 
approach towards accountability, thus, acknowledging that accountability between the actors 
in a social system (such as a board or top team) is socially accomplished (Huse 2005; Roberts 
2001; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). Researchers such as Huse (2011) and McNulty 
Zattoni & Douglas (2013) continue to call for multiple theoretical perspectives when 
studying boards as complex social systems. 
Researchers also distinguish between formal and informal processes of accountability (Frink 
& Klimoski 2004). Informal sources of accountability are shaped by the expectations and 
interpersonal relations between members of a group and the recognition of a ‘social reality’ 
with trust at its heart (Frink & Klimoski 2004; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso 2008; Roberts 
1991). Importantly, this second source of accountability, rooted in dependence and 
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relatedness, cannot be accounted for in traditional accounting or economic terms (Roberts 
2001). As such, the process of accountability and how it is achieved is complex and those 
held accountable (in this case, corporate governance actors such as NEDs) are immersed in a 
web of formal and informal types of accountability (Frink & Klimoski 2004; Lerner & 
Tetlock 1999). Interpersonal communication is key. In putting forward his dynamic social 
impact theory (a meta theory), Latane (1981, 1996a) supports the social constructionist view 
that a group’s culture is created by communication and suggests how individuals located in a 
social space influence each other to create higher order patterns and subcultures, which he 
describes as dynamic entities that feed on and evolve through communication. Group cultures 
and subcultures may appear to have an internal coherence but they are continually resisting 
categorisaion because ‘individuals [differ] in their ability to influence each other and in their 
spatial location, [affect] each other in a dynamic iterative process of reciprocal and recursive 
influence’ (Latane 1996a, p. 13). His theory is relevant in any study of the processes of 
creating accountabilty because it explains how the diffusion of accountability, described as 
the bystander effect or social loafing, can occur (Latane 1981). 
Although the distinction made between ‘outcome accountability’ and ‘process accountability’ 
has long been posited (Lerner & Tetlock 1999, p. 258) the notion of ‘creating accountability’ 
in a boardroom (in a process context) was first flagged by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005) as part of a major study undertaken at the request of the UK government’s Higgs 
(2003) review. Significantly, this study laments the dominance of agency theory in board 
research. The study comprised 40 in-depth NED interviews combined with an established 
Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute qualitative survey of 350 Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) directors taken from a sample of 605 Chairs, NEDs and executive directors 
of UK companies. The study (Roberts et al. 2005) concludes that ‘creating accountability’ is 
about bridging the gap between board role expectations and actual board task performance. 
Board accountability was, until then, often discussed in terms of expectations—that is, what 
should be done, by whom and how (Huse 2005; Nicholson & Newton 2010). In their 
inductive study, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) demonstrated that the internal context is 
critical to understanding the process of accountability by studying actual interactions, 
behaviours, routines and norms—that is, how accountability is practised. Other process 
studies have also contributed to an increasing body of research that focuses on how 
accountability is enacted behaviourally (Huse 2005; Huse & Rindova 2001; Huse & Zattoni 
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2008; Pettigrew 1992, 2001; Pye 2002; Westphal 1999; Westphal & Bednar 2005; Westphal 
& Khanna 2003). 
The literature also suggests that since strategic decisions are cognitively complex, uncertain 
and laden with ambiguity, strategic proposals are generally debatable, and, hence, different 
views are inevitable. This contestable decision setting potentially leaves space for the 
exercise of power with different power-holders pursuing preferred strategic choices 
(Finkelstein 1992; Stiles 2001). Therefore, a NED’s self-construal and conception of place in 
a group and their predisposition to seek power and influence the creation of alternatives to 
preferred strategies can be critical antecedents in understanding how NED accountability is 
practised (McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; Roberts 2001; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). 
Consistent with the view that boards have a monitoring and advisory role, there is an implicit 
assumption of the coexistence of trust and control (Huse et al. 2011; Sundaramurthy & Lewis 
2003; Westphal 1999), which promotes a collaborative model of the board; that is, boards can 
provide advice and counsel while simultaneously engaging in control. This more nuanced 
view recognises that a board is a highly complex social system comprising interactions 
between members in which trust is experienced, learned and reinforced. This social reality 
approach to accountability was explored inductively in a Pettigrew and McNulty (1998) 
study that examined the link between power and accountability in a boardroom. They suggest 
that NED power is limited in three ways: by position (the non-executive nature of the role), 
by expertise (limited direct access to specialist skills) and by information (NEDs always work 
with less information than executive management) (Pettigrew & McNulty 1998). Given their 
limited power, exercising accountability on behalf of shareholders they represent is achieved 
through relationship power and is exercised by skilful personal influence, either individually 
or collectively. More recently, researchers argue that a more socially informed actor-centric 
approach may explicate the political skills required to deal with high levels of ingratiation, 
flattery, opinion conformity and impression management, typically directed by others to 
managerial elites (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
This literature review also found evidence that accountability is a learning process in which 
actors in a social system (in this case, directors) continually reassess their value and place in a 
group and adapt their behaviour through double-loop learning (Argyris 1986). That is, despite 
individual identities having an appearance of stability, they are dynamic, recursively and 
reflexively authored, and ‘in-progress’ (Brown & Lewis 2011; Hillman, Nicholson & 
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Shropshire 2008). This is because board interaction routines act as a standard against which 
an individual continually assesses how they are performing. In previous discursive studies of 
professionals (such as the inductive study of the routines of lawyer behaviour), researchers 
found an ongoing narratisation of work selves (Brown & Lewis 2011). 
In summary, the research into small-group accountability reviewed in this section suggests 
that it is a socially accomplished process achieved through expectations, norms and 
interactions between members. However, how social factors influence accountability in 
decision-making practices remains relatively unexplored and, therefore, represents the 
problem this study seeks to explicate. Section 2.4 explores some of the relevant social factors 
in the literature that explain the social reality of a small group, such as a board. 
2.4 The Role of Social Identity and Power in the Functioning of Small 
Groups 
The nature of strategic decisions at a board level was discussed in Section 2.2 in which it was 
discovered to be cognitively complex by nature, uncertain and laden with ambiguity. Further, 
Section 2.3 argued that strategic proposals are debatable and differences of views are 
inevitable. As noted, this contestable decision setting potentially leaves space for the exercise 
of power with different power-holders pursuing preferred strategic choices (Finkelstein 1992; 
Stiles 2001). Therefore, a NED’s self-construal and conception of place in a group and their 
predisposition to seek power and influence alternatives to preferred strategies are all critical 
antecedents in understanding NED accountability. 
This section reviews research in social psychology and organisational theory concerning 
social systems. It shows that ‘socialising’ effects remain relatively unexplored in a board 
context. Moreover, current studies do not explain how power and identity might cause one 
board culture to differ from another, despite the fact that the boards in question have identical 
structures and similar composition. First, this section considers social identity, particularly 
the processes by which an individual identifies with a group (group identification) and 
categorises themselves, relative to group members (self-categorisation). Second, it focuses on 
the experience of power (particularly its sources), acquisition, maintenance and loss. Third, it 
considers how social identity and power interact and their potential ‘socialising’ effects on 
the functioning of small groups such as boards. 
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2.4.1 Review of Prior Research on Social Identity 
Despite its genesis in the 1970s, the application of social identity theory is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in board studies (Brown 2001). Relevant to this current study, the focus is on 
how group identification can influence a director’s thoughts and actions. 
This review explores literature concerning the positive and negative effects of group 
identification. As a director-level study, it is important to consider how group membership 
can both strengthen and diminish an individual’s agency and contribution. This review 
acknowledges that while we may rely on others in a group and agree with another’s point of 
view (not simply to gain approval or flatter them), we may rely on group members because 
we believe they can provide us with relevant information about the world, especially in 
conditions of uncertainty. 
There are two seminal theories of group identification and self-categorisation: social identity 
theory (SIT) and self-categorisation theory (SCT). Both show how a group fundamentally 
changes and transforms an individual’s psychology and behaviour (Turner 1982; Turner & 
Reynolds 2012). Turner’s (1987) seminal research on social identity (Tajfel & Turner 1979) 
and self-categorisation argues that social identity is what actually allows intergroup 
behaviour to occur. Hence, it is in situations in which people can conceive of themselves and 
others (that is, as ‘us’) that they are able to act as ‘us’ (Brewer 1991, p. 476). The unique 
contribution of SIT and SCT are that they are concerned with analysing a group in an 
individual rather than focusing on an individual in a group. These theories, considered in the 
context of a NED, are considered in the following sections. 
2.4.1.1 Social Identity Theory 
Social identity involves an extension of self beyond the level of an individual and is not an 
aspect of individual self-concept (Brewer 1991). Social identities are categorisations of the 
self into more inclusive social units that depersonalise the self-concept—in which ‘I’ 
becomes ‘we’ (Brewer 1991). Therefore, as this study concerns the role of a NED within a 
functioning group, social identity rather than personal identity is the focus of this section. 
SIT concerns how individuals view social categories to which they belong and, therefore, 
define ‘who I am’ (Hogg & Turner 1985; Oakes, Turner & Haslam 1991; Onorato & Turner 
2004; Turner 1975, 1985). While SIT emphasises the multifaceted and dynamic self in the 
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context of social structures, social categories are stories we construct about ourselves and 
how we fit the social reality in which we find ourselves. SIT literature is strongly linked to 
sensemaking theory (Brown 2001). Sensemaking is a three-stage process of enactment in 
which actors capture fragments of experience, link them cognitively to make a plausible story 
and reuse this story to make sense of situations in the future (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 
2005). That is, confronted with a network of relationships into which they must fit (such as a 
board group), a director will build a story about their place in a board, which then influences 
how they approach their responsibilities and interact with other group members (Hillman, 
Nicholson & Shropshire 2008). Thus, an individual’s self-definition in the social context they 
find themselves is critical to any study of group behaviour. 
SIT suggests that a special category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation or sports team) can 
provide a definition of who one is in terms of the defining characteristics of a category—a 
self-definition that becomes part of the self-concept. Each of these memberships is 
represented in an individual member’s mind as a social identity that both describes and 
prescribes their attributes as a member of that group—that is, what one should think and feel 
and how one should behave. This concept of social identity may apply to directors’ minds, in 
which their identification with a board group to which they belong describes and prescribes 
how they should think, feel and behave. Social impact theory also suggests that once part of a 
group, the ability for members to practice detachment and distance themselves from it is 
challenging (Latane 1981, 1996a). 
SIT is especially relevant to this study because it explains intergroup behaviour—that is, how 
particular features of a subjectively perceived social structure could lead people to define 
themselves in terms of a shared social identity and, therefore, produce distinctive forms of 
group behaviour. Membership of a social group may be voluntary or imposed; however, 
social identities are chosen (Brewer 1991). Thus, what occurs is not simply a social, 
structural and ideological reality but is internalised by an individual group member to 
influence thought and action. Although SIT was groundbreaking—in that it presented an 
alternative to models that perceive groups merely as aggregations of interpersonally attracted 
individuals (Turner 1982; Turner & Reynolds 2012)—it has limitations. It does adequately 
consider interaction, that is, how a director’s self-concept of their place in a board group 
might influence their thinking and actions and produce distinctive and unique patterns of 
behaviour. This is where SCT is relevant. 
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2.4.1.2 Social Categorisation Theory 
SCT attempts to describe the psychological processes that underpin the behaviour of social 
identity (Haslam, Reicher & Reynolds 2012; Hogg & Turner 1985; Hogg & Williams 2000; 
Onorato & Turner 2004). It posits that the self is not a stable identity but is fluid and context-
dependent rather than a manifestation of enduring personality traits or a self-concept. Instead, 
the self continually interacts with contextual factors. This theory suggests that the self-
categorisation process—an internalisation process developed by individuals to understand 
and explain their social experiences—is the cognitive basis of group behaviour. Therefore, it 
often features in people’s spontaneous self-descriptions (Onorato & Turner 2004). The 
process of categorisation leads to a process of differentiation—that is, accentuating perceived 
similarities and differences between features or characteristics (e.g., beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours) belonging to various categories (Hogg, Terry & White 1995). This is a critical 
theory for the study of board-member behaviour in that it may explain how in-groups—that 
is, a social group that a person identifies with as being a member—and out-groups; (the 
opposite) may affect the decision-making behaviour of an individual or subset of directors. 
Particularly, the ways in which the views of an in-group on a board may dominate the 
strategic shaping process and, consequently, the contributions of an out-group are 
marginalised or silenced. Therefore, group membership assists people to define themselves 
and provides, by association, social acceptance, influence and control. 
After being categorised in terms of group membership and defining themselves in terms of 
that social categorisation, individuals seek to achieve or maintain positive self-esteem by 
positively differentiating their in-group from a comparable out-group concerning some 
valued dimension. As Reicher et al. (2012) explain, this quest for positive differentiation 
means that when a person’s sense of who they are is defined in terms of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’, 
they want to see ‘us’ as different from, and better than, ‘them’. 
By emphasising the desire for a positive evaluation of the self, SIT also lays the ground for 
in-group identification and bias in that the ‘like me’ or ‘unlike me’ categorisations affect an 
individual’s decision-making process (Fritsche et al. 2013). Whether one takes another 
member’s view into consideration depends on whether it derives from an in-group member 
‘like me’; that is, the consensus among people ‘like me’ guides the behaviour of social 
groups (Haslam et al. 1998; Reynolds 2012; Turner 1987, 2005). SCT researchers suggest 
that in-group identification determines the receptiveness to influence by majorities or 
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minorities. For example, when a target (the person at whom the influence attempt is directed) 
receives an influence attempt from an in-group minority, they are more likely to become 
pressured to conform with the views of that in-group. Conversely, Haslam et al. (1998) and 
Turner (2005) also suggest that when an out-group minority attempts to send an influence 
attempt, the pressure to change opinions in the direction of an advocated position is minimal. 
Hence, in-group identification suggests that the ‘people like me’ construct has a pervasive 
effect on how influence attempts are responded to in a group setting such as a board. 
Moreover, influence is dependent on whether a message source is a majority or minority. 
For example, in a board setting, a majority may comprise NEDs who possess industry sector 
experience or those who have previously held CEO roles, while a minority may be NEDs 
who are female or those with direct acquisition experience. Therefore, it is possible that on 
every board, self-categorisation by an individual director will create groupings along the lines 
of ‘people like me’ and ‘people not like me’ and, consequently, affect a director’s influencing 
behaviour and the success of their influence attempts. Further, self-categorisation effects will 
depend on whether a director perceives themselves to be part of an in-group or out-group and 
are further complicated by the fact that disagreement with a group can produce uncertainty—
a sense of subjective invalidity, such as ‘have I misunderstood this’ or ‘am I wrong’. Haslam 
et al. (1998) suggest this process of validation may result in revisions of identity and 
understandings of reality. 
The dynamic nature of self-definition has recently attracted the interest of several academics 
(Reynolds & Subasic 2016; Xiao et al. 2016) who take a perceiver-centred approach to the 
social categorisation process. This approach suggests that a perceiver’s needs, motivations 
and expectations are fundamental to their perception of categories; hence, even if perceivers 
belong to a single in-group or out-group, they can have different perceptual experiences of 
the same stimuli. Xiao et al. (2016) explored social identity processes that concern variability 
in people’s self-definition from an individual to a group and the effect of in-group self-
identity on perception. They outlined a model that depicted perception as central to 
understanding the relationship between social identity and intergroup relations because 
people have the capacity to vary their self-definition depending on their environmental 
contexts (Xiao et al. 2016). 
Reynolds and Subasic’s (2016) enhancement of the model posits that self-definition can vary 
both horizontally (so that different social identities become salient across social contexts) and 
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vertically or hierarchically (so that higher level identities emerge and redefine lower level 
intergroup relations). In a board context, this might mean that a director who is an accounting 
professional and holds a board committee role may identify (horizontally) with board peers 
who have accounting backgrounds and simultaneously identify (vertically) more closely with 
board peers who are members of a committee. Hence, people have the capacity to vary their 
self-definition depending on which self-categorisation becomes more salient or contextually 
meaningful. Reynolds and Subasic’s (2016) work implies that directors can hold 
memberships across several (vertical and horizontal) categories, and revisions of identity may 
occur during a decision-making process depending on the identity they perceive to be more 
meaningful at that time. 
In summary, this review of social identity literature applied to a board context suggests it can 
be extended in two ways. First, board and director identities may not be as stable as board 
literature suggests because of internal and external context triggers for adaptation. While 
having some appearance of stability, social identity effects in board groups may, in fact, be 
dynamic and subject to adaptation during a decision-making process. Further research is 
required to understand in-depth when and how adaptation as social learning takes place and 
the role that strong social identity plays in learning among board peers—particularly, how 
social learning plays a role in shaping influence attempts. The traditional director role (in 
which NEDs are perceived as sources of expertise and experience) may need to be challenged 
and make way for a concept of NED role that is more open, emergent and adaptive. This 
reframing may become increasingly relevant as business environments continue to become 
more unpredictable and, consequently, directors are required to be more comfortable with 
ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Second, recent research reveals that social identity effects are problematised by the ambiguity 
that continues to surround board roles (Simoes, Kakabadse & Ramos 2013). This variation is 
consistent with extant research advancing the minimalist versus maximalist model examined 
in Section 2.2—that is, how each board variously applies itself to a governance role 
(McNulty & Pettigrew 1999). Role ambiguity is also further complicated by a gap between a 
regulator or legislator prescribed role and the actual roles that directors play in discharging 
their responsibilities (Cadbury 2002; Pick 2007; Simoes, Kakabadse & Ramos 2013). 
Therefore, any exploration of the effect of director identity on strategy shaping must be 
integrated with the role and accountabilities of board directors. Different interpretations of 
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the role of a NED within a given board group may give rise to role and task tensions, in that 
‘role tension’ refers to the tensions a role holder experiences in enacting their role and ‘task 
tensions’ refers to the tensions a role holder experiences when accomplishing tasks. For 
example, while all NEDs may agree that their role is to ensure the creation of shareholder 
value, they may have different views about how this is achieved through management (Pick 
2007). Further, these differences may weaken shared identity in a board group by implicit 
threats to shared values and beliefs. 
Overall, social identity is a relational construct that can transform group members from 
separate individuals into a cohesive ‘we’. Both SIT and SCT suggest that intergroup relations 
and social identity are intertwined to generate a complex social dynamic. It transcends and 
redefines the boundaries of otherness and creates cohesiveness and solidarity (Reicher & 
Haslam 2010; Reynolds & Subasic 2016; Subasic, Reynolds & Turner 2008). This is critical 
to acting on our shared beliefs, as decision-makers may experience in the process of arriving 
at a decision as a group, since we know we can rely on others to make sense of the world and 
when needed to back us up. 
Both SIT and SCT suggest that intergroup relations and social identity are intertwined to 
generate a complex social dynamic that transcends and redefines the interpersonal boundaries 
and creates cohesiveness and solidarity (Reicher & Haslam 2010; Reynolds & Subasic 2016; 
Subasic, Reynolds & Turner 2008). Hence, a board and director-level influences on identity 
are multifaceted and complex (Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008).  
Further, extant research does not fully explore these effects at a board level and how they are 
linked to power. The significance of power and its effects are addressed in the Section 2.4.2. 
2.4.2 Review of Prior Research on Power 
This review focuses on prior studies relating to the effects of power and power-holders in an 
organisational context and the relations between social identification and power. It draws 
from relevant research in psychology, sociology and organisational theory on the 
psychological effects and consequences of power for those with its possession (Fiske 1993; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003; Sachdev & Bourhis 1991). 
Power has been variously described as a capacity to modify the environment or the thinking 
and actions of others, both as an ability or source and as a property of social relations (Sturm 
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& Antonakis 2015). This review adopts the most widely used definition in the literature in 
which power is described as the asymmetric control over resources and outcomes (both social 
and material) desired by others (Bendahl 2007; Emerson 1962; Fiske 2010; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003; Magee & Galinsky 2008; Overbeck 2010; Overbeck & 
Droutman 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The term ‘asymmetric’ is relevant because power 
is relational; it exists by giving power to the controllers of resources over those who desire or 
need them but who have no control. Contemporary researchers are generally in agreement 
that influence as a process is an outcome power (Sturm & Antonakis 2015). Interpersonal 
power has also been defined in terms of its effects, by which it involves both powers over and 
freedom from influence, as well as the right to decide one’s own fate (Fehr, Herz & 
Wilkening 2013). 
Table 2.3 summarises the literature concerning the study of power in a social context. The 
various theoretical approaches reflect the complexity of power and its sources, uses and 
effects. Most studies are based on power manipulations in experimental conditions. 
Table 2.3: 
Typologies and Theories of Power in a Social Context 
Potential: 
Origins and 
sources of 
power 
Trait: 
Predisposition to 
seek or use 
power 
Use of power: 
Influence tactics 
of high-power 
individuals 
Experience of 
power: Effect on 
own cognition, 
affect and 
behaviour 
Effects and 
consequences on 
others (prosocial or 
antisocial) 
Power bases 
(Anderson & 
Brion 2014; 
Bass 1960; 
French & Raven 
1959; Rucker et 
al. 2012; Yukl 
& Falbe 1992) 
Origins of 
power in a top 
management 
team (TMT) and 
Predisposition to 
seek power 
(Sturm & 
Antonakis 2015) 
Responsibility 
disposition or 
social 
responsibility 
(Winter & 
Barenbaum 
1985) 
The proclivity to 
Social distance 
theory of power 
(Magee & Smith 
2013) 
Cognition-
simplified 
processing (less 
attention to 
detail) and less 
individuating—
that is, seeing a 
group rather 
than an 
individual in a 
group (Simons 
2002) 
Approach/inhibition 
theory of power 
(Keltner, Gruenfeld 
& Anderson 2003) 
Advice giving and 
receiving (Tost, 
Gino & Larrick 
2012) 
Perspective taking 
(Galinsky et al. 
2006) 
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board context 
(Finkelstein 
1992) 
take risks 
(Overbeck & 
Park 2006) 
The tendency to 
focus on upside 
rather than 
downside 
(Anderson & 
Galinsky 2006) 
More 
judgemental of 
others 
(Lammers, 
Stoker & Stapel 
2009) 
Power as part of 
motive 
(McClelland 
1975; 1985) 
Other 
orientation 
versus less self-
anchoring or 
dominance 
motivation as 
empathy 
(Anderson & 
Berdahl 2002) 
Attentive to 
social relations 
and concern for 
others (Blader & 
Chen 2012) 
Individual 
(motivational) 
style (Anderson 
& Brion 2013; 
Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld & 
Magee 2003) 
Coercion 
(Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld & 
Magee 2003) 
Feelings or 
affect 
The feelings 
accompanying 
power (Chen et 
al. 2001; Weick 
& Guinote 
2008) 
Optimism 
(Anderson & 
Galinsky 2006) 
Desire, 
enthusiasm and 
pride (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld & 
Anderson 2003) 
Power 
transference or 
power by 
association 
(Goldstein & 
Hays 2011) 
Less discomfort or 
fear to self-express, 
or overestimating 
the accuracy of own 
knowledge 
(Anderson & 
Berdahl 2002; 
Guinote 2007; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld 
& Anderson 2003) 
Institutional 
logic as a source 
of power 
(Prahalad & 
Bettis 1995) 
Weaker 
identification 
with groups or 
others (Seppala 
et al. 2012) 
Formation of 
alliances as in-
group or out-
group (Turner 
1985, 1987, 
Behavioural bias 
for action 
(Anderson & 
Berdahl 2002; 
Magee & 
Power loss (Brion 
& Anderson 2013) 
Trust and power 
(McKnight & 
Chervany 2001) 
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Competitive 
arousal 
(Malhotra, Ku & 
Murnighan 
2008) 
2005) Galinsky 2009) 
Source: Author. 
As a segue into a detailed discussion of the theories and typologies of power set out in Table 
2.3, a few general observations are required. First, power and status in a social context tend to 
be associated, but they are not the same (Magee & Galinsky 2008). A recent review of the 
literature by Anderson and Brion (2014) concludes that individuals with power are more 
respected and admired and, therefore, assume status in the eyes of others. This derived status 
can result in others wanting to associate with an individual because of loyalty, respect, 
admiration, friendship, affection or a desire to gain approval. Therefore, status is a form of 
social power. Importantly, this review demonstrated that those who are respected tend to be 
given control over valued resources (Anderson & Brion 2014). This may be relevant to a 
board context in which NEDs, who are perceived as having more power, will have a higher 
status in a group, be more respected and admired and, consequently, be given greater latitude 
to exercise influence over a group. 
Second, the literature review on power reveals three major trends. First is a shift in the 
research from simply defining typologies (that is, sources of power) as initiated by French 
and Raven (1959) to explanations of its use. Second is a shift away from the uses of power by 
power-holders to in-depth studies of its consequences on others, albeit, mostly conducted by 
experimental manipulations rather than real-life contexts—that is, rather than focusing on the 
structural and institutional aspects of power, a second shift in the research focused on the 
psychological and interpersonal aspects of power. Third denotes a shift from a study of 
individualised notions of power to the notion of social power by which the complex nature of 
group membership itself becomes a source of power. In this regard, the link between theories 
of social identity and power become critical to understanding the role that psychological 
identification with group members plays in the decision-making influences on individuals in 
organisations. 
Third, also relevant to this study is recent research on the relationships between social power 
and social action, particularly in the context of decision-making in which power is exercised 
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by individuals in a group and by the dynamics of a group itself (Magee & Galinsky 2008). 
The following subsections examining the extant literature on power, as summarised in Table 
2.3 and applied to the context of a board group, proceeds as follows: the sources of power 
and its acquisition, the maintenance and loss of power, the experience of power and how 
power might shape action. 
2.4.2.1 Sources of Power and its Acquisition 
The summary provided in Table 2.3 suggests that all previous typologies of power sources 
fall into two categories: structural and social. Structural power, also known as position power 
or legitimate power, refers to attained positions of formal authority within a hierarchy (Brass 
1984). Social power—also known as referent power, status power or charismatic power—
refers to occupying a power position in a social network that accords a particular (social) 
status to an individual (Burt 1992). 
Further, three critical factors apply to power acquisition. First, both sources of power 
(structural and social) emanate from a hierarchy (Magee & Galinsky 2008), which can 
develop formally or informally in a group (Blau & Scott 1962). However, no hierarchy exists 
in isolation, as all groups and organisations often have multiple value dimensions by which 
people can be ranked. This is where the study of power and social identity become 
indivisible, in that social categorisation (as group identification) facilitates comparisons by 
one’s perceived position across multiple hierarchies—for example, as a board and 
subcommittee member. The second factor is the role of expertise, knowledge and skill, 
which, arguably, may (in different circumstances) straddle both structural and social forms of 
power. This view is consistent with Rindova (1999) who characterises expert power in terms 
of cognition, which comprises requisite and external varieties. The requisite variety derives 
from experience, knowledge and reputation and the external variety derives from an expert’s 
connections and networks, which also provide power. For example, a NED’s expertise and 
professional associations concerning risk or audit may accord them a status that results in 
their position as the Chair of the risk and audit committee. Finally, the third factor is that the 
acquisition of power is independent of actual power, as actual power relies on its use 
(Pettigrew & McNulty 1995). 
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Concerning structural hierarchy, individuals are ranked by the number of resources they 
control and, in this case, resources include knowledge and expertise. Magee and Galinsky 
(2008) found that relatively few studies look beyond structural notions of hierarchy. 
However, self-categorisation, as a function of power as social identity, also plays a role in 
power acquisition. At a global level, it can refer to an individual’s perceived place in a 
hierarchy, thus, giving rise to hierarchical or position power (French & Raven 1959)—for 
example, shareholders at the top, NEDs acting as agents for shareholders and then managers. 
In a board context, hierarchical subcategories exist by means of role categories such as the 
board Chair and board committee Chair. NEDs can also self-categorise based on shared 
interests and goals and values that may drive consensus and influence. Finally, NEDs may 
self-categorise based on similarities and differences—that is, in the positions they take on 
strategic choices, which may drive conflict and potential coercion. Hence, power relations 
and their structural and social sources are complex and dynamic processes of alignment and 
realignment around subcategories, thus, suggesting that in-group and out-group 
categorisation and its effects may be a lot more complex in any given board than described in 
Section 2.4.1.2 concerning SCT. 
In this context, it is important to note that a social hierarchy is characterised by a rank 
ordering of individuals or groups according to the amount of respect accorded by others. 
Magee and Galinsky (2008) argue that social hierarchy can be an implicit or explicit rank 
order of individuals or groups with respect to a valued social dimension. They explain their 
use of the terms implicit and explicit to capture the range of awareness that people have of 
the hierarchies in which they are embedded. Hierarchies can be delineated by rules and 
consensually agreed upon or they can be subjectively understood and taken for granted. 
Magee and Galinsky (2008) use the phrase rank order to indicate that at least one individual 
or group must be subordinate to at least one other individual or group. They use the phrase 
‘valued social dimension’ because there must be some specification and understanding of the 
dimension along which people are rank ordered. Further, this dimension must have a 
subjective value to individuals or groups, as a higher rank possesses more of that valued 
dimension than a lower rank. Moreover, Magee and Galinsky (2008) suggest that an 
important implication of this definition of a social hierarchy is that there could be multiple 
value dimensions in play at any one time and that context will determine which dimension is 
most relevant for hierarchical differentiation at any given moment. This implies that power is 
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always asymmetric because it captures the relative state of dependence between two or more 
parties (individuals or groups). 
This discussion of literature on the sources of power is concluded by noting the large body of 
research concerning small groups, which demonstrates that informal hierarchical 
differentiation within groups tends to develop spontaneously and rapidly (e.g., Anderson et 
al. 2001; Bales et al. 1951; Eagly & Karau 1991; Hollander 1985; Schmid Mast 2002). 
Magee and Galinsky (2008) suggest that one reason for this incipient hierarchical 
differentiation is temporal because individuals form inferences and make judgements of 
others’ competence and power based on a few seconds of observation. Therefore, differences 
in task participation, which emerge within minutes of interaction, can produce hierarchical 
differentiation that shapes an entire group experience. Section 2.4.2.2 discusses how power is 
maintained and lost. 
2.4.2.2 The Maintenance and Loss of Power 
Power results in many advantages that motivate its individual maintenance. Power provides a 
diverse set of affective, cognitive and behavioural advantages that reinforce the status quo, 
afford affective and physiological buffers against stress, facilitate goal-directed thoughts and 
cognitions, and promote approach-oriented behaviours that contribute to the maintenance of 
power among the powerful (Anderson & Brion 2014). Although power may facilitate several 
power-perpetuating consequences and is largely a static force, it is not immutable. The rest of 
this section considers what the literature says about the determinants of power maintenance 
and loss. 
Although power provides several advantages that may contribute to the ability of power-
holders to maintain it, a significant body of evidence also suggests that power-holders may 
think and act in ways that jeopardise their grasp on power (Anderson & Brion 2014). The 
cognitive and behavioural ramifications of power are especially pernicious given that those in 
positions of power are subject to the aspirations of others who wish to obtain access to the 
resources controlled by power-holders. The question then remains: when does power lead 
individuals to maintain rather than lose power? 
The literature shows that a critical determinant of maintaining power is the extent that power-
holders engage in self-serving versus group-serving behaviours (Anderson & Brion 2014). 
Researchers draw upon the reciprocal influence model of social power (Keltner et al. 2003) in 
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addition to research on the pernicious effect of self-interested hubristic CEOs on 
organisational outcomes (Chatterjee & Hambrick 2007; Malmendier & Tate 2005). They 
argue that the key role of power-holders and leaders is to facilitate social coordination and 
cooperation to enhance group success. Sturm and Antonakis (2015) argue that power loss 
often results from difficulties in managing interpersonal relationships, especially in relation 
to the formation and maintaining of alliances, the strength of which is sometimes 
overestimated. This is especially relevant to studying boards in which cliques and alliances 
may frequently form (Forbes & Milliken 1999). 
Self-serving behaviours undermine the goal of cohesion, thus, potentially jeopardising the 
ability of power-holders to maintain their influence over a group. By contrast, collective 
group-serving behaviours strengthen power-holders’ positions by furthering the interests of 
individuals and groups rather than serving their own interests. Anderson and Brion (2014) 
studied what leads power-holders to engage in self-serving behaviours that undermine their 
power. They highlighted several moderators, which included personal characteristics such as 
the personal drive for power, personality traits (such as the ability to read social networks) 
and communication style (verbal and non-verbal) that account for how individuals 
subsequently maintain or lose power (Anderson & Brion 2014). Although they cite the 
limitations of research that make inferences from experimental conditions, they maintain 
their study may provide useful perspectives about how organisational groups and individuals 
within them might work to retain their power. The subjective experience of power and its 
effects on an individual and a group are also relevant to understanding how power-holders 
can engage in self-serving behaviour. 
2.4.2.3 The Experience of Power 
The experience of holding power in a situation generates a range of characteristics and 
propensities that manifest themselves in affect, cognition and behaviour (Keltner, Gruenfeld 
& Anderson 2003). Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) also suggest that the concepts 
and behavioural tendencies associated with power are activated whenever the possession of 
power is implied (consciously or unconsciously in a new situation) or even when an 
experience with power is simply recalled. Further, they argue that these propensities are 
stored in memory and can be carried beyond a situation in which power is directly 
experienced (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003). 
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As noted, the experience of power changes a power-holder in three ways: cognition, affect 
(emotions) and behaviour (Sturm & Antonakis 2015). Guinote (2007) summarises the effect 
on cognition by identifying the following changes: simplified processing orientation (less 
attention to detail and more global processing of information), less individuating (seeing a 
group rather than an individual in a group, which, in turn, leads to generalised thought 
patterns), overestimating the accuracy of knowledge and less aversion to threats associated 
with loss. 
As reported in the literature, the psychological explanation for these cognitive effects may lie 
in the notions of self-anchoring and self-projection (Overbeck & Droutman 2013), as well as 
self-enhancement (Pfeffer & Fong 2005). Self-anchoring extends the concept of self-
categorisation in that it determines how an individual power-holder tends to project their own 
traits, attitudes and values onto a group (Overbeck & Droutman 2013). Projection can involve 
assimilation (seeing similarities between the self and others) or contrast (seeing differences 
between one’s self and others). For example, power-holders may interpret their own thoughts 
and feelings as those of a group. This is a psychological explanation for what some board 
researchers call a false consensus, which occurs when an individual intuits an unknown 
property of an in-group by using data about the self to anchor estimates of a group’s position 
(Overbeck & Droutman 2013; Robbins & Krueger 2005). Power-holders’ self-anchoring may 
also be due to a power mindset (Fast & Chen 2009), a psychological state that carries a 
heightened sense of control and a greater feeling of entitlement to judge. 
Regarding self-enhancement, Pfeffer and Fong (2005) argue that this concept can explain and 
predict many phenomena associated with organisational power. That is, the motivation to 
think positively about ourselves and our capabilities is relevant to a deeper understanding of 
power. They found that most people are not motivated to be as accurate as possible but create 
and preserve a positive self-image when they assess themselves and others (Pfeffer & Fong 
2005). Further, they suggest that a belief in one’s self-efficacy and above average qualities 
produce an orientation towards action. This is significant because being active can enhance 
the attribution of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003). The link between power and 
action is discussed in Section 2.4.2.4. 
There is also a link between self-enhancement, self-categorisation and the exercise of power 
as influence. If people are motivated to think well of themselves, they would be motivated to 
favourably judge those to whom they perceive to be most similar. Therefore, self-
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enhancement motivation leads to similarity in attitudes, demographics and even speech and 
physical behaviour, which Montoya and Horton (2014) believe may be the most important 
basis of interpersonal attraction. The bias to prefer things that remind us of ourselves and to 
offer aid to similar others is an almost automatic and unconscious response; hence, the 
preference for similar others influences actions and choices, even in unlikely circumstances. 
For example, Burger et al. (2004) found that people are more willing to assist others who 
share incidental and trivially unimportant similarities, such as birthdays or initials. These 
findings may provide further insights into how and why NEDs gravitate to those who they 
perceive are similar to them and affect their influencing behaviours. 
Regarding affect or emotion and the experience of power also noted by Sturm and Antonakis 
(2015), Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) suggest that high-power individuals are 
more likely to express optimism, desire and enthusiasm. Further, they are also likely to show 
less discomfort or fear (Berdahl & Martorana 2006), are more open to emotional displays 
(Kemper 1991), are less sensitive to others’ suffering and show less compassion even in the 
face of others’ distress (van Kleef et al. 2008). In addition to other orientations and 
identification with a group, which can lessen these effects (Guerrero & Seguin 2012), 
individual traits and dispositions can also influence how individuals react to the possession of 
power. Hence, the literature suggests that how a director’s individual traits and dispositions 
affect their use of power to influence the strategy-shaping process is an important 
consideration. 
The literature concerning the link between power and behaviour also shows that power 
increases action orientation (Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld & 
Anderson 2003). Magee, Galinsky and Gruenfeld (2007) found that powerful individuals 
exhibited a greater propensity to initiate negotiations. High-power individuals also tend to 
depend less on others (Emersen 1962), feel more isolated (Magee & Smith 2013), express 
themselves more freely, generate more creative ideas and take more risks (Anderson & 
Galinsky 2006). 
Finally, these behaviours may have the consequence of silencing others. Tost, Gino and 
Larrick (2012) examined the effect of the subjective experience of power on leadership 
dynamics and team performance. They found that the psychological effect of power on 
formal leaders spills over to affect team performance through verbal dominance; this reduces 
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team communication, creates acquiescence among team members and, consequently, 
diminishes team performance. 
As the link between power and behaviour (as action) is particularly significant for this study, 
Section 2.4.2.4 investigates the link between power and social action. It also provides a 
review of the few extant studies of power in a board context. 
2.4.2.4 Power and Social Action 
Despite a tendency in literature to focus on the use of power for antisocial outcomes, recent 
studies have redressed the balance to show that power can be used for good, that is, as a 
catalyst for achieving prosocial outcomes that might not otherwise be realised. Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld and Magee (2003) showed that power could be conceived as an aspect of both 
social and cognitive structures that determine and shape action. 
Using experiments in which power was manipulated, Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee (2003) 
demonstrated that those who possess power exhibit a greater proclivity to act than those who 
do not, thus, arguing that power and action are intimately and positively related. Essentially, 
power channels behaviour towards accomplishing a specific goal. In their review of the 
literature on power, Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) argued that power activates a 
general tendency to approach whereas powerlessness activates a general tendency to inhibit. 
This implies that individuals with power exhibit a greater orientation to action than those 
without power, regardless of the social consequences of their acts. 
Turner’s (2005) later work explored the social influence of power, taking his theories beyond 
explanations in terms of psychological processes. A key question in understanding social 
power as a construct is to determine whom exactly do we rely on in making sense of the 
world? Simon and Oakes (2006) are also interested in the question of how these influences 
are fed and evolve through social interaction. Hogg (1992) emphasised how shared identity 
may transform social relations between group members, such that individual opinions are 
coordinated and transformed into shared values, beliefs and behaviours, and, hence, become a 
force of their own to create group cohesiveness. Overbeck and Droutman (2013) argue that 
when a strong shared identity exists between members of a group, the powerful tend to 
personify their groups and engage in self-projection in their interactions with others. 
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As described in Section 2.4.1 concerning social identity, it is people with whom we identify 
psychologically (i.e., in-group members) who both drive and satisfy the requirement for 
subjective validation. Shared identification provides a shared perspective on the world and, 
hence, a shared expectation of agreement that will influence when, how and why a power-
holder will act. The literature suggests there are two motivations for a power-holder to act: 
the first is to take, retain and restore control, and the second, to reduce uncertainty. However, 
these motivations must be considered in the context of the dynamics of group membership. 
In the intergroup literature—which suggests that group membership itself provides the 
perception of control—the control motivation has been largely ignored as an independent 
source of intergroup and ethnocentric behaviour. For example, Guinote, Brown and Fiske 
(2006) demonstrated that social identity as a group member influences an individual’s 
perception of control. Their five experimental studies of group-based control provide 
converging evidence to support their basic assumption that people increasingly act in terms of 
group membership, clinging more strongly to their in-groups to restore control when it is 
threatened. Guinote, Brown and Fiske (2006) found that the salience of low control increased 
in-group serving reactions, such as in-group bias, out-group derogation and pro-
organisational behaviour. 
Turner (2005) and Simon and Oakes (2006) proposed that it is not dependency that 
determines group formation and group life. Rather, they suggest that existing social identities 
lay the ground for mutual influence among people, which, in turn, leads to the emergence of 
power and resource control through others. Although group formation might sometimes 
occur along the lines of shared interests and positive mutual interdependence (as shown in 
Section 2.4.1), interdependence is not sufficient to explain why group membership should 
have the capacity to restore and maintain a subjective sense of global control. Turner (2005) 
and Simon and Oakes (2006) suggest the reason that group membership as interdependence is 
not sufficient to explain a subjective sense of social control is because receiving support from 
others within a group might be a double-edged sword; that is, people might want to perceive 
the self (and not others) as having control. Thus, social identity as self-categorisation rather 
than mere group membership is critical for group-based control restoration. 
Specifically, people who perceive they have low personal control may prefer to define their 
self through an in-group and act as an in-group member because this might maintain 
perceptions of power and control exerted through the (social) self. Additionally, social impact 
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theory (Latane 1981) also suggests that if a person is the target of social forces, increasing the 
number of other persons diminishes the relative social pressure on each person. If the 
individual inputs are not identifiable a person may contribute less—this is referred in the 
literature as the bystander effect or social loafing. Power and social action research have 
important implications for this study, as it may suggest that NED power and an 
accompanying sense of control is achieved through identification with a board. 
Regarding research relating to the desire for a power-holder to act to reduce uncertainty, 
Grieve and Hogg (1999) found that in-group bias is increased under conditions of personal 
uncertainty. Castano and Dechesne (2005) propose that in-group bias is rooted in the self-
preservation motive. They explored the relations between uncertainty and the influence 
process and found that the strength of group influence on the individual is greatest when a 
task is more difficult or when the stimuli are ambiguous (Castano & Dechesne 2005). 
Further, disagreement among members increases with uncertainty when stimulus information 
is limited. Uncertainty as a stimulus for power-holder action has important implications for 
this study, given that its research context is a transformative strategic-board decision that 
carries with it a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, the literature suggests that in-
group bias may be heightened in these contexts, thus, potentially affecting decision-making 
quality. 
In the last decade, two major theories have emerged that explain the effects and consequences 
of power, particularly how the effects and consequences of power may shape power-holder 
actions: the approach/inhibition theory of power and the social distance theory of power. 
These are described as follows. 
The approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003) explains the 
regulation of behaviour and suggests that those with power are more likely to act, are more 
risk-seeking and are less averse to potential losses. Those with less power are more 
inhibition-oriented, are less likely to act and will seek to minimise losses because they feel 
they have less power over situations. This theory suggests that a subjective sense of power 
plays a role in behaviour. The alternative, social distance theory (Magee & Smith 2013), 
describes the phenomenon of how social distance emerges and operates in power relations to 
produce various interpersonal phenomena affecting attitudes, behaviour and perceptions. It 
makes the link between power and identity. This more recent theory incorporates the notion 
of social comparison derived from construed identities and suggests that high-power 
		
45 
individuals’ greater experienced social distance leads them to engage in more abstract mental 
representation, which may lead to less empathy for others’ positions or points of view. Social 
distance theory uses Rindova’s (1999) definition of the cognitive diversity between power-
holders by suggesting that higher power-holders will assume that lower power-holders are 
dissimilar from them and are, therefore, less susceptible to their influence attempts. Both 
theories may have relevance for examining the predispositions of the powerful. However, 
they are based on experimental studies (often using university students) and do not illuminate 
the actual predisposition of those who seek power in a real-world context. 
Overall, several conclusions can be made about the research on social power. First, group 
membership itself can be a source of power by creating the propensity for a group to act in 
line with furthering its shared goals and beliefs and, consequently, engage in less deliberation 
that may be required. Second, a dynamic psychosocial context is created emanating from the 
rank ordering of individuals or groups according to the amount of power, status and respect 
accorded by others in a group. This social hierarchy has a pervasive influence on how in-
groups and out-groups form and balance power. Third, the link between power and action is 
driven by a need for control and a need to manage uncertainty. 
However, it must be noted that despite the extensive studies on power summarised in Table 
2.3, most were conducted under experimental conditions in which power manipulations were 
performed in artificial settings (Sturm & Antonakis 2015). The ability to manipulate and 
measure power in laboratory settings has contributed greatly to the growth of the field, thus, 
allowing researchers to control for confounding variables not possible in field settings. 
Moreover, these artificial manipulations of power rarely resemble what occurs in real life. 
Further research is required to explicate the subtleties of power relationships in real-life 
contexts such as in management and institutional contexts (Sturm & Antonakis 2015). 
This section will conclude with a brief discussion of theories concerning power in 
organisational settings and, particularly, the board. It will be followed by Section 2.4.3, 
which discusses how power and social identity interact and provides an organising 
framework for the study derived from the literature. This chapter then concludes with a 
summary of the literature and research gaps that led to this study’s primary and secondary 
research questions. 
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Regarding an organisational setting, researchers have recognised that power is not a structural 
attribute or possessed by someone in isolation; that is, power is a relative concept and a social 
process only capable of being understood in context (Finkelstein 1992; McNulty et al. 2011; 
Scheepers, Ellemers & Sassenberg 2013). Power in organisations has also been recognised as 
being applied in subtle ways, as shown by Maitlis and Lawrence’s (2003) inductive study in 
which strategy involved a complex interplay between discourse and politics. 
Finkelstein (1992) proposed a deductively derived model of power, suggesting that any study 
of strategy-making at board level cannot ignore the distribution of power in a TMT. Although 
his model was based on a TMT, it has been extended to apply to both executives and NEDs. 
Finkelstein (1992) suggested that board power sources have characteristics that differ from 
organisations in general. He defined four sources of power as follows: structural (derived 
from positions of structural authority, such as board Chair or committee Chair), ownership 
(derived from links to powerful owners, shareholders or blocking groups), expert (derived 
from a director’s particular sector or functional expertise) and prestige (derived from strong 
societal links and networks with actors outside a company, such as regulators, investors and 
industry bodies) (Finkelstein 1992). 
The original contribution of Finkelstein’s (1992) theory of power was its link to upper 
echelons theory (Hambrick 2007; Hambrick & Mason 1984), which suggested that 
managerial power affects strategic outcomes and that strategy-making cannot ignore the 
distribution of power within a TMT. Finkelstein’s (1992) study confirmed anecdotal evidence 
of the importance of the distribution of power in relation to the strategy-making role of 
TMTs. This has relevance for this study, which is keen to explore how the distribution of 
power and resulting differentials may affect director behaviour. 
However, Finkelstein’s (1992) study on the sources of power did not demonstrate how they 
are used to affect influence in a boardroom, primarily because of the complexities in 
measuring the use of power without access to director interactions in and around a 
boardroom. Arguably, Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) developed a more useful model for 
understanding board power by addressing many questions unanswered by Finkelstein’s 
(1992) study on which their work was partly based. In their inductive study—using both 
surveys and in-depth interviews with 65 part-time and 43 full-time board members and 
Chairs from the top 500 public limited companies (PLCs) in the UK—Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1995) suggested that the possession of power was merely a reflection of its 
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potential rather than its use. They argued that power, defined as the ability to produce 
intended effects in line with one’s perceived interests and, given the context and structure of 
a board, proposed a tripartite model that comprises sources, will and skill. Their research 
described how the mobilisation and use of power occur in a boardroom and its conversion 
into influence. They found that skilful and astute use of power may be required to overcome 
one’s lack of power sources (McNulty & Pettigrew 1999). Their study showed the power 
struggles result from power differentials and attempts to equalise power. That is, sources of 
power were critical but did not explain everything. In summary, their data showed that 
attention to structure is necessary but not sufficient for understanding how boards operate 
because each chairperson’s style and role may manage power differently. Further, their 
research showed that power in and around a boardroom was situational—that power derived 
and demonstrated in one setting was not transferable to another. This suggests that directors 
who were members of different boards may operate quite differently in each company, that 
power was more dynamic and relational in nature, and is generated, maintained and lost in 
the context of relationships with others. 
Board studies have investigated issues of power and politics (Bailey & Peck 2013; 
Finkelstein 1992; Finkelstein & Mooney 2003; McNulty et al. 2011), particularly the way in 
which some members form dominant coalitions within a TMT group exercising power and 
influence in the strategic choices a group makes. Researchers also argue that corporate 
politics are observable but covert actions by which executives enhance their power to 
influence a decision are not (Bailey & Peck 2013; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois 1988; Ravasi & 
Zattoni 2006). Political behaviours include behind-the-scenes coalition formation, offline 
lobbying and cooption attempts, withholding information and controlling agendas. Political 
approaches contrast with straightforward influence tactics of open and forthright discussions 
in which information is shared in settings equally available to all decision-makers—a 
characteristic of effective boards. Therefore, the challenge for many board studies is the 
extent to which they can infer these covert actions by ‘fly on the wall’ or observational 
studies, which are unlikely to reveal covert political behaviours. Director recounting of 
experiences using well-constructed semi-structured interviews may reveal more in this 
regard. 
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Having discussed the sources, maintenance and loss of power, its experience and propensity 
for social action, Section 2.4.3 examines how power and social identity interact. As noted, 
this section also provides a conceptual framework for this study. 
2.4.3 How Power and Social Identity Interact: Power Works Through Identity 
While both power and identity and its effects on small group behaviour have both drawn on 
social psychology, for some time they have occupied parallel but separate research paths 
(Haslam, Reicher & Reynolds 2012; Simon & Oakes 2006; Turner & Haslam 2001). These 
are explained as follows. 
As noted, Turner (2005, p. 6) argues that shared social identities provide the foundation for 
exerting control through others, as this kind of power ‘only emerges from human social 
relationships, from the capacity of people to organize themselves into groups, institutions, 
and societies’. Simon and Oakes (2006) put identity and group membership at the heart of 
how social actors recruit agency or create power by influencing the choices made by other 
free social actors. They argue that power involves some degree of active commitment to the 
agenda of another person, whether this is genuine or for ulterior motives. They suggest that 
group membership is the crucial pivot between an individual and the social because it acts as 
an internalised guide to thought and action rather than external motivators such as reward and 
punishment (Simon & Oakes 2006). Most power relationships involve a mix of conflictual 
and consensual power, and this depends on the salience of the shared identity of group 
members. Hence, if social identity is strong, more consensual power will exist and the reverse 
is also true. In effect, social identity provides the construction of meaning for self in a social 
context and, in turn, provides the basis on which social actors (in this case NEDs) can self-
categorise. Influence as the use of power is not provided by dependence but is the result of 
active meaning-seeking engaged in by social actors in a social world (Brown 2001). 
An organising framework emerged from this review of prior research into power and social 
identity and is shown in Figure 2.1. This framework will assist in this study’s investigation in 
several ways. First, the framework guides the generation of research questions not fully 
illuminated by extant research. If, as the current research suggests, power works through 
identity, several questions emerge about the relationship between power and social identity. 
How does the distribution of power affect group identification and how do both group 
identification and power distribution moderate the ‘social reality’ that directors experience on 
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a given board? In turn, how do the effects of group membership or identification shape the 
experience of power in and around a boardroom? Second, it provides a way of organising the 
data to be collected and third, it provides a structure by which an analysis can be conducted. 
This chapter concludes by summarising the main findings and research gaps, and provides 
the primary and secondary research questions derived from the literature. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Organising framework derived from the literature review. 
Source: Author’s review of prior research on the role of social identity and power in group relations. 
2.5 Literature Review Summary and Research Gaps 
As noted, corporate governance explained by economic research traditions, which have 
dominated the field to date, do not offer complete explanations for directors’ behaviour in 
making major decisions on the strategic direction of a company. Additionally, factors 
affecting strategic decision-making are complex and decision-makers play a significant role 
in this complexity. Since all strategies are cognitively complex, strategic proposals are 
generally debatable and differences of views are inevitable. The practices that decision-actors 
adopt over time to deal with task complexity become routines, norms and conventions and 
play a significant self-sustaining role in creating a unique ‘social reality’. This makes the 
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study of strategic decision-making challenging and, as shown, it remains a relatively 
unexplored area. 
This study seeks to address this gap in the research by focusing on power-holders in the field 
(that is, NEDs) and investigates how social identity and power may affect the process of 
shaping a strategic decision. The study will undertake this investigation inductively through 
NED accounts of their decision-making experiences and reports of theirs and others’ 
influence attempts in real-life decision contexts. 
The literature review exposes questions not addressed by current research that would 
illuminate the effects and consequences of social influences in the context of board decision-
making processes. Particularly, it reveals five major gaps that result from either the 
limitations of current research or a lack of research to date. 
First, the vast number of conceptual papers and numerous board studies have used structural 
constructs and director demography as proxies for predicting what goes on in a boardroom, 
citing access to boards as being a major impediment to studies that might reveal what really 
goes on in a boardroom or ‘catch reality in flight’. Few board researchers have taken a social 
psychology perspective to study a board group as a living complex ‘social system’ and, 
particularly, what effects this may have on individual decision behaviour as part of this social 
reality. 
Second, behavioural studies of boards (where they exist) have increasingly shown a tendency 
to use theories, constructs and concepts drawn from cognitive psychology to predict group or 
individual behaviour in decision-making. Although important, cognition and the cognitive 
limitations of individual actors is only one input to behavioural responses. Given this, we are 
no closer to understanding how directors behave when making decisions. When behavioural 
constructs or theories have been proposed, their application is in the developmental phase and 
they are largely speculative (Huse et al. 2011). 
Third, where behavioural studies exist in the board realm, they have mostly focused on the 
relationship between a CEO and board rather than between NEDs. Particularly, this regards 
how NED contributions are influenced by the complexity of peer relationships within a 
board. 
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Fourth, social identity and power appear to be two most compelling drivers of group 
behaviour. These social factors appear to be largely under-researched in a board context. 
Particularly, this regards how the intensity and direction of group identification and power 
differentials may affect individual behaviour when individuals join a group. The literature 
review shows that these social factors have pursued by separate research paths and few 
consider the link between social identity and power in a board context. Further, none have 
proposed a psychosocial theory of board functioning. 
Fifth, decades of quantitative methods seeking answers for research questions essentially 
qualitative in nature have produced little predictive value in understanding how board 
accountability is enacted. More venturesome research methods and a combination of 
methodological frameworks are required to advance the board-research agenda and deepen 
our understanding of how director effectiveness and accountability is strengthened. 
Responding to these research gaps, the findings of this study may go some way to ‘humanise’ 
the process of governing public corporations and, therefore, contribute a more balanced and 
complete understanding of how directors and boards create accountability. It seeks to explore 
and describe how individual NEDs might optimise their strategic contribution and, in turn, 
suggest how NEDs can contribute in a more strategically active board culture, one that 
proactively involves itself in shaping and directing a firm’s long-term direction and success. 
At the core of this academic pursuit is a primary question: how do social factors influence 
NED behaviour in shaping strategic decisions? The study also poses supplementary 
questions: What are the origins of and differences in an individual NED’s power? How does 
a NED’s sense of shared identity with the board group shape the process of decision-making? 
How is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the ‘social reality’ of group 
identification and power distribution? 
These questions are likely to illuminate more clearly the internal workings of a board to 
understand the behavioural processes by which director effectiveness and board 
accountability are achieved. They are explored in more detail in Chapter 3, which presents 
the methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 2 concluded that director behaviour when making strategic decisions is an area 
relatively unexplored at board level. The few board studies available have been at arm’s 
length from the actual subject of this inquiry; that is, that boards of directors have used large-
scale mailed surveys, questionnaires or the analysis of meeting minutes. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 considers the research questions that emerged 
from the identified gaps and limitations in the extant literature concerning how board 
directors participate in strategic decision-making. Particularly, this regards how social factors 
influence the creation of alternatives, the debating of options and the pursuit of preferred 
strategies at board level. As shown in Chapter 2, the extant literature has demonstrated that 
every group represents a social system in which position, power and status matters in how 
relationships form and operate, and where expectations and norms of group behaviour and 
sense of cohesion emerge over time (Forbes & Milliken 1999; Hillman, Nicholson & 
Shropshire 2008). Section 3.2 describes the methodology adopted by this study. This includes 
a critical evaluation and description of the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
underpinning it, which is a phenomenological approach, and a justification of the 
instrumental multiple case study method (Stake 1995) used to examine the complex social 
phenomena of making strategic decisions. The section also provides a detailed description of 
the five-stage research design used to collect data, including case selection, NED recruitment, 
profiles of participating directors, the interview process methodology and data validation. 
Section 3.3 examines the approach to the data analysis of the inductive process used in the 
study, including the four-level narrative method for identifying ‘codable moments’ of 
influence attempts, data mapping and its validation, within-case and cross-case comparisons 
and theory development. Finally, Section 3.4 provides a summary of the research questions 
and methodology. Overall, this chapter provides a more venturesome approach to 
understanding decision-making in a real-life board context in which it occurs; its insights on 
research-design methodology can be applied by other board-study investigators. 
3.1 Research Questions 
In this section, some of the questions that may address the gaps in understanding how social 
factors affect individual behaviour are posed, thus, accounting for a priori constructs that 
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have emerged from the literature review, particularly social identity and power. As shown in 
Chapter 2, Figure 2.1 provided an organising framework to guide the generation of research 
questions for this study. If power works through identity, as current research suggests, several 
questions emerge about the relationship between power and social identity in a board context. 
Of scholarly and practical value is the question as to whether and how some directors show a 
greater propensity for mounting effective influence attempts than others and why. As such, 
the core of this academic pursuit is the question: how do social factors influence NED 
behaviour in strategic decision-making? This primary question generates three secondary 
questions relating to the social factors that might play a part in the experience of influence 
reported by directors: What are the origins of and differences in an individual NED’s power? 
How does the NED’s sense of shared identity with the board group influence the process of 
decision-making? Finally, how is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the 
‘social reality’ (of group identification and power distribution)? This section proceeds by re-
examining the issues that give rise to each of this study’s research questions. 
3.1.1 Sources of a NED’s Power to Influence and How it Varies 
Social identity is generally defined as one’s determination of the social category to which 
they belong, which helps to define who they are in a group (Hogg, Terry & White 1995; 
Hogg & Williams 2000). In a board context, it is the story directors construct about 
themselves and how they fit into a board group, as well as the resulting ‘social reality’ they 
find themselves in and, importantly, how this influences their decision-making behaviour. 
Current research suggests that the self-construal of directors is multifaceted, complex, 
dynamic, operates as a social hierarchy and plays a role in director behaviour and the 
interactional dynamic that emerges (Anderson & Brion 2014; Bailey & Peck 2013; Brewer 
1991; Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008). 
Association with others, particularly those who they perceive as more powerful (Fritsche et 
al. 2013), provides a director with social acceptance, influence and control. In turn, these 
associations come with in-group biases that affect attitudes, perceptions and behaviours such 
as the receptiveness to influence attempts by majorities or minorities (Haslam, Reicher & 
Reynolds 2012). 
Despite multiple conceptualisations of power developed since the 1950s, including more 
recent taxonomies (Finkelstein 1992), we are no closer to understanding how power works at 
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board level—for example, how power differentials emerge, how these different capacities to 
exert influence are dynamically used in decision-making groups and such consequences. As 
noted in Chapter 2, most studies of power are conducted in experimental conditions, with 
manipulations of its effects performed in artificial settings. 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1998) revealed the determinants of power include board history, 
current culture, Chair leadership, director experience, directors’ interpretation of board life, 
norms and conduct, and patterns of selection and socialisation of directors. However, their 
research included executives as well as NEDs and did not reveal actual behaviours. 
For example, does a new director’s self-conception of how well they fit into the social 
hierarchy of a board create director-level differences in strategy-shaping behaviours? A 
review of board research by Petrovic (2008) seems to suggest this is the case. However, we 
know very little about how directors acquire power, how power differentials emerge and the 
role they play in the actual behaviours directors demonstrate when shaping strategic 
decisions. 
This issue led to the first of the three secondary questions: 
Research Q1: What are the origins of and differences in an individual NED’s 
power? 
The next issue concerns the relation between the sense of shared identity and the processes of 
influence. 
3.1.2 How Group Identification Guides How Power is Used to Influence 
Current research into power points to a relational approach; that is, power is generated, 
maintained and lost in the context of relations with others and involves the ability to produce 
intended effects in line with one’s interests (Pettigrew & McNulty 1995). The literature 
review showed that the possession of power does not imply its use (Sturm & Antonakis 
2015). Other definitions of interpersonal power suggest it is an individual’s intentional and 
effective capacity to control situations or people (Sturm & Antonakis 2015). 
The literature also showed that identities, once created, are not stable but dynamic and 
recursively constructed during discourse (Brown & Lewis 2011; Reynolds & Subasic 2016). 
However, how and what adjustments directors make to their constructions of self as they 
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develop a history of working together is not explored in the extant literature. Therefore, this 
gap raises the question as to how a director’s self-construal may change on different boards 
or at different times and how this dynamic may affect their power in influencing decisions. 
Therefore, it may be important and informative to determine if some directors more readily 
use their power to influence the direction of a debate, advocate a view or even silence 
different or opposing views other than their own. Particularly, it will be important to explore 
how a NED’s identification with a group affects how they choose to engage and interact in a 
decision-making process. 
This led to the second secondary research question about the circumstances in which NEDs 
chose to use their influence in the process of shaping a strategic proposal: 
Research Q2: How does a NED’s sense of shared identity with the board group 
influence the process of decision-making? 
The final issue concerns the social reality of a board and its effects on influence. 
3.1.3 How Aspects of the Social Reality Directors Encounter Affect Their Use of 
Influence 
Recent literature on boards has shifted its focus to process studies that explore human 
dynamics and the role it plays in decision-making processes. Boards of directors are subject 
to the social and psychological influences that all small groups of corporate elites experience 
(Petrovic 2008). As noted in Chapter 2, board cohesiveness (which Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) argue is a board-level construct) contributes indirectly through influence on board task 
performance. However, board cohesiveness is itself shaped by the presence of cognitive 
conflict or relationship conflict between individuals on a board. That is, cohesiveness is 
indirectly a consequence of relationships that directors make between themselves. As most 
strategies are cognitively complex, strategic proposals are generally debatable with 
differences of views and, therefore, conflict is inevitable. The behaviour that directors 
demonstrate in how they respond to contention and conflict is critical to the conduct of the 
board role. Thus, it is useful to explore how the effects of group identification and power 
differentials (where they exist) can shape the level of consensus and contention experienced 
by directors during decision-making. 
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Further, the complex interdependent relationship between power and identity in decision-
making in small groups has only been explored in the last decade (Haslam, Reicher & 
Reynolds 2012; Simon & Oakes 2006). The social identity model of power (Simon & Oakes 
2006) and the social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith 2013) both posit links 
between power and identity. An individual’s self-construal undergoes categorisation when 
joining a group, which, in turn, creates differentiated identities within a group, thus, creating 
‘social distance’. This results in the emergence of in-groups and out-groups reflecting power 
differentials within a group that were shown to have interpersonal effects (attitude, behaviour 
and perception). Therefore, the final question for this study relates to how aspects of ‘social 
reality’ play out between directors making a major decision and what skills and dispositions 
are demonstrated by effectively navigating this complex social reality. This led to the third 
secondary question for this study. 
Research Q3: How is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the 
‘social reality’ (of group identification and power distribution)?  
In summary, the exploration of these research questions seeks to contribute a deeper 
understanding of how social factors play a role in and around a boardroom in the processes of 
decision-making. By adopting an institutionally contextualised and behavioural approach, 
this study moves away from the heavy reliance on secondary data in board research. It offers 
a more novel approach that permits the researcher closer to the subject of the inquiry, as 
described in Section 3.2. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
Until the early 1800s, only philosophers and religious scholars who engaged in 
armchair speculation studied or wrote about human behaviour. The classical 
theorists made a major contribution to modern civilization when they argued that 
the social world could be studied using science. They contended that rigorous 
systematic observation of the social world, combined with careful, logical thinking, 
could provide a new and valuable type of knowledge about human relations. 
(Neuman 2006, p. 80) 
This study has formed two conclusions from the literature review described in Chapter 2. 
First, decision-making is much more than just a rational analytical process. Instead, it is also 
a social process by which members of a group strive to establish their legitimacy, relevance 
and influence, and this aspect is entirely relational. Second, there continues to be an 
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undersocialised view of the processes by which NEDs exercise their accountability for 
strategy. 
It has only been in the last decade that the human side of governance has been recognised and 
studied. The humanising of corporate governance may be better studied by drawing on 
theories in social psychology, particularly how individuals behave when they find themselves 
in groups into which they must fit. 
This section proceeds by examining the ontological and epistemological assumptions on 
which this study is based and compares positivist and phenomenological research paradigms. 
It then examines the methodological implications of a phenomenological approach, which 
justifies the choice of a case study method. This is followed by a detailed description of the 
case study method and its implications and challenges for the research design, which is a 
five-stage approach to data collection. Each stage is then described in detail and the overall 
approach is linked to the organising framework derived from the literature and described in 
Figure 2.1. 
3.2.1 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 
As noted, the aims of this study are to develop knowledge about how social factors influence 
decision-making behaviour of NEDs and, particularly, how this behaviour may be influenced 
by the social reality they encounter as members of a board. This phenomenon is subjective in 
nature. Relationships are difficult to observe, even for those in a boardroom. Relationships 
are experienced through the meanings construed and conveyed during discursive interactions 
between members of a group (Brown & Thompson 2013; Maitlis & Lawrence 2003; Weick 
& Roberts 1993). 
A researcher’s world view or paradigm in approaching a social study is critical. A paradigm 
is a shared world view that represents the beliefs and values in a discipline that guides how 
problems are solved (Schwandt 1994). Two researchers examining the same topic can arrive 
at very different conclusions based on their ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Therefore, before considering which methodologies to use, it is necessary to determine one’s 
world view. There are two major paradigms or ‘world views’ of social reality in social 
science research (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Positivism, a term coined by Auguste Comte 
(1830–1842), assumes that science is the only foundation for true knowledge. According to 
this paradigm, human behaviour is passive and true knowledge is external to an individual 
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and is best understood through observation and experiment. Hence, positivism stands for 
objectivity, measurability, predictability and controllability to derive constructs, laws and 
rules of human behaviour (Baxter & Jack 2008). Positivism is currently viewed as being 
objectivist; that is, objects around us have existence and meaning independent of our 
consciousness (Crotty 1989). This paradigm has dominated empirical research in the 
twentieth century, but more recently it has been criticised for its lack of regard for the 
subjective states of individuals (Ospina & Dodge 2005). For example, it does not recognise 
that human beings change themselves through interaction and bring changes to the groups 
and societies in which they interact and live. 
Conversely, a post-positivist paradigm—which incorporates constructivism together with 
interpretivist and phenomenological paradigms—emphasises that social reality is viewed and 
interpreted according to the ideological position of an individual (Guba & Lincoln 1996). 
Therefore, according to post-positivism, which is underpinned by the philosophy of realism, 
knowledge is personally experienced rather than acquired or imposed from outside. 
Observations can contain errors and, rather than theories being immovable truths, they can be 
modified (Guba & Lincoln 1996). Those who oppose the positivist paradigm believe that 
reality is multilayered and complex and that a single phenomenon can have multiple 
interpretations. There are many approaches and diverse theories within this paradigm with 
distinct variations; among these is phenomenology (Flew 2001; Hammond, Howarth & Keat 
2007). Phenomenologists hold that during interactions with various phenomena, human 
beings interpret and attach meaning to different actions or ideas and, thus, construct new 
experiences. Therefore, a researcher must develop an empathic understanding regarding the 
process of interpretation by individuals so they can ascribe their feelings, motives and 
thoughts to others’ and, thus, describe their behaviour. 
From a philosophical position, a positivist paradigm does not lend itself to the study of social 
phenomena envisioned by this thesis and has a limited capacity to illuminate social processes. 
Therefore, this study has turned to a phenomenological paradigm in which the focus is 
interpretive. Here, the beliefs, attitudes and meanings that decision-actors give to their 
experiences (in this case, in and around a boardroom) help to explicate the behaviour of 
NEDs. As such, the approach to this study is to determine what a subject knows of reality as 
they interpret it rather than verified outside their experience; that is, it assumes reality is 
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constructed rather than discovered by participants. Both paradigms are contrasted in Table 
3.1. 
In drawing from a phenomenological paradigm (in which reality is socially constructed), 
organisational members may interpret their environment in and through interactions with 
others, constructing accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively 
(Weick & Roberts 1993). Therefore, studies that use sensemaking to underpin their research 
methodology represent one way of humanising their approach. 
Table 3.1: 
Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms 
 Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Philosophical level The world is external and 
objective; the observer is 
independent; 
science is value-free 
The world is socially 
constructed and subjective; 
the observer is part of what is 
observed; science is driven 
by human interests 
Social level Focus on facts; 
seek causality and 
fundamental laws; reduce the 
phenomenon to the simplest 
events; formulate a 
hypothesis and test 
Focus on meanings; try to 
understand what is 
happening; 
look at the totality of each 
situation; develop ideas 
through induction from data 
Technical level Operationalise concepts so 
they can be measured; take 
large samples 
Use multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena; small samples 
are investigated in-depth 
Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Loma (2002) 
However, as shown in Table 3.2, there are weaknesses in a phenomenological approach 
primarily because it is time-consuming and makes analysis and interpretation open to the 
views of the researchers who are often part of a system being studied. 
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Table 3.2: 
Strengths and Weaknesses of a Phenomenological Approach 
 Phenomenological	 Positivist	
Strengths	 Considers temporality—that 
objects and people change 
over time; understand 
people’s meanings; respond 
to ideas and issues as they 
emerge 
Provides broad coverage of 
situations; fast and 
economical; statistics lend 
support to analysis and 
verification for enhanced 
credibility 
Weaknesses	 Can be time-consuming and 
resource hungry; analysis and 
interpretation of data may be 
difficult; may be perceived as 
having low credibility 
Lacks effectiveness in 
understanding processes; less 
helpful in theory generation 
Sources: Adapted from Collis and Hussey (2003), Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Loma (2002) and Gummesson 
(1991) 
Each of the two paradigms described above has implications for the research methods used in 
carrying out a social scientific investigation. The implications for this study must be 
considered in context. 
3.2.2 Methodological Implications and Choice of Methods 
Positivism, which emphasises an objectivist approach to studying social phenomena, gives 
prominence to research methods that focus on quantitative analysis, surveys and experiments. 
An anti-positivist paradigm stresses a subjectivist approach to studying social phenomena and 
attaches importance to a range of research techniques focusing on the qualitative; for 
example, this includes personal interviews, participant observations, individual accounts and 
personal constructs. 
There are several methodological implications for the philosophical approach taken in this 
study. The examination of a director’s involvement in strategic decision-making in this thesis 
will require the study of complex social phenomena characterised by a human dimension of 
interaction embedded in a real-life context, specifically strategic decisions regarding an 
organisation’s entry into international markets. As with any small group that must work 
together, a study of how NEDs shape strategy can only be fully understood by investigating 
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(over the life of a complex decision) how NEDs interact with each other, what motivates 
them to engage in a decision process, what activities and interactions they value, how and 
why they use and share information, and how they form decisions. Essentially, this type of 
study must necessarily concern itself with questions of how and why, and the chosen research 
methods must reveal answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Stake 1995; Yin 2014). 
In selecting a research paradigm and corresponding methodology, given the ontological and 
epistemological considerations raised in this section, the researcher was prompted to ask four 
questions: 
1. What is the nature or essence of the social phenomena being investigated? 
2. Is social phenomenon objective in nature or created by the human mind? 
3. What are the bases of knowledge corresponding to the social reality and how is 
knowledge acquired or disseminated? 
4. What is the relationship of an individual with their environment; are they  
conditioned by the environment or is the environment created by them? 
Given these questions, the case study method offered itself as ideal for exploring questions of 
how and why such social phenomena occurs (Stake 1995; Yin 2014). It is also relevant since 
these ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions require an extensive and in-depth description of social 
phenomena—in this case, the social reality within a board group (Yin 2014). 
There are two key approaches that guide case study methodology: the first is proposed by 
Stake (1995) and the second by Yin (2014). Both base their approaches to case study using a 
constructivist paradigm; that is, truth is relative and dependent on one’s perspective. This 
recognises: 
the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning but doesn’t reject 
outright some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed, with a 
focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and object. (Miller & Crabtree 
1992, p. 10) 
One advantage of this approach is the close collaboration between the researcher and the 
participants, which enable participants to tell their stories (Miller & Crabtree 1992). Through 
these stories, participants can describe their view of reality, thus, enabling the researcher to 
understand a participant’s actions better. 
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Yin (2014, p. 24) suggests the three reasons a study can employ the case method are: 
1. when the focus is how and why questions 
2. when you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in a study 
3. when you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are 
relevant to the phenomenon under study or that the boundaries are not clear 
between the phenomena and context. 
These three criteria justify the case study approach adopted by this thesis. First, the research 
questions regard the how and why of director decision-making. Second, the decision-making 
of a director cannot be manipulated as an experiment and third, the decision-making process 
could not be considered without the context in which a director decision is made; that is, it 
would be impossible to have a true picture of a director’s decision-making, a board or 
organisation and, more specifically, boardroom settings. 
Case studies can be conducted quantitatively or qualitatively (Bansal 2013; Baxter & Jack 
2008). These approaches to case study research are profoundly different. Applied 
quantitatively, a case study seeks to identify cause and effect; however, qualitatively, a case 
study seeks an understanding of the human experience (Stake 1995). Qualitative case 
methods can also vary between observation, qualitative content analysis of written or 
audiovisual documents and in-depth interviews with key informants; thus, the latter was 
judged more appropriate, given the aims of this study. 
A critical aspect of this methodology was the approach taken to how the decision case study 
was ‘built’ and how data were collected. Central to this was the role that (NED) narratives 
played in reconstructing their interactions with each other and the analysis of these 
reconstructive narratives to illuminate how strategic decisions were made (Brown & 
Thompson 2013). Therefore, while a case study approach to undertaking research is not new, 
the researcher explored how a multiple case approach might be combined with other 
approaches, as well as the steps required to access, collect and analyse potentially sensitive 
and confidential research data without sacrificing research quality. Further, an iterative and 
staged process of data collection, analysis and validation can deal more effectively with 
limitations of the perceived limitations of post-event reconstructions (Bansal 2013; Baxter & 
Jack 2008; Eisenhardt 1989). 
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In studying the ‘internal context’ of the strategic decisions and decision-makers more closely, 
this study took a post-event reconstructive approach. Using this approach, the narrations of 
directors as they recounted their experiences were used to explore the strategy-shaping 
interactions and behaviours of individual NEDs. Hence, this approach focused on strategy-
shaping dialogue rather than the process or procedural aspects of strategic oversight, such as 
the episodic rituals of strategy ‘away days’ and workshops. It also recognised the delicate 
balance that boardroom relationships play in the shaping of strategy and, therefore, probed 
interpersonal interactions during the interviews. 
3.2.3 Case Method as the Research Strategy: Challenges 
Miles and Huberman (1994) defined the case method as a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context. Therefore, in establishing a bounded context, the researcher 
had to consider two questions: What is the object of analysis, the director, the decision or the 
process? Did the researcher want to analyse the activity of decision-making or the 
experiences of a director? Asking these questions helped to ensure the researcher avoided one 
of the common pitfalls associated with case study research—a tendency to attempt to answer 
a question that was too broad or address a topic with many objectives for one study (Baxter & 
Jack 2008). 
Yin (2014) and Stake (1995) suggest placing boundaries on a case to prevent these issues. 
Eisenhardt (1989) refers to this as entering the field—being clear about what one wants to 
investigate. In considering these questions, the study’s focus was a director as an expert 
witness and informant of the process of decision-making and, therefore, was the unit of 
analysis. 
Before ‘entering the field’, the researcher considered three methodological implications: first, 
how to assess decision-makers as expert informants of board decision-making to obtain data 
about potentially highly sensitive and confidential matters; second, how the observation of 
decision interactions over the life of a complex decision, such as an internationalisation 
decision, can be organised and third, how influence experienced by decision-makers in and 
around a boardroom can be closely studied to produce a deeper understanding of a process 
that is plausible and trustworthy—essentially, how a NED’s influence attempts (the primary 
construct this study seeks to explore) can be captured in such a way that the methods used 
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can reveal the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of those attempts. These three considerations are addressed in 
this section. 
To address these three challenges, the researcher had to carefully consider an approach that 
would navigate some of the difficulties and challenges typically experienced by researchers 
attempting to study a board’s strategic role. Access to board meetings over an extended 
period of deliberations, given the nature of the strategic decision, was potentially challenging 
and commercially impractical. Therefore, access to individual directors and their narratives of 
decision experiences post-event was considered a viable alternative. This effectively 
navigated the difficulties of boardroom access. 
Further, an instrumental approach was adopted (Stake 1995) in which a transformative 
decision was used as the instrument to understand and illuminate strategy-shaping interaction 
and behaviours of NEDs; therefore, the decision itself was of secondary interest. That is, a 
decision plays a supportive role in facilitating an understanding of interactive practices 
between directors and the processes of collaboration, consensus-seeking, contention and 
cooption during a decision-making process. The decision used for this study was a major 
internationalisation decision by a company, which, typically, can take place over a 12–18-
month period. This length of time offered an opportunity for the NEDs to enact and 
experience ‘shaping behaviours’ to achieve a consensual outcome. The decision also 
provided a focused and consistent ‘strategic’ context to examine shaping behaviours across 
several individual decision-making cases. Additionally, to accommodate the difficulties of 
board access and to witness interaction patterns and shaping behaviours relating to a decision, 
the study assumed the research setting as a decision rather than a company. By not making 
the research setting a company or a board (in contrast with many studies on board 
governance), assumptions were also avoided about a certain ‘collective board mindset’ 
(Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008). Therefore, the decision was only secondary; it 
inductively posed the question: what is happening in this decision that can tell us about 
board-level decision experiences in general? 
To ensure the generality of analysis and results, the researcher determined a representative 
population of directors suitable to elaborate a theory about strategic decision-making 
behaviour and the associated dynamic required. Therefore, the questions posed could best be 
answered by multiple cases to allow a comparison of approaches and behaviours of several 
directors. The multiple case methodology (Baxter & Jack 2008; Yin 2014) allowed the 
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researcher to go back and forth between the 15 decision cases, select categories or 
dimensions and to look for within-group similarities and intergroup differences, thus, 
strengthening the constructs for potential theory building. This approach is consistent with 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 541), who suggests that: 
the juxtaposition of seemingly similar cases by a researcher looking for differences 
can break simplistic frames. In the same way, the search for similarity in a 
seemingly different pair also can lead to a more sophisticated understanding. 
Therefore, we may conclude that a multiple case method, if conducted using robust inductive 
approaches, carries less bias. Further, Yin (2014) suggests that multiple cases can improve 
the generality of findings. 
Finally, to test the research design, the study also drew on the five organising principles set 
out by process research pioneer Pettigrew (1992). First, decisions-makers are embedded in a 
context that may determine or shape the sector-level internationalisation that was taking 
place. The external context may have a bearing on how a decision-making group (in this case, 
a board) decides on its own plans to pursue internationalisation. Therefore, this study 
acknowledged these influences in its inquiry. Second, the temporal connected principle 
suggests that prior experiences of a board or individual director are likely to have an invisible 
hand in how current and future experiences transpire. Hence, to address these issues, a 
questioning style for directors had to be found that necessarily tapped into what they were 
thinking at the time and how they perceived the attitude of a board towards a decision, given 
their own and board experience. Third, the intertwined nature of context and action, such as 
deteriorating shareholder value or company performance (that is, the subject of a case), may 
not always be separable from actions taken by its stewards to facilitate or create value. This 
factor also required careful thought in determining the research design. It required the 
researcher to limit environmental variations by selecting a single decision as the instrument 
illuminating how directors may behave when making similarly large decisions. Fourth, the 
search for holistic rather than linear explanations of process must lead the study to ask what 
explanations may be perceived across all 15 decision stories. Further, what bigger story might 
it tell about how directors involve themselves in shaping strategic decisions? This holistic 
objective required the multiple case method employed in this study (Yin 2014) and enabled 
cross-case comparisons to represent a major part of the approach to analysis. Finally, the link 
between the analysis of process and outcome was noted. As processes in this area of study are 
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complex, consideration was given to the importance of multiple cases as the focal point to 
help generate a deeper and more thorough understanding of why the same kinds of decisions 
might result in different decision processes on different boards. 
3.2.4 Research Design 
The multistaged approach to data collection was a unique feature of the study. Table 3.3 sets 
out the stages. 
Table 3.3: 
Five-stage Research Design 
Stage 1	 Stage 2	 Stage 3	 Stage 4	 Stage 5	
Case selection Pre-
understanding 
Interviews Validation of 
themes 
Theory 
development 
Developing 
selection 
criteria; 
identification of 
companies; 
identification of 
NEDs; approach 
to NEDs 
Meeting with 
NEDs; enlisting 
support; 
exploring 
general 
governance 
insights; 
preparing NED 
profile 
60–90-minute 
recorded 
interviews; 
transcribing 
interviews; case 
analysis to 
derive data 
maps; cross-case 
analysis; 
collecting 
background 
material from 
multiple sources 
of evidence 
NED 
discussions 
using derived 
data maps to 
validate themes; 
confirming 
themes and 
nuances; 
surfacing 
additional 
themes 
Theory 
development; 
elaboration and 
extension; 
presenting 
results to NEDs 
to surface 
alternative or 
rival 
explanations 
The design was unique in its ability to engage participating NEDs in what they considered to 
be an important investigation. For example, the pre-meetings (stage 2), in most cases, 
resulted in engendering interest in this under-researched aspect of corporate governance and 
allowed NEDs to share their insights and perspectives on the role and behaviours of a board 
in shaping strategy. In turn, this assisted further refinement of the interview questions (stage 
3) and, simultaneously, allowed the researcher to provide participating NEDs with a more 
comprehensive briefing on the selection of the most appropriate decision case: the subsequent 
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interview stage. The pre-interview (stage 2) and post-interview validation meetings (stage 4) 
in an informal setting used note-taking instead of an audio recorder. This allowed individuals 
to speak more candidly about board life and provided the researcher with valuable contextual 
insights. 
The validation meetings (stage 4) served the purpose of confirming identified themes but, 
more importantly, added subtler nuances and surfaced additional themes not covered during 
the audio-recorded interview. The validation meetings also had an unexpected benefit in that 
they raised genuine excitement among participating NEDs about potential findings of the 
study and its relevance for director learning and self-development. Several NEDs also shared 
their opinions concerning current board reviews they had experienced. A number indicated 
that the reviews were somewhat superficial and suggested that studies (such as the one 
presented in this thesis) could contribute to the quality of board reviews. 
3.2.5 Case Selection 
As noted, there is a tendency for case study selection to be too broad for meaningful 
conclusions to be inducted (Gummesson 1991). Therefore, placing boundaries on the case, 
even before considering the sample, was a critical step defining what is in and out of the 
scope of this study. These boundaries are described in this section. 
First, consideration was given to the number of cases. Case study iteration shows that there is 
no ideal number of cases: ‘a number between four and 10 cases usually works well. With 
fewer than four cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much complexity’ 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 545). 
Second, the choice of public companies (as opposed to private companies) was driven by the 
researcher’s access to public company directors and her established reputation of working 
with boards and directors. Further, public companies allowed access to important contextual 
information in the form of public documents on corporate strategy, growth plans, stock 
exchange announcements, annual reports, analyst briefings and historical information about 
strategy, including press reports on the history of director appointments and departures on 
previous boards. Although this secondary data was not part of the analysis, it provided useful 
contextual information for the researcher. 
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Third, limiting the type of decision to one large transformative type, such as 
internationalisation, allowed the researcher to control variations in the decision context that 
may have influenced the decision dynamic or process. Fourth, in studying the dynamic 
surrounding board involvement in strategy, it was necessary to limit this study to a single 
governance jurisdiction—in this case, Australia. Nevertheless, this study may have wider 
applicability because of the similarities of public company jurisdiction in Australia with other 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK, Canada, US and New Zealand. 
While this study focused on the internationalisation decision scenario and the strategy-
shaping behaviour of individual directors, where practicable, the researcher approached 
NEDs representing companies from diverse sectors to obtain additional insights into the 
phenomenon under study. As noted, while it was clear that it would be neither practical nor 
possible to negotiate direct access to board meetings relating to such a commercially sensitive 
decision, the researcher took the approach of case reconstruction through interviewing NEDs 
after the event. 
A total of 15 companies were selected using the above criteria. A scan of the boards of these 
companies (on their company website) was undertaken to determine the make-up of a board 
to identify NEDs most likely to support the research. The NED selection process is described 
in Section 3.2.6. 
3.2.6 Enlisting NED Participation, Snowballing and Pre-understanding 
Following the selection of companies that met the decision-case criteria, a scan of NEDs was 
conducted to determine those within the researcher’s professional networks or known to 
those within those networks. The researcher initially identified four NEDs within the network 
who were known to her as having strong personal standing among their peer directors or who 
held multiple directorships. Once the support of the four NEDs was enlisted, the researcher 
relied on their personal advocacy with other NEDs of the identified companies. Using this 
‘snowballing’ approach, the remaining 11 NEDs were enlisted, either through the enlisted 
director contacting other director candidates personally or by sending an email. 
Initial pre-meetings were then arranged through an introduction to explore the candidates’ 
interests in participating in the study. The research aim was described in an email, together 
with general information about the approach to conducting the research. All except one NED 
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approached in this way accepted the email invitation for a preliminary meeting without 
obligation to participate in a subsequent and more formal audio-recorded interview. 
The pre-meetings were mostly conducted face to face with only three conducted by phone. 
While the purpose of the meeting was to secure the NEDs’ participation and allow them to 
feel comfortable about the research and the researcher, pre-meetings had the added value of 
deepening the pre-understanding of the researcher, as well as piquing the interest of the NED. 
The NEDs who had been recommended by the original four directors, and not previously met 
the researcher, were keen to understand the researcher’s grasp of board life and governance 
challenges. It was clear that NEDs who did not personally know the researcher were keen to 
establish her credibility. The credibility of the researcher and the importance of building trust 
while negotiating consent to conduct qualitative research is supported by Gummesson (1991); 
the pre-meeting offered that opportunity. 
During the pre-meeting, the purpose of the research and required time commitment were 
described. Matters relating to confidentiality and how this would be secured were also 
discussed. Confidentiality was anticipated as a key consideration for all the NEDs and 
examples of how the profile of the decision cases would be depicted in any future reports 
were mocked up and presented. The researcher also used the meeting to clarify some general 
points about participant backgrounds, ask questions about how directors saw their role in 
strategy and to share their insights about the differences between different boards, where 
applicable. 
Most NEDs were very open with the researcher in sharing examples of what, in their 
experience, had and had not worked well in shaping strategy. Several NEDs indicated that the 
human aspects of governance were important to accurately reflect the challenges they faced. 
Several made encouraging comments about the focus on the human side of governance; they 
also indicated that the focus on the quality of board engagement concerning strategy was an 
important subject of governance research. 
Once they had verbally agreed to participate, the NEDs were asked to reflect on an example 
of a decision episode that met the case criteria—a transformative decision such as 
internalisation or equivalent considered to be of great strategic importance to the company. 
Johnson and Scholes’s (2002) definition of strategy was used in the pre-meetings to focus on 
a strategic decision as one that could potentially and profoundly change the direction and 
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scope of a company over the long term. Boards are faced with many types of strategic 
decisions. As such, an important consideration was how the researcher might limit decision 
variability. Therefore, the researcher requested the participating NEDs to limit the decision 
case they selected to a transformative decision such as a major international market-entry 
investment, merger or acquisition, or a divestment decision with: 
1. significant financial and reputational risk to the company 
2. extreme complexity in the number of moving parts in the decision 
3. great uncertainty with few precedents for the company to rely on, such as the case 
of an international transaction 
4. potentially multiple and conflicting stakeholder interests that needed to be resolved 
satisfactorily 
5. involvement from the entire board over an extended period, during which critical 
variables were constantly changing. 
Since this discussion occurred during the pre-meetings, it gave the NED the opportunity to 
consider their selection of the decision before the recorded interview occurred. If they agreed 
to be interviewed, a formal invitation letter was provided and they were advised that a 
consent form would be brought to the interview for signature. A date, time and place were set 
for the interview. All NEDs were agreeable to a 60–90-minute audio-recorded interview. 
None objected to being audio-recorded on the basis that the reports would not contain any 
identifiable data and could be inspected on request. 
On reflection, the pre-meetings achieved an important and unexpected outcome. NEDs had 
time to ponder the chosen decision case. Several indicated—both on the day of the interview 
and before the interview commenced—that they had spent time picking a decision case that, 
in their view, conveyed many of the challenges associated with board involvement in shaping 
strategy. Additionally, as the method used was case reconstruction, it was important to flag, 
ahead of time, the level of detail required to facilitate a director’s recollection. The pre-
meetings also deepened the researcher’s pre-understanding of the issues and helped to refine 
the interview questions and the interviewing style (Gummesson 1991). 
The ‘snowballing’ approach to enlist support for this study was critical and relied on the 
existence of strong networks in the NED community. The level of perceived experience and 
credibility of the researcher in these circles was a necessary part in generating the required 
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level of trust. The researcher is a corporate consultant with expertise in organisational change 
and team effectiveness, who regularly provides services to board-level directors and TMTs. 
This allowed her to establish rapport and credibility with participating directors relatively 
quickly. Based on this experience, the researcher argues that partnerships between scholars 
and practitioners may be a critical part of future research design to secure the personal 
involvement of NEDs in large public companies. 
3.2.7 Profile of Participating Directors 
The 15 NEDs interviewed were engaged in a range of industry sectors: retail (2), telco (3), 
industrial (3), banking or financial services (3), insurance (1), infrastructure (2) and property 
(1). The transformative decisions the NEDs recalled were major international business 
acquisitions or divestments made by Australian public companies across Europe, Asia, Africa 
and the US. 
The business background of the NEDs spanned a range of functions. Nine had a general 
management background combined with other functional expertise in areas such as 
engineering, financial services and logistics. Three NEDs had backgrounds in banking 
combined with economics, law or finance, while a further three NEDs had a legal 
background, two of whom were in professional services. One NED had a background in the 
resources sector combined with finance. 
Tenure on the board (from which the decision case was taken) ranged from one to 12 years 
with the weighted average being five years at the time of the study. The overall length of 
experience of the NED sample, as measured by year of initial directorship appointment, 
ranged from 2000–2011. Ages ranged from 53–70 years with the weighted average being 61 
at the time of the study. 
All 15 NEDs held multiple directorships ranging from one to three public companies (not 
including the board from which the decision case was drawn) and most also held the same 
number on private companies, not-for-profits and statutory boards. This profile is typical of 
most directors of the largest ASX public companies in Australia. All NEDs (except one) 
reported past internationalisation experience. Of the 14 NEDs with internationalisation 
experience, three gained their experience with consulting firms advising on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). The profile of director participants is provided in Appendix 2. 
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3.2.8 NED Interviews 
NEDs agreed to participate in post-event reconstructed stories by recorded interview, 
provided confidentiality terms were negotiated up-front. The formal process also involved 
obtaining ethics approval from RMIT University (approval number 18858) before any NED 
contact was made or interviews conducted. 
Stories contain knowledge different from what is revealed by surveys, reading texts or 
interviews that do not explicitly elicit stories from expert informants, such as the directors in 
this study (Ospina & Dodge 2005; Weick 2007). Narratives offer researchers into social life 
the chance to explore issues such as social identity, intention, influence, control, power or 
change. Despite this, stories have been under-utilised as a data source to uncover and explore 
meaning (Ospina & Dodge 2005). 
The interview questions (contained in Appendix 1) captured post-event accounts of decision 
experiences in response to open-ended questions posed by the interviewer and reflected the 
NEDs’ retrospective and prospective sensemaking—that is, how a NED made sense of the 
decision they were called on to make, the sense they made of their role in influencing the 
decision outcomes and their interpretations of the interpersonal interactions surrounding the 
decisions. In their narratives, NEDs located themselves and others in various roles through 
the stories they told, implying a variety of power and knowledge positions. Through these 
narratives, they framed their roles to present themselves as competent and wise, legitimised 
their actions, reaffirmed their own strategic identities and demonstrated how they engaged in 
strategic activities and what they had learned (Brown & Thompson 2013). 
Through the audio recordings of the NEDs’ reconstructions of their decision-related 
interactions, this study attempted to explore how they established meanings, expressed 
cognition and articulated their perceptions of the environment, and (from this basis) how they 
legitimised their individual and collective judgements in their strategy-shaping role. In 
drawing on the principles of narrative analysis, the interviews were analysed as ‘meaning 
making events’ interpreted by the narrator and then the researcher (Brown & Thompson 
2013; Huff 1990). This approach sought to reveal the reconstruction of meaning in micro-
level strategic practices, rather than any kind of objective truth, and then reinterpret this 
meaning theoretically. 
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The case study approach recognises the importance of the subjective human creation of 
meaning—that is, that truth is relative and depends largely on the perception of the actor(s) 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Each case study is built on the premise that when actors tell their story, 
they describe their views of reality to explain to themselves and to others the reasons for their 
actions—in this case, the reasons they give for adopting certain (decision) practices and how 
a group influenced their strategic input. 
To optimise the potential of conversational recall, the researcher requested a NED to limit 
cases to those that occurred within the last two years and, therefore, contribute to the richness 
of their recollections through the recency effect. However, this was not the only way in which 
the researcher sought to optimise conversational recall. The interview was generally held a 
week after the pre-interview meeting, during which a NED was briefed about the kind of 
decision the researcher was seeking. Additionally, the questions were designed in a way that 
assisted recall, starting with a NED’s general recollection of a decision and progressively 
moving the questioning to more detailed interactions as the decision process unfolded. 
In conducting the interview process, the study adopted the behavioural event interviewing 
(BEI) method (Boyatzis 1998; McClelland 1998). The researcher was formally accredited in 
the BEI methodology and has had experience using this methodology in Australia and 
internationally. This semi-structured interview process focuses on thoughts, feelings, 
behaviours and outcomes. It requires a high degree of rigour from the interviewer in 
complying with the interview protocol to reveal patterns of intentional behaviour. To 
understand what makes the best people successful, McClelland (1998) sought to understand 
not just what they do, but the thoughts and feelings that generate actions. The BEI method 
identifies deep-rooted thoughts and behaviour patterns of people to reveal what would 
otherwise be hidden characteristics that significantly influence behaviour. 
The methodology requires an interview subject to recount an experience they have previously 
encountered in vivid behavioural detail (in this case an acquisition decision) with the 
interviewer walking by the side of the interview subject, as it were, while they recount their 
experience (McClelland 1998). The strength of the BEI approach is that the interview subject 
is not able to produce rehearsed answers that are hypothetical. The underpinning principle in 
BEI as a methodology is that it assumes how an interview subject behaved in the past can 
predict how they will behave in the future when faced with similar experiences. Each 
question was explored using BEI interrogative probes such as, ‘what did you do’, ‘what did 
		
74 
you say’, ‘how did you react’, ‘what crossed your mind then’ and ‘what was your thinking 
behind what you said’, thus, allowing the interviewer to surface tacit knowledge of 
recollections. As noted, applied to a decision case, the method required a participating NED 
to consider pivotal events during what is typically a 12–18-month period of intense board 
interactions and recount these in the interview. While not as effective as ‘catching reality in 
flight’, as if the researcher had sat through meetings over that duration, the process was as 
close to board access that commercially sensitive considerations would allow (Boyatzis 1998; 
McClelland 1975, 1985, 1998). 
The research interviews were up to 90 minutes in duration and commenced with overview 
questions that took between 8–10 minutes. These questions related to how NEDs joined a 
board, what attracted them and the beliefs and values that underpinned their board work. This 
was followed up by semi-structured questions pertaining to the selected decision case. As the 
decision case played out over an extended period comprising a series of formal and informal 
meetings, NEDs were asked to recollect interactions they perceived as major or pivotal points 
during the decision-making process. 
The interview questions were explicitly derived from the research questions described in 
Section 3.1 and framed to elicit responses that were reconstructions of actual behaviour. 
Some questions were particularly powerful in this regard, generating valuable narratives 
about a NED’s cognitive approach, the importance they placed on certain kinds of boardroom 
interactions and how they perceived what was going on in a boardroom. However, the 
researcher allowed a NED to take the interview into areas that appeared to contain relevant 
and additional value to the research, including contextual value. NEDs spoke openly and 
frankly about their recollections including their private reflections as decision interactions 
progressed. 
At the end of the interview, a ‘catch all’ question was posed asking if a NED had any further 
comments to make about desired and non-desired behaviours they wanted to see in relation to 
NEDs’ involvement in strategy. Following the interviews, a ‘decision story’ or profile of each 
decision case was prepared to synthesise the data into a non-identifiable summary table of the 
15 cases studied. This is shown in Appendix 2. This profile was undertaken using 
information from company and stock exchange websites, and public domain information on 
the decision, if it had proceeded. A ‘file’ was created for each case, providing the researcher 
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with a deeper understanding of the external context of the decision cases studied. Some data 
not available in the public domain were later clarified with respective NEDs. 
Where necessary, follow-up interviews of approximately 30 minutes were conducted with six 
NEDs to clarify audio-recorded interview responses. Field notes were also taken during all 
face-to-face interactions and supplemented the audio recording as well as the pre-
understanding phase. Field notes also recorded the researcher’s impressions, ongoing 
reflections and thoughts as the study progressed. 
There are some potential concerns with post-event reconstructions. Foremost is the concern 
that it may not accurately reflect practices in the past. In addition to recollection issues, there 
may also be the influence of hindsight bias and good impression efforts on the part of the 
interview subject. 
This is a challenge that most qualitative researchers face. Golden (1992) found evidence that 
executives’ recollections of their past strategies are often biased. Executives recall past 
strategies that are more rational and consistent with current strategies. Therefore, Golden 
(1992) cautions against the use of retrospective accounts. However, the position taken by this 
researcher is that the accuracy of recall is not critical because the aim of this inductive 
exploratory inquiry is to understand a NED’s construal of their decision experiences, to 
explore the meanings they personally attached to those experiences and their responses to 
these interpretations. 
3.2.9 Summary 
To improve the trustworthiness of this overall study, the researcher sought to design the 
research approach carefully. This was done by ensuring the issue questions (Stake 1995) 
were well crafted and clearly written, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings 
were considered, the case design (including its bounded context) was appropriate for the 
research questions posed and the data were collected and managed systematically. 
One of the challenges associated with the study of complex phenomena, such as this study, is 
the challenge of putting the large volume of data collected into a format that is readily 
understood by readers. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) referred to this as creating tidy 
‘intellectual bins’. To this end, Figure 2.1 was extremely useful in that it helped to create 
three tidy bins into which to organise the large quantity of data collected. Data organisation 
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was also facilitated during the coding of influence attempts (either those witnessed by the 
participating director or personally mounted by them) and using narrative analysis to distil 
the phenomenon of boardroom influence into data maps. One danger of this approach is a 
potential fragmentation of the story of influence resulting from treating each data map 
independently from the context in which that influence occurs. Essentially, the organising 
framework shown in Figure 2.1 provided a ‘meta-structure’ ensuring that the totality of the 
case was neither lost nor was the phenomenon simply viewed through the eyes of the 
participating directors. The approach to this dual challenge of not fragmenting the bigger 
story (Eisenhardt 1989; Pettigrew 1992) while organising the data into digestible chunks is 
described in Section 3.3. 
3.3 Approach to Analysis 
The function of research is not necessarily to map and conquer the world but to 
sophisticate the beholding of it. (Stake 1995, p. 43) 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 91) describe the process of qualitative analysis as climbing a 
‘ladder of abstraction’ by which: 
you begin with a text, trying out coding categories on it, then moving to identify 
themes and trends, and then to testing hunches and findings, aiming first to 
delineate the ‘deep structure’ and then to integrate the data into an explanatory 
framework. 
As noted, the approach taken by this inductive study is unique in that it uses NEDs’ 
interpretations of their decision experiences to analyse not only their cognitive and affective 
orientations to the strategic task at hand but also ‘to walk with them’ as they recount how 
they acted on those interpretations. ‘Inductively rich’ sensemaking data were embedded in 
narratives, stories, anecdotes and historical accounts provided by a participating NED to the 
semi-structured questions posed by the researcher. 
Process research, such as this study, is concerned with understanding how events evolve over 
time and why they evolve in that way. Process data consists of stories about what happened 
and who did what and when, and, thus, can be messy (Langley 1999). Therefore, it requires a 
means of conceptualising events and detecting patterns. 
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This section proceeds with an overview of the data analysis process followed by a discussion 
of issues relating to an analysis of the interviews. These include Section 3.3.1, how ‘codable 
moments’ (as influence attempts) were identified; Section 3.3.2, data mapping; Section 3.3.3, 
the relation between issue domains, influence attempts and behavioural codes; Section 3.3.4, 
theme validations; Section 3.3.5, cross-case comparisons and Section 3.3.6, the process of 
theory development. 
In analysing the data, the aim was to understand intention and action, rather than just 
explaining behaviour. The researcher was keen to explore the delicate role that behavioural 
interactions played in the shaping of strategy, rather than the mere process or procedural 
aspects of strategic oversight. Transcripts from the recorded interviews and notes taken at the 
pre-, post- and validation meetings offered a significant volume of data in this regard. 
Each decision case was analysed to generate issue domains and behavioural constructs. These 
were used to confirm, modify or extend theory. The process approach taken did not just result 
in a compilation of a variety of actor-based perspectives. Instead, it allowed for innovative 
and creative interpretation and theory development by deconstructing, categorising and 
reconstructing data to develop, redefine and create new accounts of what occurred in these 15 
decision cases, as conceived by the respective NEDs. An open-ended process of inductive 
reasoning and pattern recognition was used. This resembled a constantly iterating cycle of 
deduction and induction, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. The data analysis process. 
Source: Author 
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At all times, the organising framework (Figure 2.1) was used to guide the iterating cycles of 
analysis, which sought to reveal how the effects of power and social identity were evidenced 
in the way influence attempts were mounted and to how such attempts were responded. 
Particularly, the framework focused on the collection of data relating to the three research 
questions: What are the origins of power and how do differentials in power between board 
directors emerge? How does the strength of identity of an individual director and their sense 
of shared identity with a group construct a power dynamic that influences decision-making? 
How do the effects of group membership or identification and power differentials interact to 
create a unique ‘social reality’ and how does the ‘social reality’ moderate the use of influence 
in and around a boardroom? The analysis results are presented in Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 
4.1.4 respectively. 
3.3.1 Identifying ‘Codable Moments’ 
Interview transcripts were ‘chunked’ to select what the researcher judged as ‘codable 
moments’ during which influence attempts were mounted or responded to by NEDs. Codable 
moments were simply passages in the transcript that appeared to depict influencing 
behaviour, both in thought and action. Once these codable moments, rich in NED 
interpretations, were identified and marked through a given NED transcript, they were 
analysed using Huff’s (1990) narrative analysis structure, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Four-level narrative analysis used to code each influence attempt. 
Source: Huff (1990) 
Huff’s (1990) approach, later expanded as mapping strategic knowledge (Huff & Jenkins 
2002) and sometimes referred to as ‘cognitive mapping’, is used extensively in social 
psychology and management science to structure large volumes of data. It is a visual way of 
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mapping the process cognition and allows complex thoughts that emerge during the strategy 
process to be mapped simply (Eden 1992; Hodgkinson & Maule 2002). Huff’s (1990) 
narrative analysis structure allowed the researcher to move from raw data to behavioural 
codes and themes. 
Applying these four levels of narrative analysis allowed the researcher to produce data maps 
from codable moments. This was done by first considering what passage in an interview a 
subject emphasised, second, what associations they made and third, the importance they 
attributed to those associations. The third level leads to a final but critical level of analysis as 
the beliefs, norms and cognitive frames that underpin NED responses to a strategic task at 
hand, which may be somewhat more resistant to change through dialogue. For example, if a 
codable moment referred to NEDs voicing a concern during a boardroom debate about an 
aspect of a decision, it was analysed in terms of what they paid attention to, what associations 
they were making, what importance they were attaching to those associations and what 
cognitive frames or beliefs it represented in relation to strategy shaping. Even when NEDs 
reported a thought they chose not to voice, a similar approach was taken. Table 3.4 shows an 
example of the narrative analysis applied to a single codable moment in one of the 15 
transcripts using data mapping, which is further described in Section 3.3.2. 
Table 3.4: 
Analysing NED Behaviour: Moving from Rich ‘Codable Moments’ to ‘Influence 
Attempt’ Themes Using Data Mapping 
Attention ‘You did not get the full picture of what each one was thinking until this 
one meeting I remember … and end-of-meeting offline discussion 
between four NEDs (while packing up) about the issues of taking too 
conservative a position on value’ 
Associations ‘It was remarkable that this group had the same thoughts as I had. I had 
assumed I was the only one thinking this way. I had assumed as financial 
or CFO types, a cabal, they would think in a particular way—CFOs often 
can’t see past the numbers and do not understand strategy’ 
Importance ‘This was a pivotal moment for me where the experience of the people in 
the room and the extent of their views became clear to me. We [referring 
to the four] decided we would not be pushed into this and take control of 
the situation … [Y]ou see boards have a high degree of formality and 
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reserve—what you need is that magic in the interaction to create real 
pivotal moments for the board-decision turning points’ 
Systems of 
meaning 
‘Offline discussions can be powerful in calibrating views, testing the 
assumptions we make about others’ opinions around the table and 
solidifying a position’ 
Source: Excerpt from NED G’s data map showing a single influence attempt using Huff’s (1990) narrative 
analysis framework 
This codable moment illustrates how a casual offline interaction between a small group of 
NEDs following the end of a formal board meeting can represent important influence 
attempts with the potential (as it did in this case) to change the course of a strategy. For the 
purposes of this study, an influence attempt was defined as a specific intervention initiated by 
one or more NEDs designed to make an effective contribution to the direction and nature of a 
decision debate. 
3.3.2 Data Mapping 
Given the volume of data collected, a sensemaking strategy had to be devised (Langley 
1999). Data maps were adopted as the best way to make sense of the data. Each interview 
was distilled into a single data map. Each data map contained multiple ‘codable moments’ 
(influence attempts) for each interview, sweeping up within them a range of behavioural 
codes (refer to Section 3.3.3). The 15 data maps were valuable in that they facilitated the 
process of cross-case comparisons and helped identify patterns of influence common or 
unique across decision cases. ‘Data maps’ generated from this process resembled a table with 
10–12 influence attempts running horizontally across a page and Huff’s (1990) levels of 
narrative analysis running vertically down a page. The ‘in your own words’ data maps 
(showing unedited passages from the interview transcript) were produced for each of the 15 
decision cases. 
In the excerpt from NED G’s data map shown in Table 3.4, his description shows how a 
subgroup of NEDs came to a decision outside the confines of a board meeting, unbeknown to 
the Chair or the other directors. They then agreed to exert collective influence in a subsequent 
board meeting. The excerpt also reflects the assumptions NEDs make about the thinking or 
attitudes of others (in this case, relating to the conservatism on value creation) using a ‘like 
me’ or ‘unlike me’ lens. While the decision story that NED G narrated was a very casual 
encounter, it set up a situation in which, at the next board meeting, the four directors were 
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united in their concerns about the deal and were clear about a counter-position they would put 
to the board. As a minority group, the ‘pooling’ of their influence in this story excerpt 
reversed the direction of the decision. 
Data mapping provided inductively rich sensemaking data on which the findings in this study 
were developed. The findings from the data mapping process (presented in Chapter 4) 
provide sufficient interpretation of the data, but care was taken to ensure readers can draw 
their own conclusions. It is important in qualitative research to allow readers the opportunity 
to gain their own experiential understanding of the case and stimulate alternative reflections 
about what is occurring. In the constructivist tradition of case study investigations, 
researchers are justified in using many narrative descriptions in their reports (Stake 1995). 
3.3.3 Issue Domains, Influence Attempts and Behavioural Codes 
While a small number of a priori codes or categories of code were derived from the extensive 
literature review, the data maps were generated around identified influence attempts, which, 
in turn, generated larger numbers of behavioural codes or themes relating to strategy-shaping 
behaviours contained in the interviewed NED narratives. In this study, a distinction was made 
between an issue domain and a code. For purposes of this analysis, issue domains were 
treated as ‘what’ the influence attempt focused on and a code was treated as the ‘how’. That 
is, an issue domain was not a behaviour, but an influencing attempt, while a code related to 
actual NED behaviour in achieving that influence attempt. To illustrate this distinction using 
the data mapping shown in Table 3.4, the issue domain was an offline influence attempt 
while the behavioural codes included ‘this one meeting I remember’ (attention), ‘I had 
assumed I was the only one’ (association), ‘CFOs often can’t see past the numbers and do not 
understand strategy’ (association), ‘pivotal moment for me’ (importance), ‘not being pushed 
into this’ and ‘magic in the interaction’ (importance), and ‘offline discussions can be 
powerful in calibrating views … testing the assumptions … solidifying a position’ (systems 
of meaning). 
3.3.4 Validating Data Maps, Issue Domains, Influence Attempts and Behavioural Codes 
Stage 4 of the research methodology (Table 3.3) was theme validation; that is, it concerned 
the validation of the researcher’s interpretation of the interview data and, hence, the potential 
to strengthen the research findings (Baxter & Jack 2008; Eisenhardt 1989). Qualitative 
research is often perceived as being less able to ensure validity than quantitative research 
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(Bansal 2013). To deal with these concerns, a step was inserted into this analysis that 
involved taking the data map back to a NED for validation. All 15 validation meetings 
(which lasted on average 60 minutes) involved showing a data map to a NED and working 
through the detail of the maps, including issue domains and the behavioural themes. The 
‘systems of meaning’ conclusions drawn by the researcher were also tested with NEDs, 
asking if, in fact, it reflected the cognitive frames, belief or values underpinning their 
approach to the task at hand. The validation step proved useful for several reasons. First, it 
provided some validation for the quality and integrity of the analysis and the researcher’s 
conclusions about the codable moments. Second, it allowed NEDs the opportunity to add 
nuance, which had the effect, in some cases, of adding more clarity to the theme and, in other 
cases, materially changing the emphasis of a given theme. Third, in some cases, viewing the 
data maps triggered a new theme in a NED, which they thought was important to add. 
All the issue domains and behavioural codes were confirmed with some minor refinements. 
Validation meetings were held with all 15 directors, 12 of which were conducted face to face 
while the meetings with the remaining NEDs were conducted by phone because of their 
overseas travel and other commitments. Detailed field notes were taken of all meetings with 
directors at all stages of the data collecting process. 
3.3.5 Within-case and Cross-case Comparisons 
As part of the validation process (stage 4), and following the within-case analysis using the 
data mapping technique, a cross-case search for patterns was undertaken. Cross-case 
comparisons are critical in ensuring the researcher does not prematurely or even falsely draw 
conclusions due to information processing biases (Eisenhardt 1989; Kahneman & Tversky 
1973; Miles & Huberman 1984). 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) technique of selecting pairs of cases and listing the similarities and 
differences between each pair was employed to undertake cross-case comparisons. This 
forced the researcher to look for subtle similarities and differences: differences found in 
seemingly similar cases and similarities found in seemingly different cases. Additionally, 
comparisons were also made between cases in which a decision was made and cases in which 
it was shelved. Four criteria were applied in this process: 
1. Recurring patterns that appeared in more than one transcript could be sensibly 
labelled as an issue domain. 
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2. Each issue domain was supported by multiple sources of data such as numerous 
narratives of unfolding conversations or debates across several cases. 
3. Concepts, themes or effects not anticipated when the study was embarked upon 
were noted. 
4. Links could be made to existing theories of group behaviour and dynamics. When 
linkages were not evident, consideration was given to what other theories may 
offer a full or partial explanation. 
5. The NEDs themselves confirmed these themes as issues of significance at the 
validation meetings. 
This approach to cross-case comparison increased the possibility that this study would 
capture novel findings and improved the likelihood of an accurate and reliable theory; 
essentially, the theory would have a closer fit with the data (Eisenhardt 1989). 
3.3.6 Theory Development 
Stage 5 of the research design, theory development, elaboration and extension involved 
shaping the emerging themes, returning to the research questions and asking how the data 
might answer the questions posed. This stage also involved going back to the literature 
review and the theories considered there to ascertain two things: if and how the data 
supported or elaborated a current theory or whether it were not reflected by any current 
theory. A model capturing the psychosocial effects within the decision story told by a NED 
was then taken back to all participating NEDs to surface alternative interpretations or rival 
perspectives. As field research on boards is continually evolving—particularly the emergence 
of new inductive studies—one objective of stage 5 was to continue to review recent and 
emerging studies to determine if there were contradictory findings and their significance. The 
model was received well by respondents and, apart from minor adaptations in form rather 
than content, was confirmed as an accurate encapsulation of the NEDs’ experience of the 
social reality of their board and social influence in and around a boardroom. 
In addition to developing the data maps, key quotes that captured the essence of a director’s 
contribution to strategic decision-making were extracted from the transcripts for use in the 
case write-up to allow readers to make their own alternative interpretations (Cousin 2005). 
Following Eisenhardt’s (1989) prescription, the 15 decision cases produced more than 
enough data saturation sufficient to elaborate a theory with a degree of complexity and a 
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convincing empirical grounding for those theoretical conclusions. Particularly, the analysis 
focused on ascertaining the degree to which differences existed in NED strategy involvement 
on three levels: distinctions between the sources from which different directors derived their 
power to influence, variations between directors in the use of power and the variations in the 
effect group membership (or ‘place in the group’) had on director behaviour. For example, it 
was interesting to note if and how group membership encouraged certain kinds of behaviours 
and inhibited others, which, in turn, created a unique ‘social reality’ that differed from NED 
exposure to other boards. 
One of the big challenges facing case-study based theory development in the interpretive 
tradition is the subjective bias of the researcher. This is generally accepted as a given in case 
research (Cousin 2005). Cousin (2005) proposed six strategies for minimising ‘narrative 
fraud’ (Cousin p. 426): overstating results from flimsy evidence, ignoring local effects and 
opportunistically cherry picking the data. Bassey (1999) referred to this as the ethic of 
caution. Strategies to avoid this include triangulation when making contestable assertions and 
ensuring participant accounts provided ‘thick descriptions’ (Cousin 2005, p. 424). The aim is 
‘to write up a case study capable of ‘giving readers the vicarious experience of being there so 
they can share in the interpretation of the case’ and adjudicating its worth alongside the 
researcher’ (Cousin 2005, p. 424; Stake 1995). Both these strategies were adopted to guard 
against ‘narrative fraud’ and overstate findings. 
3.4 Summary of Research Questions and Methodology 
In conclusion, the approach taken to the methodology and methods used in this study 
responds to calls by board researchers to humanise corporate governance by undertaking 
more inductive studies closer to the coalface, in which governance is practiced rather than 
offering ‘distant predictions’ of how boards behave (Ahrens, Filatotchev & Thomsen 2011; 
McNulty, Florackis & Ormrod 2013a; McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013b; Petrovic 2008; 
Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). 
Influence attempts—behaviours recounted by NEDs to influence or be influenced by their 
board peers—was approached as relational and socially accomplished between members of 
the board group; therefore, a phenomenological approach was appropriate. The approach 
taken in this study (which uses a director as decision-maker as the unit of analysis) is unique 
in that it used the NEDs’ interpretations of their decision experiences to analyse their 
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cognitive and affective orientations to the strategic task at hand and ‘to walk with them’ as 
they recount how they acted on those interpretations. ‘Inductively rich’ sensemaking data was 
elicited from the narratives, stories, anecdotes and historical accounts provided by 
participating NEDs in response to the semi-structured questions posed by the researcher. 
Data collection focused on the delicate role that behavioural interactions played in shaping 
strategy, rather than more process or procedural aspects of strategic oversight. The recorded 
interviews, pre- and post-meetings, validation meetings and field notes (which also captured 
non-verbal information) offered a significant volume of data to identify interaction patterns 
that illuminated ‘why’ and ‘how’ research questions. 
The BEI method was used to surface both behavioural actions and participant thoughts and 
feelings. This method contrasts with the limitations of survey questionnaires or observational 
methods, which are better able to capture behavioural actions but not necessarily the thoughts 
and feelings underpinning those behaviours. The multiple case methodology (Yin 2014) was 
chosen for its ability to explore how different NEDs responded to their decision experiences 
and applied their influence variously across the 15 cases. The decision stories that the 15 
NEDs recounted as a transformative decision were used as the instrument (Yin 2014). The 
constant juxtaposition of different social realities derived from each case allowed for 
comparative case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; Stake 1995) and facilitated a greater level of 
quality in determining inductive themes. A multistage approach to collecting data from the 
individual directors was also employed to develop deeper insights into what was occurring in 
and around a boardroom. 
Since it was neither practical nor possible to negotiate direct access to board meetings 
regarding a commercially sensitive decision, this study took the approach of case 
reconstruction through interviewing NEDs after an identified event occurred. The decision 
story they told was treated as instrumental of the decision dynamic, with directors as the 
actors in a case. This approach contrasts with other case studies in board governance in which 
the unit of analysis is a company or board. The overall design of the research study addressed 
some of the challenges often cited in the literature about gaining access to board directors and 
boards to study them more closely. 
As noted, concerns have been raised in the past about retrospective accounts (Golden 1992; 
Huber & Power 1985; Schwenk 1995). Foremost is the concern that accuracy may be 
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effected by hindsight bias and good impression efforts on the part of an interview subject. 
Golden (1992) found evidence that executives’ recollections of their past strategies are often 
biased. Executives recall past strategies that are more rational and consistent with current 
strategies than they were at the time. In addressing these concerns, the position taken by this 
study is that the accuracy of recall is not critical. The aim of this inductive exploratory 
inquiry was to understand a director’s construal of their decision experiences, exploring the 
meanings that they attached to those experiences and how they acted on their interpretations 
of those experiences. 
The collective case-study method (Stake 1995) also allowed this study to optimise its 
iterative nature—the ability to go back and forth between cases (Eisenhardt 1989). This 
iterative process allowed the data collected to be viewed from multiple perspectives, 
potentially strengthening the constructs and theoretical results and increasing the likelihood 
of generating a novel theory. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion 
This chapter describes and discusses the findings from the data collected from each of the 15 
NEDs (as expert informants) about their experiences in shaping strategy. The findings—
which, as noted in Chapter 3, focused on the influence attempts of individual NEDs—reflect 
the interpretive approach taken by this study. They describe and discuss common behavioural 
themes and variations reported by the NEDs. 
The findings reveal a complex social reality into which NEDs must fit and, consequently, the 
behaviours they demonstrated during the process of arriving at a decision with their board 
peers. Particularly, the findings reveal how social identity and power play a role in who 
chooses to influence whom and upon how such influence attempts are received and acted. 
These findings contrast with regulatory assumptions that assume a board’s decision-making 
processes are characterised by rational action alone. Rational action theories and theories 
spawned from the economic research tradition alone cannot explain the findings of this study. 
Consistent with process-oriented research and inductive qualitative studies, this chapter takes 
a discursive approach to relate the findings to the three research questions posed by this study 
and the subsequent discussion of their implications. A discursive approach is required for 
three reasons. First, the findings overlap in that various data as codable moments can relate to 
several issues raised by each research question. Second, consistent with the iterative approach 
taken to data analysis, some interview questions, originally thought to be of less importance, 
elicited responses that were later found to be significant findings in determining themes 
relevant to the research questions. Third, it was important to contextualise the findings in 
relation to the research questions by describing the overall nature of the strategic decision-
making process, as reported by participating NEDs. 
Hence, this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 describes the four stages involved in a 
strategic episode and the opportunities each provides for potential NED influence. Section 
4.2 addresses research question one: what are the origins of and differences in an individual 
NED’s power? More particularly, it introduces the concept of a NED’s cognitive history as 
the source of power to influence, which includes cognitive and social capital. This section 
also considers how differences in NED motivations for joining a board may affect the use of 
their cognitive history and, hence, how power differentials emerge on a board. Section 4.3 
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reports on findings relating to research question two: how does a NED’s sense of shared 
identity with the board group shape the process of decision-making? It describes themes 
arising from the data concerning the importance of the strength of group identification as one 
source of the power dynamic that influences a decision-making process and the importance of 
subjective validations in the receiving and granting of social support for influence attempts. 
Section 4.4 further reports on research question two by considering the behavioural variations 
in a NED’s use of influence. These are related to task and role tensions that arise in a board 
dynamic, as determined by the relational and dispositional themes observed by participating 
NEDs, which, in turn, determine how and why they choose to exercise their power to 
influence. This section also considers how relational and dispositional themes contribute to 
the moderating effects of the ‘social reality’ of a board and, thus, in part addresses research 
question three: how do the effects of group membership or identification and power 
differentials interact to create a unique ‘social reality’ that moderates the use of influence in 
and around a boardroom? In describing the unique ‘social reality’ that arises, in part, from a 
NED’s relational and dispositional skills, this section then describes nine types of multiple 
influencing NED personae. Section 4.5 continues a description of the findings in relation to 
research question three in terms of how the use of NED influence in decision-making is 
shaped by the ‘social reality’ of group identification and power distribution. Section 4.6 
presents a discussion of the findings, including the triggers of influence attempts and their 
responses, the ‘hidden’ social hierarchy in which influence attempts occur, the social 
hierarchy and character of a board, and an emerging framework of social competence for 
director effectiveness. It also discusses inferences and insights into the practices of 
strategically active boards and the implications of the study for theory development, 
including a dynamic ‘psychosocial’ model of boardroom influence. Finally, discussion 
contextualises the findings and themes in terms of the relevant literature, although (where 
necessary) given the depth of the findings and their implications, the relevance of prior 
studies is also considered throughout this chapter. 
In summary, by explicating the ‘experience of influence’ in a process sense, these findings 
shift the focus from structural notions of power and influence in a boardroom to the 
interpersonal interactions between decision-makers and the effects and consequences of 
invisible ‘psychosocial’ effects on decision-makers and a decision-making process. The term 
‘psychosocial’ was coined by psychologist Erik Erikson (1959) to describe the interrelation 
between social factors and individual thoughts and behaviour. It considers an individual in 
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the context of the combined influence of psychological factors and their surrounding social 
environment. 
4.1 Strategic ‘Episodes’ and Opportunities to Influence 
Good process research considers embeddedness (Pettigrew 1992). Therefore, describing the 
strategy-shaping context was an important contextualisation for a deeper understanding of 
NED perceptions of their behaviour—the focus of the research questions. The strategy-
shaping context explains strategic episodes the NEDs encountered, which provided them with 
opportunities to contribute. 
The four stages of strategy shaping described in this section are not specifically related to any 
of the three research questions. Instead, strategy shaping shows that despite each participating 
NED selecting very different transformative decisions for purposes of this study, the strategy-
shaping contexts in which NEDs were making decisions had similarities across the 15 NED 
cases. 
For example, when a transformative decision was an international acquisition, it was 
observed that international growth was a strategic option raised by management and debated 
with a board over a considerable period. Formal consideration of an internationalisation 
strategy was then put on the agenda of the annual offsite strategy meeting. As Director I 
reported: 
generally, with these big investment decisions, there in a bucket of potential places 
we may go, grow and develop and they would have been shaken out during the 
strategy day, and so if it is on the list to be developed it is to be looked at, so there is 
not really anyone around the table that starts with the view that we should not do 
this. 
As noted, the data reflected four stages in the strategy-shaping process, taking (on average) 
up to 12 months, given the size of some acquisitions. The NEDs did not appear to engage in 
the strategy-shaping process from a neutral position without any prehistory. This prehistory 
was twofold: NEDs experience this particular ‘board group at work’, which included 
knowledge of discursive practices and the ‘political positions’ of their peers in the group. 
That is, they all had a mutual understanding (as distinct from a shared understanding) of the 
decision logic that each of their peers was likely to adopt and use in influence attempts. 
Additionally, their different business and functional experiences may, for example, result in 
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their interpretation of internationalisation ambitions and transaction risks differently from one 
another. Such differences in interpretations can produce ‘incompatible discourses’, which, in 
some cases, resulted in unresolvable differences. For example, the ‘we need to be in Asia’ 
discourse was not shared by all NEDs on one board because some NEDs believed that 
domestic growth could be better leveraged than it was at the time. This resulted in different 
NED attitudes, viewpoints and narratives about acquisition ambition and plans. 
It was difficult to determine the exact starting point of the decision stories covered by this 
study. NEDs reported that major transformative decisions often do not just become more 
formalised discussion points at offsite strategy meetings but germinate in the thinking of 
management through informal conversations CEOs may have with a Chair and other 
directors. These initial conversations sometimes occurred outside formal board meetings 
during which management sought to test board-thinking on a range of growth options. When 
they were convinced that the board would support growth options, management assumed they 
had agreement (tacit or otherwise) to bring an offshore investment proposal to the board. The 
following four decision stages were found in all 15 decision cases studied. 
4.1.1 Stage 1: Judging Strategic Fit 
The first stage was a director taking a personal position on whether a proposal could create 
value and the extent to which it was judged to fit the formally stated growth strategy of their 
company. In the case of the latter, this was not always a straightforward process. While some 
NEDs indicated that the quality of debate at the offsite strategy meeting was a major 
contribution to the quality of proposals received, others took a less sequential view. They 
pointed to the reality that a strategy session held 12 months prior may have little bearing on 
how a market may have turned or was disrupted by forces impossible to predict at the time. 
They recognised that a proposal may, at times, emerge opportunistically or that changing 
market dynamics made a proposed acquisition more interesting at this point in time rather 
than previously. 
As noted, in all 15 decision cases, the opportunity to create value was judged by the directors 
on two levels: their perception of the strategic logic of a proposal (that is, ‘how does this 
deliver value’) and their perception of its strategic coherence with the broader growth 
strategy of a company (that is, ‘how does this fit’). Particularly, the latter question related to 
alignment with the outcomes of the annual strategy retreat that all NEDs attended. All except 
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one of the 15 boards represented by the NEDs had a regular annual strategy day during which 
they had a broad discussion and agreement about the overall strategic direction of a company. 
NEDs reported a range of experiences of an annual strategy day. Some NEDs narrated their 
experience of a heavily backgrounded day packed with presentation after presentation from 
divisional managing directors (MDs) with partly or fully formed strategies and business 
plans. Hence, there was little time for unstructured discussion, debate or contention about 
options facing a company. Other NEDs interviewed described a much-improved format for a 
strategy retreat that had evolved over time, which provided NEDs with an opportunity for 
robust debate and an emergent sense of the strategic options and choices facing a company. 
Some boards invested time beforehand, discussing the specific conditions under which a 
transaction or acquisition would be considered (some NEDs referred to this as ‘go-no-go’ 
hurdles). However, in a majority of cases, this was not done until a transaction actually 
emerged and discussions were at a mature enough stage for management to feel comfortable 
in bringing a transaction to a board for discussion. Even then, formal decision ‘gates’ or ‘go-
no-go’ criteria were not used universally to evaluate transactions. As Director B reported: 
nothing formal … [I]t would generally be a conversation about the country being 
too heavily regulated or the costs of the acquisition being three or four times book 
or other reasons. 
4.1.2 Stage 2: Judging the Opportunity to Shape Strategy 
The second stage was the extent to which a director felt there was ‘room’ to shape a decision. 
This was contingent upon their evaluation of CEO openness to involve directors in a material 
way in shaping a proposal. In the case of a small number of directors, they perceived a 
proposal to be so well formed and developed that there was little opportunity for the 
participating NED to be involved. Director A narrated his experience of making three 
attempts before a CEO understood that a board was not just a rubber stamp. The director 
described his experience of the CEO’s unwillingness to engage with a board on matters of 
strategy to control the balance of power between the CEO and the board. This disengagement 
is consistent with research on ‘social distancing’ relating to the use of information asymmetry 
as a means of control by corporate elites (Westphal & Khanna 2005). Other directors also 
described their experience of the political behaviour of CEOs. This included subtle cooption 
by inquiring from one director (ahead of a board presentation) their opinion of another 
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director’s attitude to an already well-formed idea, and, therefore, secure an agreeable board 
when a proposal was finally tabled. For example, Director H reported: 
while chatting, they may say ‘what do you think John might think of this’ or ‘how 
do you think Sue will react on this point’ … this way they know how to tackle John 
… This kind of socialising of the proposal beforehand is not helpful to having a 
really robust debate as a group. So, you have to be engaged with management but 
alert and indifferent at the same time. 
This kind of political behaviour was regarded as neither constructive or conducive to creating 
an intra-boardroom trust nor helpful to a debate. It is further explored in Section 4.4.3. 
However, not all ideas brought to a board were well formed beforehand. In the case of 
Director L, one proposal was so poorly developed and unformed that it created some 
confusion among the NEDs about what the board was being asked to agree on or what was 
intended as the preferred strategic option. Nevertheless, most NEDs felt that proposals 
brought to a board had the potential to be shaped. 
Another factor influencing the ‘opportunity to shape’ was a NED’s perception, either caused 
by a CEO’s lack of awareness or disinterest in the skills available on a board, that their 
potential to contribute to a proposed strategy was ignored. The CEO’s interest in and 
recognition of NED skills and their potential contribution was, from the point of view of the 
participating NED, based on their observations of the steps the CEO took to proactively and 
constructively engage with their expertise. 
In summary, both stages 1 and 2 were likely to generate ‘role tensions’. That is, at these two 
stages, NED contribution was shaped by their perceptions of the role of a director and board 
was vis-a-vis management. Further, NED narratives appeared to reflect a strong element of 
intuition in judging how ‘made up’ the mind of a CEO was, which, in turn, influenced the 
perceived strategy-shaping opportunity. The data from this study revealed both affective and 
dispositional explanations for the responses of NEDs when navigating these tensions, which 
are more fully described in Section 4.4. 
4.1.3 Stage 3: Participating in Decision Deliberations 
The third stage involved sufficient deliberation for a NED to feel comfortable with a 
proposal. In all cases, in making a decision at a personal level, a NED was motivated by 
reaching a decision with which they felt they could live. Their judgement on this point was 
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influenced by two motivations. The first regards the contribution a potential transaction 
would make either to the shareholder value or to strengthening a company’s strategic options 
(described in stage 1). Some NEDs described an internalised norm they apply to proposals or 
ideas to deal with the first of these motivations. As Director H reported: 
there are lots of good ideas … no shortage of those. But the only ideas that are good 
for this company are those that management is fired up to achieve and that the board 
is really comfortable with the idea. Ideas that don’t meet those two tests are 
worthless for this company. I know this is a bold statement … but if the 
management has a rollicking good idea but the board is not keen on it, and vice 
versa, then don’t do it. 
The second motivation was the effect any decision could have on their relationship with other 
NEDs and management. This is consistent with research on group dynamics (Kets de Vries 
1991, 2001; Turner 1987, 2005) and in previous board process studies noted in the literature 
review (Forbes & Milliken 1999; Minichilli et al. 2012; Pye 2002; Pye & Pettigrew 2005; 
Roberts 1991). Compounding this complex social reality were practical concerns about a 
CEO’s lack of confidence to successfully execute a strategy. As Director N reported: 
it was now no longer just our concerns with the strategy but in our lack of 
confidence in the CEO and his ability to deliver what he had promised to the board. 
He was pilloried every time he presented regular updates to the board. As things 
deteriorated, every meeting became more fractious, and he became increasingly 
more aggressive with the board, and he did not like some of the things the board 
was saying. We started seeing some character traits we had not seen before. 
Regarding, the effect of the decision on an individual in terms of group dynamics, the 
transformative decision chosen by a NED for inclusion in the study had the potential of being 
perceived as a very large, discrete and anxiety-provoking event that required active coping 
mechanisms. As such decisions were generally complex (in that it reflected a web of 
interlocking choices) and time-bound, some NEDs reported that there was pressure on a 
board to work efficiently towards a final ‘go-no-go’ decision. As Director N reported, 
‘everyone had reservations … some with deep reservations like me. No one felt confident … 
everyone was nervous about it’. 
Moreover, as reported by Director B, some anxieties were not shared with a board as a 
whole: 
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One director shared with me their personal anxiety about the way in which the 
shareholder value rationale, often bandied around by directors, but regrettably in a 
very narrowly cast way … because some strategic proposals may not have a 
compelling NPV [net present value] or in fact may not be EPS [earnings per share] 
accretive for some time yet … but may still be critical for the company to pursue. 
In two of the decision cases, there was a more process-driven board. In these cases, NEDs 
characterised the board decision culture as being more driven by good time-keeping rather 
than the quality of thinking or discussion. Moreover, in some cases, the culture revealed a 
greater reliance on how a board had solved similar problems in the past. NEDs reported that 
these practices led to less contention. They spoke of the dangers associated with racing to a 
consensus without fully exposing or exploring spoken or unspoken concerns along the way. 
In summary, while stages 1 and 2 were likely to generate ‘role tensions’, stage 3 was likely to 
generate ‘task tensions’—that is, tensions associated with an actual decision task itself. 
4.1.4 Stage 4: Reaching a Consensus 
The final stage of the decisions related to securing a consensus. In several cases, a decision 
was not unanimous but NEDs made a call that it was one they were prepared to live with 
despite their concerns. 
Concerning large transformative decisions, it was common for consensus to be built rather 
than a vote taken. NEDs reported that it was very rare that anyone pushed their point of view 
or request that their dissent recorded. Instead, focus was on robust debate to arrive at a 
consensus. If a small minority were not comfortable with a deal, they could decide whether 
they could live with a decision rather than record their formal dissent. Some NEDs reported 
being concerned about the effect that formal dissent would have on future board harmony. 
Regarding the process of arriving at a consensus, decision-makers were less likely to engage 
in slow sequential or linear thinking than simultaneously integrating key choices and tactical 
plans as they proceeded through each stage of a decision-making process. NEDs reported that 
anxiety was a major component driving a single decision from a complex set of 
interdependent choices and this underpinned each influence attempt. 
Each case resulted in a decision. In fact, there were four possible decision-process outcomes 
across all 15 stories: 
1. A proposal was accepted without change (not evidenced by this study). 
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2. A proposal was revised after NED input and shaping. 
3. A proposal was rejected. 
4. A proposal was rejected in favour of a more attractive option; for example, 
replacing the outright acquisition of an entity with a proposal in which to buy a 
material stake. 
The point at which a NED or board was ready to decide was described as intuitive, thus, 
suggesting that rational analysis was not the whole story. As Director B observed: 
I think it was a bit intuitive … there comes a point that more data is [sic] not going 
to give you more insight. And you have got to jump. And that point comes when 
you feel you have enough mitigates in place to defray the risks and where you have 
convinced yourself that the worst of the risks are manageable and the size of the 
price is worth having. 
Detailed explications of NED reported behaviour and patterns of behaviour in stages 3 and 4 
of the strategy-shaping process are described in Section 4.4.3. 
4.2. Origins of and Differentials in Power Between NEDs 
To strengthen the oversight function, boards need to have a process for ensuring the 
optimal value is derived from the experience [or] skills that each director brings. 
(Director B) 
This section describes the findings in relation to research question one concerning the origins 
of a NED’s power to influence: what are the origins of and differences in an individual 
NED’s power? NEDs are not responsible for the execution of strategy and their contribution 
in and around a boardroom is almost entirely cognitive (Forbes & Milliken 1999). Therefore, 
the ‘cognitive history’ that participating NEDs bring as input to a decision-making process is 
relevant. The sources of power as NED cognitive history were analysed both within and 
across the 15 cases to identify and explicate similarities and variations between participating 
NEDs. 
Rindova’s (1999) elaboration of cognitive variety within a group (which she used as a group 
construct and as described in Chapter 2) offered a useful means to organise findings about the 
cognitive history of individual NEDs participating in this study. The cognitive history of 
directors varies in two ways. The first is the requisite variety derived from prior career 
experience and business reputations accumulated from that experience, for which the term 
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‘human capital’ is applied (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013). The second, an external 
variety (known as ‘social capital’) is derived from a NED’s connections and corporate 
networks, such as multiple directorships (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013). This 
combination of human and social capital represents a NED’s relative capacity to influence 
others. The relationships between cognitive history and relative power of the NEDs are 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Cognitive history as a source of NED power as the capacity to influence. 
Source: Author. 
Both human and social capital helped to define the sources of NED power. Further, in as 
much as each NED varied in the diversity of their respective cognitive history, this 
determined the extent of power differentials on a board. 
NED’s 
Board Capital
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4.2.1 Requisite Variety: NED Human Capital 
As noted in Chapter 2, current research shows that the diversity of NED career experience 
and knowledge networks are likely to result in differences in how they perceive, process and 
respond to a task (Prahalad & Bettis 1995; Ruigrok, Peck & Keller 2006). The requisite 
variety of cognitive history (human capital) of NEDs in this study comprised a combination 
of complex and alternative interpretive frameworks and ‘cognitive givens’ or mental models 
gained through prior career experiences. These included knowledge or assumptions about 
future events (such as the forward revenue trajectory of a target business, supply–demand 
dynamics, commodity price fluctuations and changes in cost of capital), knowledge about 
alternatives (such as alternative deal structures or alternative targets or geographies) and 
knowledge about the consequences of those alternatives (such as how investors, analysts, 
regulators or competitors may react). This diversity of human capital that NEDs brought into 
a boardroom (as function of prior experience and associated reputations) included one or 
more of the following: experience as a CEO of a large company that had grown globally or 
had an acquisitive profile, specialisation in M&A economics, advisory or functional 
experience at top levels of advisory firms and public companies, an international career 
(either working in or running an international business), leading a functional team dispersed 
across multiple locations or direct experience in internationalising a business or company 
across multiple jurisdictions. These differences in NED human capital and how they were 
perceived were significant because, as shown by the theories of social identification and self-
categorisation discussed in Chapter 2, they formed the basis of how strongly NEDs identified 
with each other and categorised or ranked their experience relative to their peers on a board. 
Hence, the NEDs’ level of social identification and self-categorisation determined the relative 
value they placed on contributions of others and, in turn, the extent of the potential of others 
to influence. For example, NEDs in this study tended to place a higher value on their own 
type of career experiences. In particular, Directors N and M, who had previously held CEO 
roles, remarked on the rise of professional directors who ‘had not run a business before’. 
They believed a lack of experience could reduce the value of a NED’s contribution, including 
the ability to challenge assumptions, alternatives or consequences relating to an acquisition 
proposal. Since Directors N and M had served as CEOs, it was not surprising that they would 
value the experience of running a business ahead of, for example, functional expertise in an 
accounting or legal firm. As Director N observed: 
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I think operators who have spent their life battling in the trenches sometimes have a 
different perspective of how easy it is to drive change or turn around a company … 
as opposed to someone from the public sector or from an accounting firm where 
some of those views [put forward by management] may seem logical … In this 
case, I could hear all the theory, but it smells like this is too tough. 
Director M held a similar view: 
The legal person has had commercial experience but always from a legal point of 
view. This is valuable, but you always have your legal glasses on. But someone who 
has been a CEO of a business has had to deal with issues without a functional filter 
and that changes the conversation … this is the challenge of getting the board 
composition right. 
However, other NEDs (mostly those who had not previously held CEO roles) disagreed. 
They observed that when a NED had previous experience as a CEO, this challenged the 
transition to a NED role because of a ‘healthy measure of arrogance’ that comes with ‘let me 
show you how’. They also recalled that when things do not go well, there is a propensity for 
ex-CEOs to jump into the details and try to run a company. 
These differing perspectives reinforce the conclusion that NEDs tended to place a higher 
value on their own career experiences and, therefore, valued the contribution of those who 
were ‘like them’. The findings suggest that, at a subconscious level, NEDs were continually 
assessing how the human capital of their peers was like their own. In effect, this laid the 
foundation for how susceptible each NED was to the influence attempts of those most like 
them and how, in turn, they exercised their capacity to assert their influence during a 
strategy-shaping process. In fact, the findings suggest that power, as the capacity to influence, 
worked through the processes of social identification, i.e., group membership itself can 
become a source of power. The effects of social identification are discussed further in Section 
4.3. 
4.2.2 External Variety: NED Social Capital 
In addition to similarities or differences in NED experiences, the diverse cognitive 
communities from which NEDs were drawn were also relevant to an individual NED’s 
capacity to influence. As Director I explained: 
during the eighteen-month period of this deal here, my directorship with another 
company was maturing … so I was learning some interesting things from that board 
		
99 
I was on, and they [the directors on this board] were looking to me as one of the 
people with expertise … so there was quite a bit of questioning of me outside the 
meetings about what was happening over there and how it was all going. 
The external variety or ‘embeddedness’ of participating NEDs comprised their current and 
relevant connections and networks gained by association with and membership of diverse 
‘cognitive communities’. Embeddedness is a social science construct described in a board 
context by Pettigrew (2001) to account for the dependence of a social phenomenon in the 
environment in which it occurs. That is, social action cannot be understood dissociated from 
the social world in which it is embedded. Memberships in cognitive communities expose 
NEDs to industry ‘macro-cognitions’ not acquired by career experience. These professional 
connections (which often include multiple directorships in completely different sectors) 
exposed NEDs to inter-industry perspectives, diverse business models, ‘industry outsider’ 
perspectives and diverse approaches to disruption in those sectors. Social capital also 
constituted an array of networks with corporate and proxy advisers, consultants and other 
‘outsider’ groups, and, therefore, provided access to relevant, up-to-date knowledge, 
connections and information. The strength of a NED’s external networks provided them 
legitimacy in the eyes of their peers and, therefore, greater power to influence. 
This study found that NEDs’ connections within the broader director community served four 
purposes: securing board appointments, access to knowledge that allowed them to cross-
calibrate information from management, door-opening for management and access to 
resources for a company. Most participating NEDs recollected how they joined a board and 
reported that, although an appointment process was formalised through a search firm, initial 
contact was established through their personal networks. Hence, this study showed that a 
NED’s embeddedness in networks and connections were significant in securing other board 
roles. As Directors L and K explained: 
I was invited to join by the chairman … to consider joining in and then went 
through the process of interviews … [E]essentially, I was known to the CEO and 
Chair over a number of many years of interaction … the CEO for about 25 years as 
a peer and [in] various business relationships. (Director L) 
the Chair and I were on the board of Company X [names the company] together … 
we had enjoyed … [and] had a good rapport there. So, when I came back [to 
Australia], he contacted me and said come in for an interview … and that’s how I 
came to be on this board. (Director K) 
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Previous research suggests that personal ties and NED embeddedness may result in strong 
identification with a group and, in turn, may be socialised into shared notions of 
accountability and normative expectations of how one behaves in a group (Westphal 1999). 
Based on these findings, questions may be raised about the effects of social ties and past 
associations. For example, it raises the question of how past associations generate an informal 
set of expectations, even if operating at a subconscious level, compared to no prior personal 
relationship. It also raises questions about the extent to which a degree of agreeableness may 
emerge during discourse through the norms of reciprocity that are created and, therefore, 
inhibit necessary boardroom contention (Westphal & Zajac 1997). Additionally, past 
personal associations and ties may lead to cognitive and behavioural convergence at a board 
level because of the narrowness of the cognitive pools from which NEDs are selected (Forbes 
& Milliken 1999; Geletkanycv & Black 2001; Hambrick 2007; Rindova 1999). These issues 
are discussed in Section 4.4. 
Second, a NED’s embeddedness, characterised by inter-organisational and inter-sector links, 
facilitated information flow and knowledge exchange between directors and boards. In turn, 
this allowed NEDs to calibrate and verify market information provided by management with 
peers sitting on other boards and by tapping into a different network of advisers used by other 
boards. Research on industry macro-cognitions suggests that executives from outside the 
industry are more likely to challenge ‘industry recipes’ (Rindova 1999; Spender 1989). 
Moreover, provided it was accompanied by pattern recognition skills, the value of an 
‘outsider’ view was supported by Director B, who held four ASX directorships: 
I have particular and strong views about this. Sector should not matter as much it is 
how one thinks about the business that matters more. So, for example, with W and 
X [refers to two of his current directorships], despite being in very different sectors, 
are both large branch-based distributed businesses and highly technology driven … 
The same with Y and Z [refers to two of his other current directorships] … although 
they are both in different sectors, the issues relating to physical risk and the impact 
of environment issues are very similar … My cross-sector experience is useful 
because I am able to extrapolate. Valuable lessons can be taken from one sector into 
another. But it requires you to step back from the sector and consider what are the 
issues by thinking laterally and transformatively … [using] pattern recognition 
skills. 
A well-cited study on multiple directorships by Mizruchi (1996) reviewed the inconclusive 
data relating to the behavioural consequences of multiple directorships; many studies both 
confirmed and disconfirmed these effects. The study found that previous, predominately 
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quantitative, studies of multiple directorships did not capture the richness and complexity of 
behavioural dynamics and inter-firm relationships—something this current study seeks to 
address. 
Finally, this study found the extent of a NED’s social capital served the purpose of both door-
opening for management and access to relevant resources when a company is acquisitive. As 
Directors C and M observed: 
someone has information that has subsequently come to the attention of the NED 
and may be relevant … it happens in big M&A scenarios because there are always 
people wanting to talk to you … [Y]ou are besieged from everywhere. (Director C) 
we [referring to himself and one other NED on a risk committee] had connections 
with people in regulatory agencies, government and so on … [W]e were able to talk 
to them and open the door to having a discussion with management about this issue 
… Sometimes it is difficult [for management] to make a cold-call on something a 
bit out of the box [referring to a unique restructuring of assets that had no prior 
precedence and would have needed regulatory approval]. (Director M) 
In summary, the findings showed that a director’s cognitive history comprised human and 
social capital. This is significant because previous board studies reviewed in Chapter 2 
(Bailey & Peck 2013; Finkelstein 1992; Hambrick 2007; McNulty et al. 2011) did not 
describe the effects of variations in NED cognitive history. Particularly, how such personal 
construals derived from self-categorisation and social identity may explain how NEDs 
behave and why they differed in their behaviours when enacting their strategy-shaping 
responsibilities. That is, cognitive history is an important differentiator between NEDs’ 
sources of power. Further, understanding how NEDs interpreted the diversity of these power 
sources and the differentials they represented is an important consideration largely ignored by 
the current literature. This study found further evidence for what NEDs themselves made of 
the distinctiveness of their experiences. These NED construals are described in Section 4.3. 
Prior to reviewing these construals in Section 4.3, the data also revealed another interesting 
element relating to personal motivations of NEDs, which may provide a deeper 
understanding of how these construals are formed in the first place. NED motivations are also 
largely ignored by current board literature. 
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4.2.3 Differences in Director Motivations: ‘Why I Joined’ 
This section reports on findings relating to the motivations of participating NEDs in joining 
their boards. This question was incidental to the main interview in that it was simply a 
‘warm-up’ introductory question posed at the start of the semi-structured interviews in stage 
2 of the data gathering process. However, despite this, the question elicited rich insights into 
how NEDs defined their distinctiveness with respect to their peers. That is, while cognitive 
history provided a basis for understanding power differentials, these findings (concerning 
motivations) provided a glimpse into how individual NEDs construed the distinctiveness of 
both their human and social capital; this, in turn, deepens our understanding of NEDs’ 
behaviour. 
Motivations for joining a board appeared to fall into four categories, although NEDs often 
cited more than reason: an opportunity to add value, an opportunity to belong to a successful 
company, an opportunity to join a board that was respected and an opportunity to work with 
great people and culture. It is important to note that while some of these motivations may be 
viewed as adding significant cognitive diversity to a group, in other cases they may 
contribute to narrowing cognitive horizons and potentially driving strategic persistence 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis 2003; Westphal 1999). The notion of ‘cognitive pluralism’ was 
explored previously in a normative study by Hambrick (1994) and refers to the degree of 
diversity in the schema or cognitive frames employed by members of a given group. 
Cognitive pluralism fosters good debate up to a point until a divergence of views can be 
unproductive and detrimental to collaboration (Sundaramurthy & Lewis 2003). This section 
explicates these four motivational themes, theorises what they say about NEDs’ construals of 
what they bring to their boards and how these construals affected the mounting and receiving 
of influence attempts. 
4.2.4 Opportunity to Add Value 
For those NEDs who spoke about their excitement in joining a board and the value they could 
add, a board represented an opportunity to, in their view, engage in decision-making in a 
meaningful and unique way. In several cases, NEDs identified unique expertise that they 
could bring to a board. This included regional, M&A or start-up experience and was not 
unexpected, as the decision scenario selected for study was a transformative decision. Where 
a NED was hired expressly for the unique experience they could add to a board, there was 
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evidence that that experience was being used to challenge board-thinking. For example, 
Director C had previously run large-scale technology change programs. He reported that this 
board viewed him as uniquely placed to guide their thinking on a major technology 
investment: 
It is one of Australia’s largest iconic companies. It is very complex and does a 
whole range of very different things … and also [sic], it is global. It has operations 
all over the world … and had been reasonably successful overseas … but not as 
successful in Asia. This was one of the reasons they were attracted to me, and I was 
attracted to this particular company. They were looking at doing significant 
expansion in Asia … they had done a few stop-start attempts. This is where my 
experience lies in this particular part of Asia. (Director C) 
Directors L and D also reported they brought unique expertise to a board: 
I was a CEO previously of a company and I know what it is like to operate from 
zero market and zero revenue and go from that to something big … [W]hen 
everyone said it could not be done … but I have lived it … and not afraid of it and 
that in a sense is what I bring to this board. (Director L) 
The role they expect from me is a heavy engineering operational guy running big 
businesses … as well as my Asian experience and US experience for that matter. 
Most [other directors] had been involved in M&A, but I had this heavy plant 
experience also. (Director D) 
However, two NEDs also raised anxiety about whether they were adding value by their 
appointment, thus, suggesting that it is only in times of crises that a board adds real value. 
This may suggest that the environmental context matters in terms of the perceived value that 
NEDs believe they are bringing to a board and, consequently, the degree of influence NEDs 
feel they can wield in and around a boardroom, especially when a company faces significant 
challenges. Directors P and N both expressed these reservations: 
It worried me greatly that in my first couple of years … [I] was not contributing … 
but in a sense that I was saying I could not see how I was adding value. It worried 
me greatly … all the time examining your own performance. In smaller companies 
or medium-sized companies … when you sit around the table, they really need you. 
They can’t afford to bring in specific skills they need into the exec ranks across the 
board, so they rely on board directors much more … So let’s contrast this with this 
[a] large company where you have [a] highly paid, highly skilled executive team … 
where if you have a gap you simply hire it in, so they don’t rely in a business sense 
or an everyday sense on the board. And when things are going swimmingly well, 
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you sit back and wonder what value am I really adding when you sit on bigger 
boards? (Director P) 
I don’t know how much we add as a board to strategy from a forward-thinking 
sense. Where we add value is when management brings a whole bunch of strategic 
decisions to us … we play the role of filtering them out and add value to holding 
management accountable to driving what they said the strategy will deliver … 
Additionally, the board really comes into its own when management has failed, or 
there is a big change or something like that … When a company is going well, a 
board does not add value at all. Management says we are going to do this and do 
that and we say it sounds all right, and we double-check and then go away again. 
But when a company is in trouble or has to change the CEO or make decisions for 
the next generation, those are the times when a board really comes into its own. 
(Director N) 
As noted, some directors who were new to board life and had recently transitioned from 
executive to non-executive roles spoke about their attraction to a board because of the 
perceived ability to add immediate value. However, others felt more comfortable on the 
boards they had been on the longest. They cited the time it took to understand a business, get 
to know its different personalities—executives, shareholders and customers—and what their 
issues were. As Directors M, A, and E respectively reported: 
I thought given my background … I was a good match … I could see this is 
somewhere I could add immediate value. When you are a NED, you have to believe 
you can add value. So, it was a large cap, capital-intensive, Australian-based, but 
international and, therefore, fitted the profile where I thought I could add value … 
and they were looking for someone with a finance background and skills, which I 
think I bring. (Director M) 
in my case, I had an understanding of strategy at a major company … so I brought a 
way of thinking about how you build sustainable companies. It is always attractive 
for someone like me with my financial background to be part of an audit committee 
for instance. But once you are on that board, then other dimensions come into play 
in addition to the initial dimensions that may have made you attractive to that board. 
This becomes evident through early board interactions. (Director A) 
I wanted a diverse range of boards … while at that time [I] had no experience in this 
sector, I had enough different experience to be of value … and at that time there 
were some people on this board with sector expertise, so my general business 
experience and CEO experience was seen as a complement to those people with 
sector experience. (Director E) 
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In summary, it appeared that the way in which a NED construed their opportunity to add 
value to a board in a business, functional or process sense might affect how they perceived 
they could contribute, interpret the influence attempts of others and respond to those 
interpretations in their own influence attempts. 
4.2.5 Opportunity to Belong to a Successful Company, Challenging Business and Vital 
Sector 
The lure of a particular sector or industry, a company experiencing change or one of vital 
importance to society were other motivations cited by NEDs. The excitement they felt (in 
some cases, evident in their voices) was described in several ways. First, a company was 
perceived to have a profound effect on day-to-day life or materiality to society more 
generally. Second, they perceived business as undergoing major disruption or facing major 
consolidation or disintermediation. The third concerned the profile of a company and its 
success to date. As the research shows, NEDs are concerned with protecting their reputations 
as expert decision-makers and, thus, would avoid serving on boards of lower-quality firms 
(Certo, Daily & Dalton 2001). As Directors H, N, K and D reported: 
what set this company apart was the style of the business they did, and some 
companies did not have businesses that were strategically sustainable … [T]his one 
did. It had a reputation for honesty and probity and decent all around humanity. I 
don’t mean sustainably in a green sense. What I mean by strategically sustainable is 
that they have got a business model that is going to work and does not have 
strategic weaknesses … [I]t is not single-person sensitive and a business you would 
like to invest in. (Director H) 
it was a large, blue-chip successful company but had considerable challenges, and 
so the board had a real role to do to change the culture and the direction of the 
company. It was a meaty role … in terms of it had pretty well everything you could 
want ahead of it … big strategic decisions had to be made but also a lot of short-
term tactical decisions had to be made … fast-changing space where no two 
quarters were ever the same … very evolving environment … so it was an 
extremely interesting board to me and remains a really interesting board to me. 
(Director N) 
I was excited by this opportunity because of my scientific … materials engineering 
background … I understood the language, and I could walk around plants and 
understood it and was interested in it … There were several things I wanted … 
global reach in the US and here … it was a leading player in this marketplace, and 
you get to deal with a particular level of problems. It felt as though there was some 
substance. (Director K) 
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so, when I returned to Australia to pursue a non-executive career, I was approached 
… and it exactly fitted my background in heavy industry … and of course, it was an 
iconic company in that space. (Director D) 
Several NEDs cited the inherent complexity of the challenges facing the sector as being an 
important motivation. While these responses could be part of a post-rationalisation of the 
reasons for joining, the espoused explanations were, nevertheless, meaningful to them. As 
Directors G and O observed: 
I did not believe in doing turgid analysis about what boards I should join. It seemed 
to me that the business this company was involved in was a feature of the modern 
world. But, in the end, it is also about sociability … how you are likely to get on 
with the people you work with. (Director G) 
It is a vitally important sector … one that was important in all of our lives, 
impacting us all … [I]t was strong in terms of its market position and its capacity to 
grow. (Director O) 
4.2.6 Opportunity to Join a Respected Board 
Several NEDs pointed to the due diligence they undertook in relation to a board they were 
invited to join. Others spoke about a strong Chair and, by implication, preferred to join a 
board that had effect, that could make a material difference in strategic decisions facing a 
company and had influence over management. Several NEDs indicated that they would never 
join a board without first meeting its CEO and working out the nature of the dynamic 
between the Chair and CEO. One NED spoke about deciding not to accept a high-profile 
board appointment because of a Chair who was regarded by peers as a bully. It is possible 
that if a NED’s view of a board before joining was positive, they might be more positively 
disposed to decision processes that a board employs and, hence, question it less. In this 
respect, comments made by Directors J, I, D and K were revealing: 
It clearly was a company that was performing very strongly … quite a unique 
culture, the board was a very strong board. It had a significant international side to 
the business, and in a sector I did not know a huge amount about … and so [I] 
thought I would learn a lot … The people on the board were highly respected for 
their achievements, and it also had several members of the board who were from 
overseas, and this attracted me. (Director J) 
The type of work that this board did was weighty and material enough to feel I was 
still meaningfully involved … [I]t had values that were very much aligned with my 
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own … I was attracted by the people I was going to be sitting around the table with 
and the way the Chair brings that group together. (Director I) 
A weak chairman and passive board … this is a frequent problem … You see papers 
not prepared on time because it is a low priority for the CEO … making decisions 
and then validating it with the board … but not on this board. (Director D) 
I like boards where my fellow directors are engaged. Someone who has sleep 
apnoea and falls asleep at board meetings … I have great difficulty with that. If you 
want to be around that table … please be engaged … The most important thing for 
me is the people on the board … it makes a huge difference. When I say the people 
… I have enjoyed working on boards when people are clear about their intent … 
they want to build a winning company … to compete … to make things better … I 
like boards where my fellow directors are engaged. (Director K) 
4.2.7 The Opportunity to Work with Great People and Great Culture 
Directors spoke warmly about the associations, positive assessment and their belief in the 
people they would become involved with on a board. These motivations are significant 
because a NED’s positive perceptions of other board members are likely to contribute to 
greater cohesiveness and collaboration through the attribution of common understandings and 
shared values. This finding is consistent with the similarity-attraction syndrome known to 
define board ties, which is extensively researched in social psychology (Westphal & Zajac 
1997). It is also consistent with other studies (Forbes & Milliken 1999; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis 2003). However, NEDs who identify with each other are likely to share common ways 
of thinking and a cognitive schema that could lead to less robust challenging of each other in 
decision-making. As Director H observed: 
the matters that the board considers are intellectually stimulating and interesting and 
opinions you offer of decisions you are part of are implemented … and colleagues 
around the table are good to work with … no smarty pants or put-down people … 
[B]ut that is not to say they are in anyone’s pockets, but everyone on this board are 
[sic] respectful of other people’s knowledge and experience. 
In summary, it seems that NEDs want to join a reputable board or company that offers some 
interesting challenges in which they might engage and use their skills and experience, and 
benefit from some intellectual and collegial stimulation. The reasons directors join boards 
and their keenness in describing the distinctiveness of their cognitive history was relevant in 
understanding the ways they categorised themselves relative to others on a board and 
construed their relative position in a social hierarchy. NED self-construals of their unique 
		
108 
cognitive history and the diversity it represented was found to influence their notions of what 
was expected of them and how they settled into effort norms and interaction patterns. NED 
motivations also potentially explain how the cognitive diversity they bring shapes the 
strength of group identification and ultimately the nature of their decision interactions. The 
effects of group identification are discussed further in Section 4.3. However, the data also 
showed that motivations were significant in understanding potential allegiances that may 
develop on boards. NEDs’ positive descriptions of a board they were invited to join implied 
they may be more positively disposed to decision processes that it employs and, therefore, 
question it less. Finally, NEDs rely heavily on their networks and connections to obtain 
subsequent board appointments. This may affect how strongly they argue a point or adopt a 
minority position while shaping strategy. 
It may be concluded that in response to the first of the three research questions (what are the 
origins of and differences in an individual NEDs power?), themes that emerged from the data 
that determine a NED’s potential power to influence include those related to their cognitive 
history and the various motivating factors that drive NEDs to join the board of a company. It 
is now important to consider why and how NEDs choose to use that power and how power 
differentials function to create a group dynamic that influences a strategic decision-making 
process. 
4.3 Group Identification  
The findings reported in this section relate to the second research question regarding the 
strength of group identification: how does the NED’s sense of shared identity with the board 
group shape the process of decision-making? As noted in Chapter 2 concerning SIT, group 
membership assists people to define themselves. Hence, this section describes the findings 
relevant to the salience of the social context in which a NED must perform their duties and 
describes two group-identity related processes that contribute to the strength of group 
identification: first, through a process of ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ self-categorisation and 
second, through a subjective validation of one’s own and others’ legitimacy to mount 
influence attempts. As stated in Chapter 3, for the purposes of this study, an influence attempt 
is defined as a specific intervention initiated by one or more NEDs designed to make an 
effective contribution to the direction and nature of a decision debate. This section proceeds 
by describing the data as themes that emerged from each of these two identity-related 
processes. 
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4.3.1 Themes Relating to ‘Like Me’ and ‘Not Like Me’ Categorisations 
There were three themes associated with the subjective judgement a NED made about who 
they most associated or affiliated with in a group. These themes related to past associations 
and personal ties, common cognitive histories and shared values and implicit beliefs. 
4.3.1.1 Theme 1: Past Associations and Personal Ties 
As noted in Chapter 2, the power of informal structures to regulate social behaviour was 
observed by Pick (2007). Personal ties are important, as they imply an informal set of 
expectations about what a director will bring or how they are likely to contribute, not 
otherwise available. Although NEDs in this current study considered personal ties to have 
precipitated their board membership by lending legitimacy to their appointments, the NEDs 
in this study did not claim pre-existing ties were more than an introduction to a board. 
However, despite this, some quotes suggested that NEDs looked at these relationships 
positively, thus, reflecting the continuing rapport they valued. Further, NEDs were generally 
more open to interacting and exchanging viewpoints with these peers outside formal board 
meetings. As Directors G, J and K observed: 
the CEO of the investment bank that had been involved in advising on the 
recapitalisation of the business approached me (I had known him previously). I also 
knew the incoming CEO whom [sic] I thought was a good guy … competent. 
(Director G) 
I was approached by the chairman of the board to see if I would be interested in 
speaking to him and to the CEO about becoming a director … I knew some of the 
other directors as part of my professional personal network. Obviously, I don’t 
know how this actually came about as I was not there, and there is a nominations 
committee meeting … but they were looking for skills I had, and I was known to 
other board directors. (Director J) 
the Chair and I were on the board of Co X together … we had enjoyed … had a 
good rapport there. (Director K) 
4.3.1.2 Theme 2: Common Cognitive Histories 
Director comparisons related to both requisite and external varieties of cognitive history. In 
the case of the requisite variety (human capital), comparisons were made in relation to 
experience in terms of role, function, sector or industry. As shown in Section 4.2.1, NEDs 
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were attracted to those who had a similar experience. Moreover, NEDs with different 
cognitive histories were not always regarded positively. Comparisons were not only used as 
guides to determine whom to pay attention to, but also the reverse. As Director G reported: 
I had assumed they were all CFO types … a cabal … who thought in a particular 
way, but in fact, they also had reached the same conclusion as I had. I have my 
prejudices about CFO types … [T]hat they are unable to see past the numbers and 
do not understand strategy. 
Director G continued to recount his experience by naming another board of which he had 
previously been a member. There, his view about ‘CFO types’ was shared by other directors 
like him who had previously run businesses. 
4.3.1.3 Theme 3: Shared Values and Implicit Beliefs 
Support for shared values and beliefs appeared to be important to some participating NEDs 
generating a greater sense of ‘we’ and ‘us’ collectivism. This was evidenced in some of the 
decision stories in which NEDs expressed confidence in the contributions of board members, 
as they perceive them to have shared values. 
How threats to implicit beliefs were responded to was identified in the interview transcripts at 
both individual and subgroup levels. For example, identification acted as a form of group 
control and the sanctioning of a member deemed to be ‘unlike’ the majority. These findings 
confirm other board research (Westphal & Bednar 2005; Westphal & Khanna 2003). This 
study also found evidence for new-to-the-board directors and others who were more likely to 
be socially sanctioned (often in private) when perceived by others to violate in-group values 
or beliefs in seeking to exercise influence in a decision debate. This was evidenced by 
Director A, who, after her initial board meetings, was sanctioned: 
The chairman was very alpha-dog (he has now moved on). It was very polite … in 
fact, a board member after the first few board meetings took me aside and said, ‘you 
can be awfully blunt’. They were old-fashioned and very polite, and I had come 
from an organisation that was hard-headed and where the motto was ‘think straight 
talk straight’ … [O]nce he [the Chair] pronounced, it was difficult to disagree with 
anything he raised … he was very much the man in charge … [O]nce he said what 
he thought, there was very little further discussion. 
While board cohesion was important for process effectiveness, it also had the potential of 
creating self-censorship and acting as ‘mind guards’ by creating and subtly enforcing social 
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norms that can pressure deviant thinkers, as evidenced in both the analysis of Director A and 
Director B’s transcript. In at least one decision story recounted by Director O, threats to 
implicit beliefs and values of two subgroups (one that supported the internationalisation 
transaction going ahead and another that was strongly against it) resulted in a split board. In 
another decision story recounted by Director G, the eventual departure of a Chair and CEO 
were the result of their fundamental disagreements. Essentially, the basis of these divided 
boards were differences in beliefs about the importance of value creation (not just value 
preservation), notions of risk and the relevance of acquisitive activity. Based on these two 
case study examples, it may be suggested that shared values and beliefs may not only be 
important for the functioning of a board but may act as a source of power. Differences on 
such fundamental matters, such as values and beliefs, may result in a loss of confidence and 
cohesion. Internally posed threats to shared values may also evoke swift action by an in-
group (like-minded directors) to close down contention or disagreement, as illustrated by the 
two cases mentioned above. Board factions emerged as a result, breaking down trust and 
leaving a board divided, as described by Directors G and O. 
Regarding the significance of shared values and implicit beliefs, the data reflected a clear 
tendency of NEDs to value their own experience and to attach a higher relative value to the 
‘cognitive communities’ from which they came (and the implication it had for shared values 
and beliefs) above that of others. This ‘like me’ tendency was important in terms of this 
study, as it may have implications for the attention participating NEDs pay to the 
perspectives of others or the weight they give to contributions of others ‘unlike me’, even 
discounting those contributions, as observed by some NEDs in this study. It also follows that 
cognitive similarities may create ‘people like me’ groupings and result in tensions when 
issues of role, ideology, beliefs and values were perceived to be at stake during a decision-
making process. These findings reveal the notion of social comparison derived from 
construed identities and provide confirmation of Magee and Smith’s (2013) recent work on 
the social distance theory, which articulates predictions about how power affects social 
comparison, susceptibility to influence, mental state inference and responsiveness, and 
emotions. 
In summary, as can be seen from the three themes reported, participating NEDs tended to 
first determine how similar or different they were from their peer directors in terms of their 
own cognitive histories—that is, the requisite and external varieties they bring as their source 
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of power to influence in terms of human and social capital. This self-categorisation created an 
internalised personal guide by which a NED sought to fit behaviourally within the ‘social 
reality’ they encountered and how they navigated this reality within a board. These processes 
determined the degree of comfort and confidence a NED felt in a group and laid the 
foundations for the confidence they personally felt in their discursive practices in and around 
a boardroom. 
These themes relating to self-categorisation examined here have important implications for 
the research question posed about why, when and how NEDs mount influence attempts and 
how they respond to the influence of others. These implications will be addressed in Section 
4.6. 
4.3.2 Subjective Validations and the Receiving and Granting of Social Support 
Section 4.3.1 described how NEDs identify with those they perceive to be most like. This 
section describes the second process of identification in which a NED subjectively validates 
their own legitimacy to influence and, in turn, empowers the legitimacy of others to enact 
influence. The first part of this section examines the former, that is, data associated with 
seeking social support for a NED’s own influence attempts. The second examines the latter, 
that is, data associated with a decision to grant or withhold social support for influence 
attempts of others. 
4.3.2.1 Seeking Social Support from Others for NED Influence Attempts 
As discussed in Chapter 2, how a NED construes their role on a board shapes the contribution 
they make, influences how they view the contributions of others and ultimately affects a 
board dynamic (Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008). For example, when a NED 
contributes by drawing on their business, functional or process skills, the way in which that 
contribution is responded to by other NEDs feeds back into self-construal and self-validation 
(Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008; Pick 2007). Therefore, how convinced others are of 
this uniqueness may, in some cases, result in a contribution viewed as either disruptive and 
annoying or helpful and illuminating. The findings of this study were consistent with this 
research and showed several ways in which directors responded if their contribution was not 
perceived to be positively received. Some concluded that their contribution was not 
understood or valued and this caused a NED to reassess the specific contribution they made 
or influenced their future contributions. In some cases, this resulted in a NED determining 
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that a point was not worth pursuing or that their influence on that or related points were 
limited. As Director N reported: 
you don’t want to be a pain in the bum. Also, your fellow directors all seemed 
reasonably relaxed about it, and you start to think that maybe I am wrong and I 
don’t feel that confident that I have some divine inspiration that they don’t have. 
When a NED had no social support from other board members for their view, it was likely 
that, if they identified strongly with the group, they were more likely to adopt, reflect or 
mirror the views of in-group or self-censure their own reservations. The strength of numbers 
tended to be felt most acutely by new directors. This was reflected in the above quote from 
Director N who was new to a board despite having considerable global experience as a CEO 
on acquisitions and divestments. His self-construal of his newness played a part in his 
reluctance to challenge robustly or hold firm on his divergent views. 
On larger boards, strength derived from numbers can also result in ‘offline huddles’, usually 
after a formal board meeting has ended, such as packing up, during walks from or to a venue 
or by phone between board meetings—all intended to build informal ‘coalitions’ on a large 
board. As Director G explained: 
it just emerged from this discussion [referring to a discussion that took place 
between four of the most senior NEDs of a large board while packing up to leave 
after a board meeting had concluded] someone said something and then someone 
else said something else and so on and suddenly it was clear to us what needed to be 
done. That we would not be pushed into this … that we would take control of this 
conversation … which we did at the subsequent board meeting. 
In this case, the formation of an ‘offline coalition’ was precipitated by shared views between 
a subgroup of the NEDs about a board’s responsibility, as well as beliefs about value 
creation. This subgroup appeared less prepared to voice their opinion until they felt they ‘had 
the numbers’. In this and other similar narratives of participating NEDs, it was evident that 
subgroup influence attempts may be more salient than those of others on a board because of 
the construed importance or status accorded to their long- and well-established cognitive 
histories. 
It was also evident from this study that some NEDs used their identity as a source of self-
definition and were motivated to maintain and promote a positive self-concept. The skills 
associated with seeking to maintain and promote a positive self-concept are detailed in 
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Section 4.4. Conversely, there was evidence that the contributions from ‘people not like me’ 
was subject to some ‘discounting’ during decision interactions—that is, attaching lesser 
importance to what ‘people not like me’ said. For example, Director C stated that ‘I don’t 
want to be one of those directors who just ask incessant questions without having a strategic 
intent’. Granting or withholding social support for others’ influence attempts was also 
evident. Director O observed that ‘the perceived credibility of a director [in the eyes of their 
peers] determines the weight that will be given to their input’. 
As described in Section 4.2, the comparative uniqueness of a NED’s cognitive history acted 
as a form of personal validation of their purpose and role, which, in turn, resulted in their 
confident contributions to discourse and the openness of others to their influence attempts. 
However, in addition to mounting influence attempts, the findings also revealed when and 
how participating NEDs granted or withheld social support for others’ influence attempts. 
4.3.3 Granting or Withholding Social Support for Others’ Influence Attempts 
After engaging in a process of ‘invisible’ self-categorisation, participating NEDs described a 
process by which they subjectively validated the cognitive history of others to determine their 
legitimacy to influence a given issue. This subjective validation determined if a NED would 
give or withhold support for the influence attempts of their peers. There were three perceptual 
themes that emerged from the data characterising the determination the NEDs made: the 
competence and professional credibility of an influencer, the perception of a shared view of 
the work of a board (especially the role of the NED in strategy) and the perceived diversity of 
cognitive communities from which an influencer was embedded in or to which they were 
exposed. The themes were described as follows. 
4.3.3.1 Theme 1: Perceptions of Competence and Professional Credibility of an Influencer 
NEDs appeared to be continually making judgements about the competence of their board 
peers. Every contribution was used to either confirm or disconfirm the competence of an 
individual director. NEDs who were new to directing or a board were particularly anxious to 
make a good impression with their peers as being perceived as competent and wise; at times, 
they self-censured their own contributions in case it may be viewed as ill-judged or ill-
informed. For example, referring to a proposal under consideration when he joined a board, 
Director G was keen to create the right impression with his peers, withholding any potential 
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influence attempt and, instead, was receptive to the influence attempt of others based on their 
perceived competence and professional credibility. As he reported: 
I was new and was sitting back learning the competence of the individuals … I did 
not have the confidence to say this [referring to a challenge about who would be the 
better owner of the business] at the time. It took me two to three meetings to notice 
particular individuals whose opinions you should pay attention to. (Director G) 
However, once a NED had established themselves, their response to influence attempts of 
others was motivated by a need to maintain a positive self-concept, such that they would be 
perceived as balanced, rational and wise. These social effects seemed to be subtle, 
unconscious and likely to be invisible to those outside a boardroom. As reported, ‘you should 
not be seen to blow with the wind or be stubborn or come to a meeting with what seems like 
a closed mind’ (Director O) and ‘if you say something often enough, it eventually washed 
over other people … one must not appear to be too desperate’ (Director D). 
4.3.3.2 Theme 2: Shared View About the Work of the Board and the Role in Strategy 
Participating NEDs reported that there was often not a shared view among NEDs about their 
role in strategy. Some NEDs were perceived by their peers as too involved in strategy, giving 
rise to unproductive interpersonal tension with management, while others were perceived as 
standing too much on the sidelines. NEDs continually made references to their observations 
about the convergence or divergence of their peers’ view on the role of a board in strategy. 
For example, Director G stated: 
you see boards don’t really understand their roles. There are only two critical roles 
they play: CEO succession and as an arbiter of strategy. The rest is really routine, 
for example, determining risks etcetera [sic] are all about how to achieve these two 
key things. The key issue for boards is to lock on to these two things. However, 
most CEO and directors don’t understand strategy. What they think is strategy is 
simply tactical planning and budgeting. 
The cross-case comparisons showed some variation in when and how involved a NED was in 
strategy episodes. For example, Director G identified the failure to actively engage in strategy 
as a major ongoing issue in corporate Australia. As a current member of several boards, he 
described some NEDs who, in his experience, still believed they were there to ‘endorse’ 
strategy rather than ‘determine’ it in collaboration with management. As noted, he cited the 
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determination of strategy and the selection of a CEO as being the two most critical aspects of 
board accountability. 
Conversely, Director N observed that some director motivation was not always well placed: 
In these days with liabilities and things … more and more of what the director is 
saying is how do we cover our backsides in case it goes wrong and we are sued … 
Instead, we should be saying [sic], ‘what is the best decision for the company’ and 
then after that step back and consider the risks and liabilities. 
Other NEDs described receiving limited background, incomplete information, experiencing a 
‘highly choreographed’ strategy day or board papers that were late, as a reflection of a CEO’s 
attitude to a board’s role in strategy. While these findings support the recent research of 
Simoes, Kakabadse and Ramos (2013), who suggest that ambiguity continues to surround the 
board role in strategy, this study further suggests that behaviours associated with avoidance, 
opinion conformity or deference can result when board members have divergent views on 
responsibilities for strategy. 
4.3.3.3 Theme 3: Diversity of Cognitive Communities of Influence 
In addition to common histories that NEDs shared, they also had access to diverse cognitive 
communities, for example, by sitting on other boards together and having similar exposure to 
common external stakeholder groups. As Director I noted: 
multiple directorships (even across different sectors) can be useful because of the 
potential value of translating lessons and insights from one sector to another, in 
turn, strengthening [sic] the quality of oversight. 
Directors who sat on multiple boards expressed the view that directorships with experience in 
a sector were useful in a control role, whereas experience drawn from diverse sectors was 
more useful to an advisory role because of the value exposure to different business models, 
platforms and ways of creating added to a debate. That is, there appeared to be a subtle but 
important distinction NEDs made between common and diverse cognitive histories. 
Director M, who was the Chair of a Finance, Risk and Audit Committee, felt he was the most 
exposed should a transaction not go well. He recounted how he led discussions and involved 
himself with the regulators who were keen to know how the impairing of assets would be 
undertaken in a transaction. Significantly, he recounted that he had considerable experience 
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with regulators from another period in his career. In his opinion, this made him the best-
placed director to be involved in steering the conversations with both regulators and the 
banks involved in a decision to free cash and continue as a viable entity by selling assets to a 
foreign joint-venture partner. 
Director N, who recounted how his relationship with an institutional investor helped shape 
his thinking and subsequent pessimism towards the transformative decision management had 
put forward to the board 
I recall … one of our institutional investors whom I knew … a very smart guy 
predicted this completely … he had said to me, ‘I predict if you don’t sell it now 
you will be standing in front of us in a number of years’ time, and you will be 
writing off shareholder value’, and that’s exactly what happened. 
Although, in this case, while Director N recounted that the divestment had proceeded much 
later than it should have, links with external communities (as in this example) were viewed 
by NEDs as useful in calibrating their judgements and solidifying positions. In summary, 
these findings reaffirm the social reality of boards as cognitive groups faced with what are 
essentially cognitive tasks. They are not accountable for implementing or executing strategy 
but rather for directing strategy. In directing management, they are called upon to apply their 
cognitions and judgements drawn from their considerable experience and expertise (that is, 
their diverse cognitive history) to influence executives charged with management of the 
companies they direct. 
As seen in this section concerning the power of group identification, power differentials 
based on relativities between individual cognitive histories emerge in a board group 
whenever it is faced with a cognitive task. As shown in Section 4.2, these differentials exist 
across two dimensions: the requisite variety (representing experience and reputations) and the 
external variety (representing connections and networks). Particularly, differentials emerge 
from the depth, breadth and diversity of individual cognitive histories. 
Power differentials existed in each of the boards the 15 NEDs represented, but only became 
salient under certain conditions—for example, when a task required discernment, judgement 
and practical wisdom. These differences and resulting divergent viewpoints in some cases 
translated into tensions and conflicts between board members while solving these cognitive 
tasks. 
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The processes of identification found in this study, which moderate potential power tensions, 
are shown in Figure 4.2. The figure summarises the themes that emerged from the data 
concerning research question two: how does the NED’s sense of shared identity with the 
board group shape the process of decision-making? 
	
 
Figure 4.2. How self-categorisation and validation of others’ power to influence occur in 
NED decision-making processes. 
Source: Author. 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates how, in the first instance, (step 1) ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ 
identification—in which a group derives comfort and confidence from associating with 
people most like them—results in affiliations in which subgroups may be more open to the 
views of people they perceive have common experiences. These affiliations are loose and 
exist as part of a social reality that provides a board member with a guide about where they 
fit into a board group. While this process of self-categorisation (as step 1) might determine 
feelings of affiliation, similarity and attraction, and the degree of openness to others’ 
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viewpoints, it does not necessarily affect the strength or direction of a director’s influence 
attempts. As reported by the experiences of participating NEDs, it is the second process of 
identification (step 2) that shapes the strength and direction of NED responses during an 
influencing process. In this second process of identification, a director pre-judges and 
validates the legitimacy of others to influence, and relies on their sensemaking of that 
legitimacy to influence, as based on the three themes revealed in the data. More specifically, 
this regards the competence and professional credibility of an influencer, the diversity of 
cognitive communities an influencer is connected to or embedded in and shared perceptions 
of board work, particularly a NED’s role in strategy. Therefore, this validation will determine 
the importance that a NED attaches to the influence attempts of other NEDs. 
4.4 Behavioural Variations in NED Uses of Influence 
In section 4.3 it was found that the importance a NED attributes to influencing decisions is 
affected by his/her sense of shared identity with the board group (i.e. they self-categorise). 
Whether the NED exercises power to influence is the focus of this section.  
This section reports on findings related to that power to influence. Particularly, it reports on 
findings relating to differences between NED relational skills and dispositions required to 
deal with the task and role tensions that arise in the various stages of a strategy-shaping 
process, as described in Section 4.1. The issues discussed here specifically concern task and 
role tensions and the relational and dispositional themes that emerged from the data. The term 
‘relational theme’ refers to interpersonal behaviour that emerged between NEDs when 
dealing with task tensions and a ‘dispositional theme’ refers to NEDs propensities evident 
when NEDs are confronted with role tensions. 
Task and role tensions occur during interpersonal interactions as experiences described by a 
narrating NED or by those observed in others. The first part of this section describes 
relational themes found in NED narratives concerning their decision experiences. The second 
relates to the dispositional themes reflected in the NED narratives. However, prior to a 
discussion of those themes, some context concerning the power dynamic in relation to task 
and role tensions is required. 
For example, despite NEDs having the power to influence discussion and debate, it is clear 
from the foregoing sections that they did not always choose to exercise it—a key issue for 
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this study. Particularly, how were divergent views and associated tensions resolved? Were 
there variations in how some directors managed these tensions? How did power differentials 
affect the actual enactment of influence attempts and what explanations might there be for 
behavioural variation? 
Hence, the findings in this section present the NEDs’ ‘experience of power’, including 
behavioural effects and consequences when debating a complex and potentially value-
creating proposal. As noted, a NED’s cognitive history did not completely determine their 
power to influence. Importantly, the sense NEDs made of the ‘social reality’ of a board and 
the choices they made to use their cognitive and social competence were also important. The 
moderating effects of that social reality are discussed in detail in Section 4.5 in response to 
research question three: how is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the 
‘social reality’ of group identification and power distribution?   
4.4.1 Task and Role Tensions 
For the 15 NEDs contemplating acquisitions in new markets, there was significant 
complexity and uncertainty concerning the decision and, therefore, conflicting views were 
likely to emerge, particularly between TMTs and NEDs. This is particularly so when 
management fail to fully acknowledge, recognise or actively utilise the depth and breadth of 
knowledge, expertise and networks that NEDs cumulatively provide. Participating NEDs also 
recounted conflicting perspectives and differences among their NED board peers—a 
consequence of cognitive or ideological differences within a board group. 
All 15 decision narratives evidenced competing or paradoxical demands NEDs needed to 
resolve by influencing others and remaining open to influence—that is, by supporting or 
challenging a proposal. Both task and role tensions emerged in this process, the former 
depicted by four relational themes and the latter by three dispositional themes. These themes 
concerning NEDs’ relational and dispositional propensities required for decision-making 
effectiveness found in the data are discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 and are summarised 
in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. NEDs’ use of influence; relational and dispositional themes found in the data 
relating to influence attempts. 
Source: Author. 
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logic related to both return on capital and management capacity, as new acquisitions can 
compete with domestic business. NEDs reported this aspect was often underestimated. For 
example, Directors B and I noted that ‘management overreach’ was common in their 
experiences and NEDs had to vigilant concerning its propensity in both TMTs and NEDs 
with limited experience. What made this task more challenging was the information 
asymmetry with which NEDs had to contend, given their limited involvement between board 
meetings that resulted in less continuity and depth of information. Concerning large 
transformative decisions, it was reported that levels of uncertainty and incomplete 
information could further compound information asymmetry issues. NEDs reported having to 
build trust with management to ascertain all the information they required to make a sound 
decision during the entire period of a ‘live’ deal. NEDs reported variations in the levels of 
trust they experienced on a board between an executive and non-executive members, a Chair 
and with each other. 
Anxiety was particularly heightened when it related to what was perceived as a 
groundbreaking transaction that did not conform to the normal investment metrics used by a 
company. Typically, the participating NEDs reported that at the early stages, some peer 
NEDs were in favour of a deal, others not and some neutral. For those reporting their position 
as sceptical at this early stage, there was a level of anxiety about the likelihood of others 
being captured by ‘deal fever’ often associated with high-profile acquisitions. For those 
reporting that they felt positively disposed to such a deal pending further debate, they 
reported concern that some peer NEDs were too conservative and risk-averse. These themes 
further supported the evidence that director work is filled with cognitive paradoxes and 
group-related tensions that need resolution. 
The rest of this section describes what the thematic analysis of the data revealed about four 
relational themes reflecting the ‘social competence’ required to successfully mount influence 
attempts reported by NEDs while enacting their strategy-shaping accountabilities. These 
influence attempts solved the twin challenges of needing to reduce the perceived uncertainty 
associated with a deal decision and, simultaneously, demonstrating trust in the judgements 
and expertise of others. 
		
123 
4.4.2.1 Theme 1: How Influence was Gained through Questioning and Contention 
NEDs reported acute interest in whether assumptions stacked up in the first place. This was 
achieved through questioning and contention. As Director I reported, what was perceived to 
be in contention and how it was questioned were both important: 
The things that were of most interest to me was whether we hadn’t allowed hubris 
to overtake us in terms of what we thought the forward trajectory of the target 
business would be. That we did not necessarily assume that our sales projections 
were going to come to fruition and not recognise that more supply will be coming 
into the market and the owners of that supply may be as successful as we would be 
in forming those relationships … [I]t is a problem when directors become too in 
love with the ethos … [T]hey have to be able to detach themselves from sacred 
cows … and be prepared to challenge and be challenged. 
Directors indicated that a tactic they often used during a debate was to ascertain for 
themselves how much contention there was among a management team. This evidence was 
often used as a litmus test for how well reasoned a proposal was in the first place. As 
Directors L and I observed: 
I was concerned also about the misalignment amongst [sic] management in their 
conversations with us. It concerned me … [A]re you guys on the same page?… Do 
you all agree the price is right? Are you all supportive of doing this? I wanted to 
know that there was good contention within the management team around price. So, 
I said, ‘convince me that you are getting counter views and challenge from the 
finance people to make sure we do not overpay’. It took me a while to expose the 
process [and] later … it was characterised by weakness and left people feeling 
uncomfortable about where we landed on price. (Director L) 
if management does not bring to us [in addition to what they propose] what they 
reject, then you are not having as robust a discussion as you should. It’s like the 
John West analogy [referring to a tuna cannery’s quality claim] … [W]hat fish did 
they reject? It’s a discipline that some boards get into and others don’t. (Director I) 
Most NEDs participating in this study raised the dangers they attached to hubris and the 
pervasive influence of ‘deal fever’, which can capture management as well as a board. As 
noted in Chapter 2, emotional states (such as hubris) associated with different parties 
involved in takeovers have long been investigated by researchers (Chatterjee & Hambrick 
2007; Malmendier & Tate 2005). Hubristic behaviour is generally associated with arrogance, 
vanity and self-importance, thus, leading to an exaggerated sense of one’s accomplishments 
and capabilities. For example, Director A said that the tactic of role-playing a fictitious deal 
		
124 
scenario in a target country may be useful practice and a means of securing pre-agreements 
about decision protocols, including ‘go-no-go’ parameters. He suggested the tactic may also 
reduce the danger of losing perspective in the middle of a large deal when emotions are 
usually high and objectivity can be lost to overconfidence. 
In relation to the style of questioning, participating NEDs varied in their approach to working 
through what they perceived as task tensions. Some suggested that a NED’s persistent 
questioning can be perceived as either helpful or a nuisance, depending on their delivery. The 
persistence required to face a resistant CEO was also a theme some NEDs reported, thus, 
suggesting that a NED must persist after a first attempt. For example, Director A reported: 
the going-in position of management had been that the target had a very strong 
management team. I did not think that necessarily … I had concerns from 
experience. I was concerned about the expertise in the finance and risk areas and 
felt we needed to put our key people into those key roles. There was a need to 
integrate the supply chain and also [sic] fully integrate the staff into the organisation 
(culturally). I had two to three goes with the CEO before the penny dropped for the 
CEO on this issue. 
Director K described the need for incisiveness and directness in questions, and wariness 
about repeated and previous failed attempts in a target market: 
This board, in particular, is very wary of ‘this time it’s different’ statements because 
this is a biggest cop-out for managements as well as boards. You actually have to go 
back and say [sic], ‘how is it different, why it’s different’ … [It is] all too easy to 
say ‘this time it’s different’ … This is really about challenging assertions that 
management are making and exploring those. Also, [it is] about testing the 
credibility of their assertions … and determining if they are extracting the right 
lessons from past experiences the company has had in China. 
The style of questioning was also key. Director E described one ex-director’s ‘acerbic punch 
in the nose style’. While acknowledging that, as the Chair of an audit committee and 
impatient with their CEO’s lack of swift responses to his audit concerns, the director had 
asked some great questions, but in the process he ‘blew up all the relationships around him’. 
While he would accept feedback from NEDs in closed sessions and improve for two to three 
meetings, his acerbic style would reappear. Director E (who served on a nominations 
committee) recounted that the board appreciated the insightful questions but briefed a 
recruitment consultant to find a director with a similar depth of audit knowledge, but with a 
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more constructive style. Therefore, a NED’s ability to read social cues is an important aspect 
of questioning style. 
Some NEDs reported that the style of questioning could at times result in a board judging an 
presenting executive too harshly, thus, suggesting there is a very fine line that may be crossed 
by an interrogative board in the questioning style they adopt. For example, Director L, as 
Chair of a human resources (HR) and remuneration committee, reported: 
it emerged over a board dinner that some NEDs doubted the sponsoring executive’s 
capabilities. I tried to temper this view by saying she comes from a different world 
… let her management decide her development. We have to be careful we are not 
judging her too quickly because she is different. I think of myself as a coach on 
these HR issues. 
In summary, the contention and questioning themes revealed the NEDs’ skills and 
competence in accurately perceiving what was going on in and around a boardroom 
(including skilled questioning) to reveal more of what must be known to move forward. The 
tone or style of questioning was also critical to ensure trust was preserved. They also 
demonstrated the significant amount of self-control required for a NED to not leap in and 
take over a debate. 
4.4.2.2 Theme 2: How Influence was Shared through Feedback, Learning and Adaptation 
A second relational theme reported by participating NEDs was how others reacted to their 
contribution, which could either drive learning and adaptation or narrow what was perceived 
as permittable at board meetings. When some NEDs spoke and their contribution was poorly 
received, this response fed back into their self-construal. NEDs made various interpretations 
of this response. Some concluded that others did not value or understand their contribution. 
Others reappraised what they brought to a board or reappraised the relevance of their 
perspective on some issues. Such reappraisals, according to the literature on identity 
(Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008; Lawler et al. 2002; Nadler 2004), are continual and 
modify the dynamic of individual and group behaviour, which, in turn, influences a board 
dynamic’s level of engagement or passivity. This was evidenced by the narratives of all 
NEDs in this study. Power and identity effects appeared to determine who learned what from 
whom. 
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NEDs learned from observing their peers, even when they had significant prior board 
experience. For example, Director N asked, ‘why did I not think of that question?’, referring 
to a peer. Director N had observed that the peer in question said very little, but when he did, 
his questions were consistently impressive and, in this instance, reflected a unique way of 
reframing an issue or concern and opening the conversation. 
Others adapted their thinking through the course of a discussion without expressing their 
views, even though their perspectives had changed because of the well-reasoned arguments 
they had heard. For example, Director P reported his learning from the experiences and 
attitudes of others: 
I expect as a lawyer you are taught to surface and identify risks … [Y]ou can’t 
eliminate risk, but you can optimise it … but there were some directors more 
optimistic than me, especially those with a financial services background. I learned 
to adapt my approach over time [on this board] … to appreciate the upside as much 
as the downside. 
While some experienced NEDs showed an openness to learning, board tenure differentials 
acted as a means of learning. NEDs new to board life, adjusting to the transition from an 
executive to a non-executive role, were generally viewed by their peers as being on a learning 
curve and expectations of their contribution to strategy were not high. Importantly, NEDs 
new to board life, or early in their first term at the time of the transaction under study, were 
hesitant in their contributions. 
In the case of NEDs new to a board or new to directing and on a learning curve, some of their 
behaviours as observed by NEDs with longer tenure were telling. For example, they reported 
that newly appointed NEDs looked for ways to make an immediate contribution to debates 
and justify their appointment. This need, at times, resulted in raising what were perceived as 
irrelevant, peripheral or nitpicking questions. Conversely, other new NEDs admitted 
reticence, hanging back deliberately to grasp a decision dynamic, particularly how divergent 
or dissenting views were reacted to by a Chair and the extent to which these views were 
encouraged. As Directors P and G reported: 
while banking is at one level a simple business, at another level it is complex, and I 
found it very difficult to understand. I looked around the table and formed an 
assessment about the directors in terms of reliability competence and judgement and 
listened especially to those who had more experience in that sector than I had. 
(Director P) 
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I was new and sitting back learning about the competence of the individuals. I did 
not have the confidence to say this [referring to a challenge about who would be the 
better owner of the business] at the time. It took me two to three meetings to notice 
individuals whose opinion you should pay attention to. (Director G) 
This was further evidence of directors learning from others and consciously applying self-
control to manage the perception of other directors with more seniority (in tenure terms) than 
their own. Director K also described the way NEDs shared their influence by playing a ‘bad 
cop, good cop’ scenario to get a result when faced with a resistant and recalcitrant CEO. 
Conversely, while longer tenure was accompanied by familiarity, shared understanding and 
higher levels of group learning, there were also some challenges perceived to be associated 
with long tenures, such as strategic persistence and lower tolerance for risk. As Director I 
observed: 
the reason why after 10 years it is probably time you go … by then you have seen 
enough and made so many decisions, you get invested in the trajectory and lose a 
bit of independence of thought … It is the classic dilemma because you are on the 
board because you have the expertise … and have enough information in order to 
do the oversight … [but] you can’t oversight something you don’t understand. 
There were clearly some board contexts in which more learning was occurring than others 
and NED experience of shared power on one board did not mean it was transferable to 
another. Director B reported that their experience of a banking board was distinctly different 
from a resources company board; in their experience, the resources sector was not always as 
open to strategic logic sourced from other sectors and this, in their view, was a lost 
opportunity. According to Director B, the resources sector tended to value long tenure in that 
sector over lessons that derived from other sectors. This experience reflects how the influence 
of a NED can differ from board to board because of the extent to which some board groups 
perceive and value ‘outsider’ cognitions. This experience was a common theme evidenced 
from the responses to the interviewer’s question, ‘are there some boards that engage you 
more than others and why’, and suggests that, in the experience of these NEDs, some board 
groups were more receptive to ‘outsider’ perspectives. These findings confirm the theory of 
perspective taking, tested empirically by Galinsky et al. (2006) (as reported in Chapter 2), 
which showed an inverse relation between power and perspective taking. Perspective taking, 
in this context, refers to the propensity to step outside one’s own experience and imagine the 
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emotions, perceptions and motivations of another—the antithesis of the self-interested 
behaviour often displayed by the powerful (Galinsky et al. 2006). 
Some NEDs perceived some of their peers on their last term as resisting learning and 
adapting. These longer-serving NEDs were more concerned about jeopardising their legacy 
and, therefore, adopted a ‘safer path’ by discouraging what they perceived as a high-risk 
acquisition with a long-term payoff. As Director A reported: 
I think there were a couple of board members who from the start were not sold on 
the idea … because they may have been thinking about their own reputational risk 
in a ‘not on my watch’ kind of way … not willing to invest for the long term or 
accept taking a short-term hit. They may have had deep reservations that remained 
unspoken. When concerns or fundamental objections are not drawn out early and 
remain unspoken, they can come back again later in the process in a different guise, 
as I suspect it did in this example. 
This finding supports Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1990) study that showed a positive 
relation between team tenure and strategic persistence. In their study, Golden and Zajac 
(2001) found a curvilinear relationship. That is, tenure had a positive relation only to a certain 
point, beyond which it had an adverse effect, thus, creating a greater attachment to current 
strategies. The finding also supports the work of Scheepers, Ellemers and Sassenberg (2013) 
that found group status (in-group or out-group alignment) mattered in the promotion or 
prevention of choices in group decision-making. Groups that were deemed to have more 
status would seek to preserve the status quo. This study shows that some of this effect can be 
sought covertly. 
In summary, learning to share power, learning from each other and adapting one’s approach 
was critical in contributing to effective NED decision-making. These NED behaviours, 
associated with openness to learning from other NEDs perceived to have more experience, 
were accompanied by a desire to be perceived as open, balanced and considered in their 
approach during decision-making processes. 
4.4.2.3 Theme 3: How Influence was Asserted through Skilled Articulation of Relevance 
and Expertise 
A third relational theme reported by NEDs found that judgements concerning the relevance 
of a contributor’s experience and standing determined how much attention was paid to their 
comments or questions. Conversely, there was a salient warning from some NEDs about the 
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dangers of experience and how it can blind, especially when faced with a business 
environment characterised by less certainty and more disruption. 
For example, a NED’s embeddedness in the NED community appeared to influence their 
attributed personal standing. This manifested itself in how others showed respect for their 
perspectives and, in some cases—but not all—ascribed significantly greater weight to their 
contributions relative to others; consequently, this strengthened their relative influence over 
the direction of a debate. 
For example, with eleven years’ experience as a NED and, in his executive life, responsible 
for the Asian division of a global business, Director H reported feeling confident about his 
challenges to a debate. He believed he had the respect of others around a table because of his 
long CEO experience in emerging markets. More particularly, he reported his success in 
clearly articulating to other board members the notion of growth optionality in the target 
market, convincing them to not get too hung-up on the price of the target entity and consider 
the value of the growth option in that market. 
Further, experienced directors often volunteered or were asked to play informal roles in a 
debate, as described by Director E: 
A year ago, when we were doing the transformation, this part of the business was on 
the sale list, and now we wanted to bulk on it, it did not make sense … But the CEO 
was now a convert to it, and I always worried about converts … [H]ad he got deal 
fever from spending too much time with the investment bankers? … [Y]ou pay a 
large amount of money to engage an investment bank, which is on a success fee and 
of course they will tell you why this is a good idea. The logic of taking out a 
competitor just because someone else may buy it did not stack up! I wanted to make 
sure we kept an eye on the ‘no case’ case … I was sceptical from the start, so, the 
Chair asked me to be the black hat … I did not need convincing! 
However, several NEDs reported an interesting nuance about subject matter experience. A 
common theme was the observation typified by more senior Directors O and H—that less 
experienced NEDs often assumed that they had to have expertise in a subject to make a good 
contribution: 
It is often thought that you have to have expertise in a particular subject to make a 
good decision. You need to know what questions to ask, and this comes from well-
rounded commercial experience … [I]t’s the totality of that experience and how you 
use it that matters. (Director O) 
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He [referring to the Chair] does not go to the subject-matter experts [SME] around 
the board table to ask them what they would do in this instance … he does not turn 
to the directors with marketing experience and ask what do you think of this 
marketing campaign. Otherwise, the board is getting dragged into being the expert, 
and it is not. (Director H) 
In several cases, NEDs reported that the unique body of expertise they possessed was not 
present on the board they were invited to serve. This included regional, M&A, and start-up 
experience. This finding was not unexpected because the scenario selected for this study was 
a major transformative decision. For example, Director C observed: 
This was one of the reasons they were attracted to me, and I was attracted to this 
particular company. They were looking at doing significant expansion in Asia they 
had had a few stop-start attempts. This is where my experience lies … in this 
particular part of North Asia. 
The degree to which a NED felt their experience was unique to that board is an important 
validation for their construal of their place or role within that group (Hillman, Nicholson & 
Shropshire 2008). This was an indicative theme in this study. For example, Director L—well 
known in the technology sector as previously CEO of a major player—joined a board in 
which his experience (in his self-conception) was unique because he was the only person on 
it with a technology background. Therefore, its director perceived that he should be 
recognised as the ‘go-to’ person on that board for advice and opinion on technology-related 
matters. This self-perception, in turn, affected the role (active or otherwise) Director L played 
in the decision story and reflected his subjective sense of power and personal confidence in 
the relevant expertise area. As he reported: 
I was a CEO previously of a company [sic], and I know what it is like to operate 
from zero market and zero revenue and go from that to something big … [W]hen 
everyone said it could not be done … but I have lived it … and [am] not afraid of it, 
and that in a sense is what I bring to this board. (Director L) 
However, this approach was not always viewed positively by other participating NEDs. Some 
raised the danger associated with board-thinking abdicated to NEDs perceived as subject 
experts. Over-reliance on some NEDs, including committee Chairs, they suggested, had on 
occasion resulted in the unintended consequence of typecasting directors into narrow and 
rigid roles by their peers. It also resulted in misplaced trust in one person’s advice that affects 
boardroom opinion disproportionately—for example, a board being captured by an expert’s 
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own cognitive biases. Three NEDs suggested that as a rule, deep domain expertise of a NED 
was most relevant in committee work, but not board work in which broader business and 
commercial experience were more relevant. 
In summary, the theme of how influence was asserted by the skilled articulation of relevance 
and expertise related to how articulately a NED assembled and framed their arguments and 
how eloquently they put forward the merits of their positions. However, it appears that while 
SME was important, it was not considered by participating NEDs to be sufficient if 
commercial relevance to a discussion at hand was not demonstrated clearly. 
4.4.2.4 Theme 4: How Influence was Supported through the Challenge Process 
A final relational theme related to the method of the challenge process. The way that focused 
and persistent questioning was successfully received in a boardroom relied to some extent on 
how NEDs worked collectively to support the NED posing a challenge question. NEDs did 
this by adding a comment of their own to questions posed, asking a clarifying question of a 
director to make a point clearer to management or making a helpful restatement. When an 
individual NED decided to take on a decision challenge, it could involve a critique of 
management and result in a defensive response. NEDs also reported being prepared to own a 
peer–director critique by asking questions to clarify a challenge to a CEO and signal support 
for a question. This had the consequence of presenting a ‘united front’, which, in turn, 
resulted in a CEO taking a challenger’s question more seriously. As Directors B, K and I 
respectively reported: 
he referenced that offline conversation we had had at the coffee break [during which 
he had sought reassurance from me about a technology platform issue in which he 
had no prior experience], back into the boardroom and said I had helped him think 
through his reservations. He said to the board he was still nervous and why, which 
then allowed the others to join in and ask for additional information to be provided 
to address his residual concerns. (Director B) 
certainly styles on this board are different. I tend to play the role quite often [sic] of 
getting beyond conflict. Sometimes I found it very valuable outside the boardroom 
to go to the person and ask what is really troubling you [about the valuation of this 
deal]. (Director K) 
someone will say something, and a director will ask a question about it, not to offer 
a different view but to clarify the point and to better explain [sic] what the person 
was putting in the room … and this is helpful for others of us too. (Director I) 
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Participating NEDs showed support and trust during a decision-making process, which was 
distinct from collective ownership at the end of that process when consensus was required. 
Collective ownership of the process played a role in signalling to NEDs that there was both 
permission and space for contention and challenge, and that the processes of challenge were 
an equally owned and shared responsibility by every NED, despite their power status. The 
findings appear to suggest that the strength of collective ownership of the challenge process 
depended on the strength of group identification. 
Several NEDs spoke about the protocol of providing notice of a challenge to a CEO or Chair 
(or both), which, hence, provided an opportunity to deal with a challenge before a meeting. 
As Director H observed: 
one of the conventions [on this board] is that you don’t open the discussion with 
dissension … [I]t comes later … an unwritten rule … [A]lso if directors have 
studied the paper and have issues they will raise it beforehand either with the Chair 
or CEO: ‘heads up, this is an issue that is troubling me’. 
In summary, the relational themes reveal that a NED’s cognitive history, which comprises 
both human capital (experience and reputation) and social capital (connections and network), 
combine to represent the source of relative power in a boardroom. However, this power only 
gets mobilised by the behaviours NEDs demonstrate when interacting with others. These 
findings lay the groundwork for a social competence framework, discussed in Section 4.6.3. 
When task tensions were resolved effectively, NEDs reported stepping up to tough 
conversations with courage, conviction, persistence and determination, while showing respect 
for and trust in others’ judgements and ideological differences. The more deal-anxiety 
experienced and the greater likelihood of divergent views, the more lively inquiry skills were 
used (coupled with preparedness) to learn from the experiences of others. NEDs also invested 
the time required to reach across cognitive or ideological differences and satisfactorily 
address divergent views while simultaneously being mindful of the need for efficiency, given 
most transformative decisions (such as acquisition deals) had immovable timelines. The 
ability to read social cues that may convey hubristic sentiment and sense the level of 
management contention prior to a proposal coming to a board was also important in how 
questions were posed. For this kind of contention to occur, the existence of intra-boardroom 
trust was pivotal, as was a Chair’s encouragement of contention and the creation of an 
environment in which all NEDs felt they had a voice in a debate, even if there was no 
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agreement. Essentially, relational skills neutralised any potential adverse effects of power 
differentials. 
However, it was clear that relational skills are only one part of the explanation of differences 
in NED behaviour concerning task tensions. That is, the skilful behaviours that NEDs 
employed as described in this section reflected underlying NED dispositions that also shaped 
their attitudes to their work. As noted in Chapter 2, behaviours have their roots in motives, 
needs and personality type. Section 4.4.3 describes these dispositional themes and their 
relevance in resolving the task tensions that NEDs experienced. 
4.4.3. Dispositional Themes 
The second tension that emerged from the 15 cases related to a NED’s role. As an 
independent director who represents the interests of shareholders, a NED is, when necessary, 
expected to demonstrate independent thinking (Berghe & Baelden 2005; Huse & Rindova 
2001; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013; Stiles & Taylor 2001). That is, to work effectively 
with others in a board group in a unified way they need to show a propensity to identify 
strongly with a board; however, as independent directors, they must feel comfortable to stand 
alone in their views, if required. In respect of a major strategic decision on which much is at 
stake, this capacity for independence manifests in a decision-making process, as a NED’s 
ability to strike a balance between their propensity to influence others versus their propensity 
to be influenced by others are both critical for director effectiveness. 
Therefore, NED motives were a relevant consideration in studying how directors managed 
this balance. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, NEDs demonstrated certain motives in their 
narratives, particularly when responding to questions posed by the researcher at the start of 
the semi-structured interviews: ‘how did you come to be on this board?’ and ‘what attracted 
you to join this board?’ Since needs and propensities predict and shape behaviour 
(McClelland 1985; Schutz 1958), the responses to these questions revealed a variety of 
underlying motives, as shown in Section 4.2.3. 
Further, research suggests that there are dangers of over-identification with a board group in 
discharging director accountabilities and, to be accepted, this may result in silencing one’s 
own doubts (Fritsche et al. 2013; Turner 1987, 2005). Conversely, a lack of identification 
with a board group may generate interpersonal friction and disunity and result in suspicion 
and low trust levels (Hillman et al. 2008). The current study revealed that NED propensities 
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could explain how these tensions arise. These propensities—as dispositions towards certain 
recognisable behavioural strategies and responses by participating NEDs and those observed 
by the peers with whom they interacted—reflected a variety of traits. As Director H 
explained: 
there are people who are the devil’s advocates, some the cheer squad, conciliators 
[who bridge differences] … some are chatterboxes, and others are more reserved … 
and all of those different styles in a team are evident here. I think most people are 
predominately one thing or the other … no one is one third, one third, one third, if 
you know what I mean … [M]ost people are temperamentally predisposed one way 
or another. 
This study found three dispositional themes that recurred in the data that may explain how 
behavioural strategies and responses of participating NEDs were used to resolve role 
tensions. Sections 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3 describe the dispositions evidenced by the data. 
4.4.3.1 Theme 1: Acting and Reflecting During Discourse with Others 
The propensity for a NED to initiate or show a bias to act, as opposed to adopt a more 
reflective style, when working with others on issues of high-level complexity was a double-
edged sword. NEDs perceived by others as having a strong bias for action tended to control 
conversations rather than let it emerge. For example, Director L suggested that allowing 
ideas, perspectives and viewpoints to emerge, rather than seeking to control the conversation 
or its outcome, was an increasingly important director skill. Director G added that it was 
important not to try and control discussions, but to be more comfortable with allowing 
conversations to emerge. 
A NED may have power but not the relational attributes or dispositions by which to mobilise. 
Participating NEDs also suggested that the need to opine on every issue can be a distraction 
in a boardroom and observed the tendency of some of their peers to act as such. Some 
speculated that this might be the desire to ‘show they have read all the board papers’ or a 
tendency to construe themselves as an expert on every topic, despite how complex. The 
capability of directors for self-reflection emerged as an important theme and was perceived 
by narrating NEDs as helpful when balanced. For example, Director I explained: 
there is definitely one director who feels the need to make a comment on virtually 
everything that is raised on this board, which is not the way this board operates, 
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which is tedious … and likes to intellectualise things … and I don’t find that 
particularly helpful. 
Some NEDs observed others as more considered and reflective in their responses to 
complexity, more willing to allow a conversation to emerge without needing to control it, 
thus, synthesising the contribution of others and adapting and responding as they went. 
Others, they suggested, were quieter, keen to keep their options open (especially when things 
were a close run) and did not want to commit too early to one side or the other. One director 
observed that ‘pacing’ in a conversation was a skill because ‘you may not want to be the first 
person to say yes every time or the last person to say yes every time’. Conversely, some 
NEDs spoke about the lack of contribution by some peers, suggesting that they were either 
intimidated or overwhelmed by the context or simply on a board because they needed to fund 
their post-executive life. 
As noted in Chapter 2, director motivation has been examined closely by Guerrero and 
Seguin (2012) who suggest that the extent to which a director was self-oriented or showed 
pro-organisation orientation was the key determinant of contribution—that is, one’s 
commitment to the goals and benefit of an organisation versus self-orientation. This study 
showed that personality-related factors also played an important part. A director’s 
contribution appeared to be a complex manifestation of orientation, personality traits and 
learning habits. Director G described this phenomenon as follows: 
I guess it is that some [NEDs] are more reserved, diffident in their views. I 
remember X [refers to his mentor who has now retired from board life and was on 
the same bank board] used to say, ‘I might be stupid but can you run that past me 
again’ … which then tended to get more conversation going. I know from 
experience that is not uncommon for directors to sit there without saying anything 
even if they don’t understand the issues … reluctant to admit that they don’t know 
or understand. Part of the ego thing. Most directors are very experienced, and they 
have got there because of their experience. So, it is hard to admit you don’t know … 
not wanting to look stupid or appearing like a hot rod. Or, in some cases having 
been part of the school of hard knocks, you learn not to declare your hand too early 
and are more guarded. 
In their decision stories, NEDs suggested that a fine balance existed between acting and 
reflecting was required to optimise their ability to learn from others and adapt their approach. 
While these were individual dispositions, some directors spoke about them in a collective 
sense. For example, Director L suggested that the ability to reflect collectively as a board 
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group (with and without management) would become increasingly important as companies 
look to acquire adjacent but related businesses on which they have little knowledge. This was 
the case with his decision story, which related to the acquisition of an offshore entity in an 
emerging technology: 
We had maybe half a dozen or more clunky, unproductive and frustrating 
discussions. First with management in the room and then without, discussing why 
we seemed to be collectively having a problem with this proposal … [W]e were 
having difficulty getting clarity over what the business was, why it was strategic 
and why we should pay this money for it. (Director L) 
Several NEDs also spoke about the need for board and management to adopt a more 
emergent style, not seeking to control the conversation too tightly, especially when 
contemplating a complex international growth strategy—a conversation that needs to be more 
fluid, dynamic and ongoing and not just ‘deal driven’ by reacting opportunistically when a 
good deal comes along. Additionally, a recurring theme in the narratives was NEDs’ 
acknowledgment that as an environment becomes more uncertain, questions of strategy also 
become more uncertain. Therefore, they suggested board conversations must necessarily 
change and a board environment created, which gave people the opportunity and permission 
to be frank about their uncertainty and levels of comfort. This suggested that fact-based 
logical argument may not be the only skill required, but it is increasingly a disposition to deal 
effectively with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
These findings provide support for a good balance between the propensity to act and reflect 
by both an individual NED and a board when working through complex decision challenges 
characterised by uncertainty. They also provide support for the seminal learning theories of 
Argyris and Schön (1978), which give prominence to the process of reflection as the key to 
how people learn. They suggested that people carry an espoused theory as well as a theory in 
use, which can be at odds with each other (Argyris & Schön 1978). That is, the espoused 
theory of an actor may not necessarily translate into a theory they use to guide their actions. 
Argyris and Schön (1978) posit the notion of double-loop learning, which pertains to learning 
to reflect on, question and change one’s underlying assumptions and values to ensure actual 
learning occurs. The findings of this study support their theory, thus, suggesting that more 
learning may occur in boardrooms if more time and space were created for reflection, 
something (as described in Section 4.5.2) a Chair can facilitate and nurture. 
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4.4.3.2 Theme 2: Practicing Detachment and Distance While Involved 
As distinct from the propensity to act or reflect with others, when dealing with high levels of 
complexity described in Section 4.4.3.1, the propensity to detach oneself from a situation was 
a common theme. Constructive detachment from a situation or group is difficult, especially 
when you are clearly a member (Latane 1981; Oakes, Turner & Haslam 1991; Simon & 
Oakes 2006). Some NEDs reported the ability to be part of this process while staying above 
it, while others observed peers who had varying abilities to perform this skill. 
This disposition was reflected by a NED’s expressed commitment to a decision process but 
detachment from a decision outcome. In the case of Director C, the only person (board and 
management included) with deep experience in the target geography, she was placed in an 
interesting position by being both new to a board and the role of directing: 
I had to try and be very even-handed and put in a sense my pro-X view [referring to 
the target country] aside … [and] consciously step back from that [her optimism 
about X] … I had to be very careful that I was being very objective and consciously 
work out the risk, really understand the risk–reward analysis and at what point we 
will [sic] not proceed. 
In describing the attributes of change leaders, Heifetz and Linsky (2002) draw the metaphor 
of a dance floor and a balcony, to describe the diffirent picture one would get if one was 
looking down from the balcony, seeing patterns you would not see when you are on the 
dancefloor amongst the dancers. 
Likewise, it could be suggested that NEDs may only gain both a clearer view of the ‘social 
reality’ in a boardroom and some perspective by distancing oneself from the fray. However, 
if you want to affect what is happening, you must return to the ‘dance floor’. Hence, you 
need to be among the dancers and on the ‘balcony’. As in the Heifetz and Linsky (2002) 
metaphor, NEDs recounted that effective contribution to board decisions resulted from the 
propensity to go back and forth between the two, using one to leverage the other. Director A 
explained this disposition as follows: 
I think one needs to be careful as a NED that one is not captured by the process if, 
for example, there is too much informal front-end work with the management team 
(on the deal) then you end up being in a position where you are advocating the deal 
rather than drawing distance from it in order to provide the required oversight. 
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The decision stories also reflected examples of NEDs, including reports by Chairs, of over-
identifying with a decision and channelling one’s contribution to fit with a conclusion they 
desired. As Director H reported: 
some Chairs have made up their mind already and see their job as getting everyone 
to reach that decision. A good Chair gets the directors to reach the decisions 
themselves and does not play tricks to get you there. 
Effectiveness in navigating this tension required a NED to exercise a constructive level of 
‘social distance’ through needing to be respected rather than being liked, confident of the 
value they bring to debates and being prepared to engage with the value that others bring. 
Director H also reported that management had been known to ‘play games’ to which the 
NED had to be alert to and this reflected the views of other NEDs: 
Some management spends a lot of time ‘marinating’ the board so that when the 
decision comes around the board directors are all soft and tender and say yes 
immediately … [T]his was a very fraught area. Of course, management has to do 
some socialising of ideas to get [d]irectors up to speed and tease out concerns but 
this can sometimes go too far … when they pick off directors they think would be 
most supportive [of the proposal] and whom they marinate first. 
As noted in Chapter 2, social distancing was investigated by Westphal and Khanna (2003) as 
a means of social control and to keep less powerful board members in line. Where power 
differentials were large—that is, where significant differences exist in the origins of power 
described earlier in this chapter—their study found evidence of subtle control to ‘guide’ the 
decision process towards an outcome. This effect was reflected in this study by Director D’s 
observation that a major part of a decision was already taken beforehand by both Chair and 
Deputy Chair (on the basis of their relatively long experience in the mining and resources 
sector) and ‘choreographed into the room’. The negative effect these political manoeuvrings 
have on director accountability and governance is clear and supported by previous studies 
(Bailey & Peck 2013). The propensity of a NED to stay in the fray while simultaneously 
staying above it and intuit what may be happening was clearly important for retaining 
objectivity and independent-mindedness, especially when faced with powerful and influential 
experts or by over-confident decision-makers. 
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4.4.3.3 Theme 3: Conceding to and Resisting Social Pressure from the Influence Attempts 
of Others 
The dominant logic in corporate governance is that NEDs who are held accountable for their 
judgements would resist agency pressures (Roberts 1991; Stiles & Taylor 2001). However, 
this view ignores the social reality of groups. Social influences acting on groups have a long 
history of research (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004). According to social impact theory, how we 
respond to influence attempts by others is dependent on who the influencers are, how many 
and the immediacy of their effect (Latane 1981). 
The propensity for a NED to be attracted to ‘people like me’, how they respond to influence 
attempts by others they see as similar or dissimilar and the cognitive processing they engage 
in when their views deviate from the norm were reflected by the findings of this study. As 
noted in Section 4.2.3, almost all the participating NEDs cited their attraction to join a board 
was motivated by who else was on it, including high-profile names. Some of the judgements 
made by participating NEDs about ‘peer compatibility’ can be explained by a range of social 
influence theories reviewed by Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) and cited in Chapter 2. 
The admiration that NEDs recounted for peers on a board is relevant because they may be 
more positively disposed to decision processes a board makes and engage in less questioning 
(Lorsch & MacIver 1989). Conversely, Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that there must be 
a minimum level of interpersonal attraction for board members to have mutual trust regarding 
judgements and expertise. For example, Director J was impressed by the quality of their 
board: ‘The people on the board were highly respected for their achievements [the director 
proceeded to name them], and it also had several members of the board who were from 
overseas, and this attracted me’. 
However, three directors spoke openly of some disappointment after joining their boards—
that their initial external impressions did not completely match their experience after they had 
joined. This suggested that dispositional factors can make social influence more complex 
than some previous theories have suggested. That is, members of a group, such as a board, 
will make careful and conscious reassessments of their prior judgements to determine how 
their contributions might fit a group. For example, as Director C reported, this conscious 
process was evident when NEDs described their early experiences with new boards: 
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When you are first appointed to a board, you don’t participate fully until you have 
worked out the personalities … [Y]ou have to take a back seat and observe … work 
out what particular topics interests particular directors, how the Chair related to the 
directors, whether they are strict timekeepers, inclusive and allow everyone to 
speak. 
As evidenced by Director P’s observations, the data also showed dynamic and fundamental 
patterns that occurred in which majority ideas were dispersed and diffused in ways such that 
some subgroups in a majority (the in-group) got bigger while others in a minority (the out-
group) got smaller: 
I found it [referring to the financial services sector] difficult to understand … I 
looked around the table and formed an assessment about the directors in terms of 
reliability, competence and judgement and listened to those who had more 
experience in this sector than I had. 
These influences confirm dynamic social impact theory (Latane 1981, 1996) in which groups 
working together over time produce subtle shifts in power relationships between subgroups. 
Further, data from this study showed that once members had established themselves, their 
response to influence attempts (by others) was motivated by affiliation and the maintenance 
of a positive self-concept. This is consistent with recent research that shows that the 
activation of social effects is subtle, indirect, heuristically based and often unconscious. As 
noted in Chapter 2, two theories hold relevance for the finding of this study. A brief revisit to 
those theories is required before concluding this section’s findings on relational and 
disposition themes by examining their significance in determining variations in director 
behaviour. Three points are particularly relevant. 
The first regards the social categorisation theory (David & Turner 1996) that studies ‘in-
group’ and ‘out-group’ effects, which, in turn, determine the receptiveness to influence 
attempts by majorities or minorities. That is, when a target receives an influence attempt from 
an in-group minority, they are more likely to become pressured to conform. Conversely, 
when an out-group minority attempts to send an influence attempt, the pressure to change 
opinions in the direction of an advocated position is minimal. This suggests that the ‘people 
like me’ construct has a pervasive effect on how influence attempts are responded to in a 
board-group setting. Therefore, the influence effect is dependent on whether a message 
source is an in-group or out-group. Here, it is significant that Director O recalled that the 
credibility of a position depends on who is making the point. 
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Second, the social identity model for deindividuation effects (SIDE) (Reicher et al. 1995) 
also has relevance for what was found in this study. This model suggests that responsiveness 
to a group norm is not simply a reflection of a reduced sense of self, but a conscious and 
rational process relating to the situation-specific norms defined by a group’s identity. For 
example, when group members perceive they face social sanctions for norm deviance, 
anonymity and identifiability may become important and this leads them to keep their 
divergent views to themselves. Here, the experience of Director O is also relevant. He 
reported that although he strongly disagreed with a Chair’s view that a board continue to 
entertain an acquisition proposal, he made a judgement not to raise his continuing concerns 
directly with that Chair. Instead, he deferred to more senior colleagues to take on the Chair, 
reflecting a process of deindividuation: 
I guess I felt this was a responsibility for the more senior directors (than me) who 
had a closer relationship with the Chair and had worked with the Chair for a longer 
period of time to have that one-on-one conversation with him. (Director O) 
Finally, most NEDs described raising concerns during a decision process and felt their 
concerns were addressed along the way. None reported that their concerns remained 
unresolved to the point they were noted in the minutes (a formal protocol on most boards). 
They suggested that although this was allowed in formal protocol, this request was likely to 
have unintended effects on boardroom harmony. It would also be perceived by peers as a 
self-serving attempt by a NED to, as Director N put it, ‘cover their backside’. 
Only one NED described a scenario in which he had a different view from the start of the 
process and it was only after several meetings that another NED began to accept his view. Up 
to that point, the dissenting NED went along with the majority view, raising his concerns, but 
not strongly. Other NEDs, while not attributing dissent themselves, described their 
experiences of other sole dissenters on their boards. This study found that it was easier for a 
NED to stand their ground on an issue if there were at least one other NED in a group that 
agreed. Clearly, there is strength in numbers, thus, giving support to this phenomenon as 
described by social impact theory (Latane 1981, 1996). 
The strength of numbers mattered. Higher-power directors (those perceived to have longer 
and more established cognitive histories, as described in Section 4.2.1) commanded greater 
attention: ‘when they spoke others listened’, said one NED, and this is a form of social 
control of a debate. However, in some cases, experience was discounted when a director did 
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not have tenure. That is, higher-power NEDs who had joined recently were less able to exert 
influence on the direction of a debate, as evidenced by Director N. Despite having 
considerable experience as a CEO on global acquisitions and divestments before joining a 
board, Director N’s self-construal of his newness played a part in his reluctance to challenge 
decisions robustly. He recounted his hesitation during a debate a few months after he joined a 
board: 
Fellow directors all seemed reasonably relaxed about it, and you start to think that 
maybe I am wrong and I don’t feel that confident that I have some divine inspiration 
that they don’t have. (Director N) 
4.4.4 The Significance of Behavioural Variations in NED Uses of Influence 
The relational and dispositional themes found in this study concerning a NED’s ability to 
deal with task and role tensions shape the way they choose to use their influence. The themes 
also suggest that while board cohesion was important for decision-making effectiveness, it 
also had the potential of creating self-censorship and act as a ‘mind guard’, thus, pressuring 
deviant thinkers to conform to majority opinions. This finding supports the theories of Janis 
(1983) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) and provides further support for socialisation tactics 
and social sanctioning, particularly as forms of informal control (Westphal & Khanna 2003). 
However, these findings extend the theorising around social sanctioning, suggesting that ‘one 
of us’ socialisation at times can be given more weight in boardrooms than experience. Social 
control was found to be exercised through several behaviours employed by higher-power 
NEDs, which included discounting a NED’s contribution, paying less attention to their 
remarks, not extending invitations to informal discussions and not building conversationally 
on the positions or views they put forward. In summary, this study found a wide variation in 
the nature and sources of NED influence and the skill by which this influence was mobilised, 
ultimately determining how a NED enacts their strategy-shaping accountabilities. 
Prior career experience shaped the ‘cognitive givens’ each NED brought to a decision, such 
as knowledge, assumptions and mental models, and knowledge of alternatives and 
consequences of actions. A director’s social embeddedness had the effect of exposing each 
member to a diversity of macro-cognitions. These were broader cognitive strategies in 
decision-making, sensemaking or problem-detection processes that generated various 
effective courses of action not determined by interactions they had experienced on other 
boards. When experienced, NEDs brought more external cognitive history from multiple 
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directorships or multi-sector experience, which others perceived as enriching the processes of 
strategic debate concerning options and possibilities. It prevented the over-reliance on narrow 
skill bases, specialisations or ‘industry recipes’. Therefore, this social embeddedness and the 
exposure it provided had the consequence of tempering a board member’s tendency to reach 
for what has previously worked. Essentially, the findings showed that director networks 
could play a significant role in guarding against the narrowing of a director’s cognitive 
horizons, thus, suggesting that multiple directorships hold value for broadening a director’s 
strategic perspectives. The findings also show significant variations in the mix of human and 
social capital NEDs brought to a board and their experience of influence in and around a 
boardroom, which was affective and relational in nature. How NEDs vary on all these 
dimensions of cognitive history (board capital) result in power differentials, which, in turn, 
strengthens or weakens group identification. 
The findings reveal the complexities involved in the effects and consequences of social 
factors, which the study’s second research question posed and discussed in Sections 4.2 and 
4.3: how does the strength of an individual director and their sense of identity with a group 
construct a power dynamic that influences decision-making? They reveal that a NED’s 
relative board capital (a combination of experience, reputations, connections and networks) 
formed the basis of an invisible social hierarchy, which, in turn, determined how NEDs 
responded to influence attempts and how social support for these influence attempts of others 
was granted or withheld. It also showed that while a NED’s board capital was important, the 
social competence and dispositions of NEDs were critical in determining the success of their 
influence attempts. 
As described in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 regarding relational and dispositional themes, social 
competencies included well-developed skills in questioning and dissenting constructively. 
These involve openness to learning and feedback and alertness to emerging thinking, 
articulating the relevance of one’s experience eloquently, owning and engaging 
constructively with the challenges and counter-positions of peers, the propensity to reflect 
and practice detachment while staying involved and resisting social pressure while being 
prepared to concede a point or argument in the face of a strong rationale. 
The findings suggest that decision behaviours are as much influenced by a social system and 
its associated tactics in which NEDs find themselves as by the cognitive aspects of a decision 
at hand. Additionally, social systems also shaped decision behaviours, particularly the NEDs’ 
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preparedness to mount influence attempts and the strength with which such attempts were 
mounted. Further, this study (which was focused on a large transformative decision with 
significant strategic change implications for an organisation) revealed several board personae 
and provides further evidence in response to the third research question relating to the 
moderators of boardroom influence. As noted, the third research question is addressed in 
Section 4.5: how do the effects of group membership or identification and power differentials 
interact to create a unique ‘social reality’ that moderates influence in and around a 
boardroom? However, since the behavioural variations in a NED’s use of influence reveal 
distinct board personae that comprise the ‘social reality’ of a board, as a segue into Section 
4.5, the personae are presented as follows. 
4.4.5 Multiple Influencing Personae of NEDs 
NED-recounted behaviour of their peers can be distilled into personifying NED contributions 
as influence attempts. There were nine director personae distilled from the findings that 
directors adopted when influencing matters relating to strategic change and that pertain to 
influencing styles that NEDs observed of others. Some directors were reported to play several 
of these styles at various times during the extended decision story and reported personae they 
observed in their peers. These personae were situational, board and task-relevant. For 
example, some directors reported that peers adopted a manifestly different influencing style 
on other boards on which they shared membership, which is an important implication for how 
group membership can materially alter the experience of board culture. Additionally, it is 
possible that some personae were more appropriate for different stages of a company’s 
growth cycle. 
4.4.5.1 The Mediator 
This persona regards a director who habitually adopts a mediating role, acting as a go-
between among two subgroups or individuals that have divergent views. A mediator tends to 
look for common ground and tries to make connections between divergent views on a given 
strategic position. They will generally have a more reflective style, be attentive to other NED 
inputs, seek to clarify underlying thinking, build on other views and generally be perceived as 
collaborative and a team player. A mediator may at times lose their voice in their attempt to 
be a peacemaker. 
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4.4.5.2 The Cheerleader 
This persona regards a director who over-identifies with a group and believes their role is to 
reinforce the attractiveness of a group, thus, focusing on only the positive qualities views and 
actions of a group. In this regard, they often opine positively and frequently on almost all 
issues. When confronted with an acquisition proposal by management, they may often choose 
to focus on the upside, providing unqualified support. Their discernment skills may be 
underdeveloped or suppressed to achieve group acceptance. 
4.4.5.3 The Pragmatist 
This persona regards a director who is likely to have a realistic sense of the demands and 
constraints of current circumstances and be more interested in what will work or seems 
practical. Therefore, they may be focused, for example, on the practical implications of a 
potential acquisition on management attention and not necessarily on the upside potential. 
They may not be energised by ‘blue-sky’ thinking, believing that operational considerations 
and practical applications are more important. 
4.4.5.4 The Conserver 
This persona regards a director who prefers the known to the unknown and may find that 
ambiguity in a proposal is unsettling. They typically prefer an incremental proposal rather 
than one that involves transformative change. A conserver tends to opt for continuous 
improvement, seeks to minimise uncertainty and ambiguity and is generally perceived as 
risk-averse. On occasion, a conserver is referred to as the ‘black hat’ who focuses on why a 
deal or proposed strategic change should not proceed. 
4.4.5.5 The Sage 
This persona regards a director who says very little, but when they do their contribution is 
perceived by most other directors as wise. This director does not derive their wisdom from 
tenure, age or years of experience in a particular task but instead shows practical wisdom. 
That is, they instinctively know the right way to do the right things. When a sage asks a 
question, other directors reported wondering why they had not asked this themselves. As 
such, a sage plays a significant role in the learning of others, especially when contemplating 
strategic change. 
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4.4.5.6 The Technician 
This persona regards a director who is manifestly functional or specialist in their orientation. 
They do not stray far from their functional discipline or specialisation, preferring to leave 
others to discuss issues who they perceive have more expertise. A technician tends to view all 
aspects of a decision through the prism of their discipline. In this regard, they were thorough 
and detail-minded but confined their contributions to discussions they thought they were 
most ‘qualified’ to comment on or influence. 
4.4.5.7 The Politician 
This persona regards a director who pays close attention to ‘how the wind is blowing’ before 
taking a position. That is, they take positions that further their own interests or personal 
ambition rather than the best interests of a company or stakeholders. This may include 
furthering their influence and connections with powerful board members to become more 
powerful by association. A politician may also engage in covert political tactics to shore up 
support for their own position. This persona is inherently political, not to be confused with 
the display of political astuteness or savvy. 
4.4.5.8 The Innovator 
This persona regards a director who shows a preference for a radical approach to strategic 
change. They continually challenge existing norms, politics and structures and are 
comfortable proposing a change that may disrupt the status quo because they believe change 
is good for an organisation. They do not just ask ‘why’, but ‘why not?’ They are generally 
seen to be counterintuitive thinkers and idea generators and are respected for their vision, big-
picture thinking and contribution. 
4.4.5.9 The Bomb Thrower 
This persona regards a director who is often viewed as disruptive to the normal flow of a 
conversation and has an opinion on most issues. A bomb thrower has little regard or patience 
for group norms or past precedence. They display a confrontational, pugnacious and 
belligerent style of discourse because they believe there is far too much politeness in and 
around board tables. They often have a relatively low tolerance for emergent reflective 
conversation and are perceived by peers as unpredictable and volatile in their reactions and 
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responses. They often show surprise about the reactions they receive from peers because of 
their inability to understand the personal effect of their style. 
In summary, these nine personae and the subjective roles that they imply each have 
implications for how the processes of accountability for strategic change may be exercised. 
NEDs may need to consider how they work with the many personae they may encounter in a 
boardroom and better understand how each persona may enable or inhibit the exercise of 
accountability during processes of contemplating, debating and deciding a strategic change. 
This taxonomy may also help a NED reflect on their own style—that is, whether they may be 
over-playing the role of a persona to the detriment of a decision-making process and 
collegiality of a board group. These personae may also be useful for a Chair in considering 
how they might proactively adapt their leadership approach to the management of a debate 
around a table to get the best out of its members. 
4.5 NED Influence in Decision-Making and the ‘Social Reality’ of the 
Board 
This section further reports on findings in response to the final research question posed by 
this study: how is the use of NED influence in decision-making shaped by the ‘social reality’ 
(of group identification and power distribution)? In particular, it considers how different 
board compositions and contexts moderate the use of NED influence, including themes that 
emerge from the effects of board leadership, the effects of board protocols on discursive 
practices and the effects of CEO attitudes to NED experience. 
In terms of a board context and its effects on NED capacity to influence, the dynamic 
between a board and an executive was deemed critical, as discussed in detail in Section 4.5.3. 
For example, some directors reported the way in which a Chair ‘groomed’ a CEO to develop 
a deep and genuine understanding of the substantive contribution a board makes to CEO 
performance. This included both understanding the accountabilities of a board in oversight of 
key decisions and the tangible value that individual contributions of board members can 
make to CEO thinking on key decisions. Two of the 15 decision stories revealed the effect of 
a resistant CEO on a decision dynamic regarding negotiations and consensus building in 
relation to efforts for an acquisition. 
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It is significant that NEDs in this study who held multiple directorships reported experiencing 
very different decision-making processes on each board regarding opportunities for shaping 
strategy. This is the clearest evidence that context matters, thus, providing support for an 
institutionally contextualised orientation to board research. This orientation contrasts with an 
economic orientation that promotes a context-free approach to board research. 
Despite this study focusing its exploration on a decision situated in a company, a second 
question posed as a ‘warm-up’ in the semi-structured interview about decision deliberations 
elicited some significant findings: ‘are there some boards you are on that you enjoy more 
than others?’ Since all directors involved in this study held multiple directorships, this 
question elicited a broad range of recollections relating to differences in the social reality 
experienced by NEDs. The degree to which a director feels validated and recognised for their 
contribution on one board could, through personal learning, strengthen their confidence and 
motivation to contribute on other boards. The data supported this implication to the extent 
that directors with experience on bigger and more prestigious boards appeared more 
confident of their role and contribution. However, levels of NED confidence might be (at 
least in part) a factor of the depth and breadth of experience, and be related to their cognitive 
history. 
yes [laughs] … Inevitably there is a direct correlation between what I can contribute 
and my enjoyment … so if I can contribute, I enjoy it more. And what I have found 
is that areas that I have experience in and I understand the sector quite deeply, or I 
do understand the area of expertise and that is needed in the organisation … maybe 
I am more comfortable … I feel I contribute more because I understand the business 
better. (Director J) 
All directors interviewed were able to articulate these distinctions. This provides the strongest 
evidence that the ‘social reality’ or dynamic of a board is an important factor in the study of 
effectiveness and accountability, and reflects the findings of most process researchers (Forbes 
& Milliken 1999; Huse 2008; McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Pye 
& Pettigrew 2005; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005). Consistent with these studies on board 
context, Director N expected a board he joined would have an operational focus: 
I joined another board which I thought was a very operational board and when I got 
there I found actually it did not have anything to do with the operation. [A]ll we 
talked about was financial engineering and structures and the rest of it. I did not 
really like that … I don’t think I am particularly good at it either … [I]t was all 
around its ‘23 per cent of this, which, in turn, had a 10 per cent option over that’ and 
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so on and so on. You had to have a PhD in high maths to understand what they were 
talking about. I thought we were going to talk about customers and operations and 
costs control and things like that and we hardly talked about that. 
4.5.1 The Effects of Board Leadership 
This section details observations participating directors made of their board Chair and style of 
board leadership and how it might enable or inhibit NED contribution. For example, Director 
C explained the importance of a Chair’s role as follows: 
It is the nature of boards … especially on a board of a listed company … [Y]ou 
have a collection of people with very strong personalities … part of the skill of 
being a Chair is to use their personalities and use that experience to the company’s 
advantage and not let them get out of the control, not get out of the paddock. 
While NEDs’ sources of power and attributes were relevant to understanding influence in a 
boardroom, the role of a Chair was also relevant. Particularly, the conversational culture and 
‘reflective space’ created by a Chair’s leadership was described as a critical moderator of 
shaping behaviour, specifically a Chair’s facilitation of NED input and management of board 
process in reaching an agreement with which all directors felt they could live. 
Participating NEDs recounted variations in how Chairs enacted influence in and around a 
boardroom. Some NEDs suggested that a generational change is starting to occur in 
Australian boardrooms, with more recently appointed Chairs operating with less of a 
‘command control’ mindset replaced by individuals that have honed facilitation skills. There 
was consensus from all participating NEDs that a healthy board governance culture is one in 
which both agreement and disagreements are effectively managed by a Chair. Specifically, 
the study found six themes relating to the pivotal role that a Chair played in managing 
agreements and disagreements in relation to strategic proposals brought to a board. These are 
skilled facilitation, impartial judgement calls, reflective observation, effective process 
management, creating tactical interventions and the nurturing of psychological safety. 
Managing these factors is particularly challenging when there is not a significant ‘power 
distance’ between a Chair and a board comprised of equally experienced corporate elites 
(Magee & Smith 2013); essentially, a Chair must be able to exercise considerable skills in 
managing board relationships and interactions. 
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4.5.1.1 Theme 1: Skilled Facilitation 
Skilled facilitation was demonstrated in how a Chair managed an agenda efficiently while 
allowing robust debate to thrive in a way that discussion was not hijacked or derailed by 
directors with one point of view. As Directors C and I observed: 
this board has very strong chairman … very consultative … very good at making 
sure everyone has a say and keeps the debate going. He makes sure no one talks 
more than others. We have one director who does sometimes go on labouring the 
point … [H]e [the Chair] will say ‘I think we understand that point, but it’s really 
important we move on’. (Director C) 
I was once on a board where the Chair did not have control of the board, and it went 
around and around, and I was in that company for one term so I voted with my feet 
because that it is not the way a company should be run … They got themselves into 
an operating routine where individual directors had their own pet projects, and they 
were constantly pushing those projects and because … the Chair was not strong … 
[H]e would say to the CEO, ‘have a think about that will you?’. Not a [sic] way to 
run a company. (Director I) 
it is not to do with the form of the organisation but is always determined by the 
people you sit around the table with and the way the Chair brings that group 
together. (Director I) 
Irrespective of the extensive experience and knowledge individual directors may bring to a 
firm, NEDs recounted that how a Chair brought a group together was critical to a decision 
dynamic. From the moment a new board member is appointed, some directors suggest that a 
Chair is expected to play a critical role in successfully inducting a member by coaching and 
mentoring to get a director up to speed quickly and ‘contributing confidently’. Further, 
directors in this study saw a Chair as having the responsibility to ensure that the onboarding 
of directors is complete and effective, and an individual director is encouraged to proactively 
seek help getting the background and knowledge they need to contribute confidently. 
NEDs reported that an effective Chair needed to ensure they did not put a stake in the ground 
too early on a proposal and let a debate run its course, thus, ensuring a diversity of opinion 
could emerge and proactively guide the conduct of discussion. Director B explained a Chair’s 
role in facilitating open debate as follows: 
I think positioned as I am with four boards, one of the things that is quite critical to 
effective board operation is the behaviour of the Chair … [T]ypically they tend to 
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be strong personalities … but have to use that as a force for good rather than evil … 
Some Chairs are too ready to jump in and say what they think … [T]hey need to let 
the debate run and also [sic] coral it in when they need to … Keeping the debate 
even-handed … letting everyone say what is they can usefully say … without 
beating it to death … it is the skill of facilitation that not all of them have. 
Director A felt that the wealth of experience NEDs on his board brought could have been 
better leveraged beyond a formal interview and selection process. NEDs observed that good 
Chair facilitation was proactive and did not wait for directors to insert themselves into 
discussions. Given that this Chair had a deep understanding of what each director brought to 
the table, they would invite NED contributions. As Director C explained: 
he is also good at saying ‘Director X, I know you have experience in this, would 
there be anything you like to add … or Director Y, is there anything you can add to 
this debate’. He will actually facilitate that rather than wait … if he feels he wants 
directors to specifically talk about something he knows they have experience in he 
will ask them … [S]ome Chairs don’t do that. 
4.5.1.2 Theme 2: Well-timed Judgement Calls 
These findings suggested that in addition to good facilitation skills, Chairs needed to apply 
their judgement ‘in the moment’ to determine when to rein a discussion in or encourage more 
divergent thinking, but not give too much time to a well-known biased or researched view. 
The overworking of a point was a time-waster—a Chair had to judge and manage director 
contributions. However, in this regard, NEDs reported that some Chairs had more tact than 
others in facilitating contributions. For example, Director C recounted a time when a Chair 
suggested firmly, ‘we have heard that it three times, we don’t need to hear that a fourth time’. 
Director A also reported a Chair with a very direct style: ‘you have sucked the air out of that 
point, it’s time to move on’. 
NEDs reported that Chairs also needed to be vigilant and spot ‘management cheerleaders’ 
and those who were pervasive advocates of a deal. Director A believed that in these cases, a 
Chair should intervene and allow others to balance a debate: 
Some directors, because of their personality, have a bigger voice and may be more 
articulate [or] less fearless and a debate can get off the rails as a result … [T]hey 
become a pervasive advocate that can sway the whole conversation. That is why a 
good Chair is important, as they can create the interventions for others to contribute. 
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Director O described this impartiality as the skill of ‘faithful representation’—that is, the skill 
in faithfully representing the views of directors. A Chair’s oversight responsibilities in 
relation to a large transformative decision (such as these decision stories relate) requires 
faithfully representing directors’ feedback to management. In a decision story recounted by 
Director O, he suggested that a Chair had shown partiality in his judgement: 
Something like this [deal] needed unanimous support to go through. It was 
impossible for consensus to emerge when the Chair has a fixed view that is contrary 
to the board. It was not process-related or skill-dependent. It was purely related to 
the mindset of the Chair [that] was aligned with management and wanted this to go 
through but without board consensus. Given the Chair had a fixed position, which 
was immovable, perhaps made him less sensitive to his colleagues and made it 
impossible to arrive at a consensus. 
The culmination of this decision story ended with an example of offline cooption. Director O 
was ‘volunteered’ by more senior directors to initiate a discussion with a Chair about the loss 
of confidence in his chairmanship. This suggests a political motive by these senior directors 
not to be seen to have ejected a Chair from a board and ‘keep their powder dry’. That Chair 
departed months later. 
4.5.1.3 Theme 3: Reflective Observation 
The findings also showed that an effective Chair ensured rich engagement of spoken and 
unspoken concerns about a decision early in a conversation. In an issue raised with a Chair by 
Director G, this was not the case: 
I raised it with the Chair and said that there was a lot of anxiety that was not 
surfacing at the board meeting … [H]e was frankly more than negligent on this. He 
politely listened, agreed, but did nothing about it. 
The reflective skill involved careful observation of what was really going on in that debate. It 
related to observing when a director had something to say, but not saying it for whatever 
reason and finding ways to draw them into the conversation. As Director L reported, this 
required the Chair to be a keen observer of individuals so that their unspoken concerns could 
be voiced, ‘Peter [not real name], I can see you looking pensive, is there something on your 
mind?’ 
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4.5.1.4 Theme 4: Effective Process Management 
Despite that timing is critical in large transformative deals and most transactions had key 
‘drop-dead’ dates, participating NEDs reported it was important for a Chair to be flexible 
about process. This included (when necessary) revising timelines on an agenda to allow more 
time for a debate, for additional information to be presented or to allow advisers more time to 
do their work. During the period of this study, the commodities market in Australia collapsed 
and this external factor required boards and Chairs to adjust the board process to account for 
factors outside an organisation’s control. As Director H explained: 
he will review the agenda and notice that management has allocated 30 minutes and 
he knows it will take only 10 minutes … and only gives 10 minutes to it, and if 
something is going to be difficult and only has 30 minutes he may extend that to an 
hour, so people don’t feel under pressure to roll over quickly or their opinion is 
cleverly diverted because of time … [so] no one would feel … pressured or the 
decision was made too quickly. It will be really thrashed about. 
Another area of process management concerned potential conflict of interest. In these 
instances, a Chair would ensure that directors who may have conflicted views—for example, 
because of their directorship on another board that may benefit either materially or otherwise 
from a deal—absented themselves early in the process. This was particularly the case in 
which participating NEDs were also on the boards of large banks, advising a big acquisition 
or competing to provide advice. 
4.5.1.5 Theme 5: Creating Tactical Interventions 
In addition to the four skills mentioned above, NEDs in this study recounted a range of tactics 
and skills their Chairs demonstrated. Concerning very large transformative decisions, 
directors recounted two ways in which Chairs supplemented their facilitation skills in a 
boardroom. First, a Chair spoke individually to each NED offline to ensure there were no 
concerns or questions not being raised at a board. Second, as Director A explained, a Chair 
used closed sessions to surface concerns that may not have been apparent during debates: 
This was the time when some directors raised any concerns or reservations they 
may have had [which they were uncomfortable raising while the CEO was present]. 
Even if they don’t disagree with the CEO’s proposal, they may wish to voice a 
particular emphasis. 
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The use of a board dinner (with or without a CEO present) was also a tactic that some Chairs 
employed. Several directors suggested that the conviviality of a dinner, held after the 
conclusion of a board meeting, surfaced some interesting observations or nuances not voiced 
at board meetings because of the momentum by which an agenda progressed. 
The ability of a Chair to create interventions for directors to contribute to a debate was 
considered critical. This includes the tactic of simply stopping discussions and signally to a 
‘process check’ to determine individual positions. These reported tactics, practised by some 
but not all Chairs, were nevertheless critical in surfacing unspoken concerns (especially 
earlier in the decision process) and moderating the influence of pervasive advocates of a 
position not in the best interests of process or outcome. 
4.5.1.6 Theme 6: Nurturing Psychological Safety 
Finally, NEDs reported that boards they regarded as most effective were those in which the 
Chair created a sense of psychological safety, such that NEDs were made to feel safe to 
disagree and challenge the Chair as well as other NEDs. This skill theme was integrally 
connected with the preceding five skill themes, such that it was unlikely to emerge if a Chair 
did not possess the other five attributes. 
In summary, the role of a Chair cannot be understated. They can strengthen a board or 
weaken it and cast a shadow over its deliberations. Despite this, all NEDs have a 
responsibility to take the lead if they feel that the direction of a debate raised personal 
concerns or anxieties. 
4.5.2 The Effects of Board Protocols on Discursive Practices 
Although this study was focused on NED interactions, board processes were the context in 
which those interactions occurred and could shape discursive practices and interactions, just 
as interaction history can shape process over time. Some board processes were more salient 
in this regard than others. This section describes the observations NEDs made about the 
effects of key processes on their experiences of influence in and around a boardroom. 
Several themes relating to board protocols and practices emerged from this study as having a 
positive or negative effect on NED behaviour. All the boards in this study had a history of 
practices that characterised the conduct of their work. In the context of large ‘bet-the-farm’ 
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decisions, such as the ones in this study, NEDs described the need for a different type of 
diligence. Norms practised in other ‘business-as-usual’ decisions were not applicable. As 
Director L explained, ‘investment into new markets is about belief … desire, ambition and 
passion … and not about facts, data or money and, therefore, demands a different model of 
governance’. 
4.5.2.1 Closed-door Sessions 
All 15 boards practised closed-door sessions in which members met without a CEO. This was 
sometimes held for 15–30 minutes at the start of a meeting and always at the conclusion. In 
some cases, the allotted time may spill over to an hour at the beginning of a meeting, with an 
agenda pushed back. NEDs felt these sessions were critical in stepping back from the heat of 
a live transaction and sharing reflections with the Chair and each other before a meeting 
began in earnest. A NED-only dinner, usually held twice a year or during a big deal or crisis, 
was also a way in which NEDs gave oxygen to this kind of reflective discussion. 
While recognising its value, directors felt that private NED discussions should be managed 
carefully to preserve trust with a CEO. For example, Director G described how a closed 
session held during a live transaction was taken out of context and created friction with the 
CEO: 
you have to be careful about this. You don’t want the CEO to feel ambushed. On 
another board, we had a case where we had discussed something at a board dinner, 
and everyone piled in, and then the Chair rang the CEO that night to tell him what 
had been discussed and the CEO asked understandably ‘where was I during that 
discussion?’ 
4.5.2.2 Board Effectiveness Reviews 
Participating directors all felt that board reviews were an important aspect of board life and, 
if conducted well, contributed to the strengthening of board process and governance. Usually 
initiated by a Chair and undertaken by an external consultant or adviser, not all NEDs felt the 
review was run effectively. There were three concerns: the lack of feedback to individual 
directors after the process, the use of online questionnaires (which did not provide sufficient 
nuances about complex issues of dynamic) and the skill of the reviewer. Nevertheless, as the 
ASX (2014) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
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Best Practice Recommendations require an independent review at least once every three 
years, reviews were reported to be occurring, albeit with questions about their effectiveness. 
4.5.2.3 Offline Discussions 
Informal NED interactions are important in shaping strategic decisions. NEDs in this study 
reported that such informal interactions strengthen governance, build relationships and 
cohesion necessary for boards to function well. They allow an informal sharing of ideas to 
test and calibrate thinking or seek additional understanding. This finding supports other 
research showing that informal relationships create a greater capacity for information sharing 
and mutual problem-solving. For example, Hansen and Lovas (2004) showed that meetings 
tightly structured in a formal environment could reduce open communication. Alternatively, 
loosely structured and informal meetings in a more casual environment facilitate open 
communication (Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson 2010). However, in some decision stories, 
offline discussions created pivotal moments during which powerful subgroups attempted to 
secure control of direction and the nature of an event. The data map excerpt shown in Table 
3.4 and reported in Chapter 3 showed how pivotal offline discussions between members of a 
powerful subgroup could shift a debate to align with the views of a small minority rather than 
the collective wisdom of a whole board. 
4.5.2.4 Pre-meeting NED Interaction with Executives 
Most NEDs, on receiving board papers, identified areas that they felt needed clarification and 
sought this before a meeting from the CEO, CFO or other members of a management team, 
including the head of strategy. Some NEDs indicated that Chairs encouraged this kind of 
exchange, although others experienced Chairs who would insist they channel all available 
information. Generally, NEDs used their judgement on this, with smaller issues of contention 
best addressed with a CEO and or Chair before a board meeting, thus, leaving the bigger 
issues for debate in a boardroom. 
More than half of the participating NEDs indicated that prior interaction with management 
gave them a chance to evaluate the executive function in two ways. The first related to 
assessing the robustness of executive contention regarding the target acquisition before a 
proposal was presented to a board. NEDs felt they should know of any lack of contention 
regarding a proposal at management level. The second was to assess the capability and 
capacity of a management team to digest a target entity. NEDs with experience in 
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acquisitions held the view that a board’s oversight role must include an assessment of the 
merits of a strategic proposal and the capacity of management to implement and creatively 
envision a company’s future. In summary, the sense NEDs made of their experiences in their 
capacity to influence did not just relate to their interactions or how a Chair led, but also to the 
way in which accepted board routines, norms and process were applied. 
4.5.3 Effects of the CEO’s Attitude to Director Experience 
It is in times of crises when you put to the acid test management’s attitude to those 
[NED] skills. I was on a company board once where management resisted even in a 
crises … [and] management resisted being too close to the board … On this board, 
management said, ‘we will take all the help we can get’. (Director M) 
While this study did not include interviews with CEOs, the narratives of the NEDs contained 
several perspectives on how the attitude of a CEO could enable or inhibit the strategic 
contribution of a collective board. Several NEDs reported scenarios concerning resistant 
CEOs either on the company from which the decision story was taken or from other boards. 
As Director A explained, ‘a board is hostage to how the CEO chooses to engage with it, 
which, in turn, profoundly impacts the ability of the board to play its strategic advisory role’. 
All NEDs spoke about their respective CEOs and there was a range of views. At one end of 
the spectrum, NEDs recounted that CEOs were resistant to NEDs’ strategic contributions, 
interpreting any questioning of strategy as a challenge to their competence. Conversely, 
NEDs recounted CEOs who proactively sought out NED skills and resources in and around a 
boardroom. There was an affective dimension to this variation, as well as a contextual 
dimension. Concerning the former, the NEDs attributed a CEO’s propensity to seek advice 
and counsel as a mark of emotional maturity. Those that demonstrated such traits showed 
well-developed skills in working with a board both collectively and individually and had 
developed such successful tactics. For example, some participating NEDs spoke about the 
way in which CEOs had learned to socialise big unformed ideas well before bringing a 
specific internationalisation proposal to the table, which they saw as constructive in aiding a 
collaborative relationship between a CEO and board. 
As noted, this study was conducted post-GFC (2007–2008), whose effects were still being 
felt, and this downturn resulted in a large number of CEOs exiting their posts. Many 
institutional investors saw this period as one in which some CEOs who had ridden off the 
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back of a crest of interrupted double-digit growth for over three decades in Australia were 
now exposed, as was reported in numerous press articles. Most NEDs referred to turbulence, 
dynamism, uncertainty or even crises as the trigger for some CEOs to seek help from NEDs. 
In some cases, advice was perceived by NEDs to be sought reluctantly. 
NEDs also indicated that CEO attitude to the skills on a board was a complex issue. In their 
experience, a competent CEO generally felt more secure in and confident about their role and 
did not fear a board. If a CEO was incompetent, this could often materialise in behaviour that 
was defensive, protective and distrustful. 
In other cases, some NEDs reported political behaviour and power plays by a CEO who 
preferred little or no oversight and who opted for unilateral decision-making even on major 
transactions. Director K spoke about the unilateral action that a new CEO was taking in 
relation to an acquisition. Further, he suggested the CEO was taking advantage of the new 
Chair’s situation: 
the new Chair had just taken over and was feeling his way … and he [the CEO] was 
doing it his way and functioning independently of the board … [In a] real sense we 
were being kept out of the deal … [T]he CEO was distancing himself and excluding 
the board at critical times, presenting us with a fait accompli on price. (Director K) 
In other cases, a CEO was judged by a board not to be delivering promised value and, 
therefore, a performance judgement was made. In the case in question, as Director N 
reported, a divisional CEO was eventually asked to leave by the group CEO, with board 
backing: 
The relationship deteriorated generally because he [the divisional CEO] felt more 
and more under pressure … Every time he stood up at the board to present regular 
updates on the strategy … he got a hard time … and the relationship started 
deteriorating … [W]e saw things we had not seen before in the guy … [H]e was 
aggressive with the board because he did not like some of the things the boards [sic] 
said to him. We saw some character traits we had not seen before. 
Some CEOs, in Director O’s experience, were perceived to have an oversensitivity or 
touchiness and, when questioned, can demonstrate defensiveness: 
It was at one of these dinners when I had a big argument with the CEO. Although it 
was not great at the time, it was a good one to have. I was asking about the way in 
which management were [sic] handling an issue which I was not happy about. But 
he thought I was criticising him. I was just trying to find out what really had 
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happened. It was not his making, but unless board members have information they 
can’t do their jobs or decide if the way it was being handled was acceptable from a 
reputational point of view. He thought I was going over old ground to play the 
blame game … We need to know what happened to be able to discharge our roles. 
It’s not the mistakes in business that sinks you. It is the way you handle the mistake 
that sinks you. 
These findings showed that people who had a highly subjective sense of power—defined by 
Anderson and Galinsky (2006) as a psychological property associated with feelings—had two 
consequences. First, they were less likely to heed advice, even from experts, and were more 
likely to act independently. These findings reflect research that shows that high-power 
individuals are likely to resist advice from people they see as novices (Anderson & Galinsky 
2006). However, they resist advice from experts for defensive reasons. That is, the expert 
status of an adviser challenges their own standing, knowledge and experience. Director G, a 
NED who had previously held CEO roles, suggested that it was hard for some experienced 
CEOs to admit that they may not have all the answers. Second, implicit in this subjective 
feeling of power was a heightened optimism towards risks. Therefore, one might assume, 
based on Anderson and Galinsky (2006), that high-power CEOs were likely to focus on 
potential rewards and upsides and ignore the downside of a transaction. 
Some NEDs in this study developed an attentive regard, if not a healthy cynicism, for CEOs 
who ‘wanted to go global’ without necessarily weighing the risks with an executive before a 
proposal was presented to a board. NEDs developed this ability, in part, by building a trusting 
relationship with some members of a TMT. This was easier with some boards because their 
CEOs encouraged board-member interaction between meetings. However, in the case of 
other boards, in which CEOs were overly protective, any direct contact between NEDs and 
members of a TMT was discouraged. In other instances, as Director L related, NEDs 
employed the tactic of indirectly questioning a CEO about the levels of executive contention: 
I also wanted to know that there was good contention within the management team 
around price. I said, ‘convince me that you are getting counter views and challenge 
from the finance people to make sure we do not overpay’. 
To counter the over-reach of CEO influence on a board, some NEDs also reported that they 
would only entertain board proposals that offered more than one strategic option. If this was 
not the case, they would request reworking proposals so that more than one strategic option 
was presented. 
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In summary, the findings show that NED behaviour cannot be fully understood without 
considering the social context in which they perform their duties, including Chair leadership, 
board protocols and practices, and the attitude of a CEO towards the skills on a board. The 
performance of NEDs’ duties is not solely reliant on the board capital an individual NED 
brings or the capacity to influence they represent through their social competence. It also 
relies on the deliberate choices they make to deal with aspects of inner context. 
4.6 Discussion 
This section discusses what the findings show regarding the processes of influence enacted at 
board level and the factors that enable or hinder NEDs’ contributions to strategic decision-
making. Following a brief introduction concerning the ‘social reality’ of a board, the 
discussion proceeds by examining the triggers of influence attempts and the types of 
responses, the social equilibrium and ‘character’ of a board in terms of its social dynamics. It 
then presents a framework for defining the social competence required for exercising 
boardroom influence, including insights into the practices of strategically active boards and 
the implications for theory. 
More broadly, this section makes the link to current theory by seeking to address three 
questions: How do the findings add to current theory about the influence of NEDs in strategic 
decision-making? Which findings run contrary to current theory? How might this study 
contribute to a new theory of the process of influence? 
The findings, described in Sections 4.1 to 4.5, showed that director work is not merely an 
expression of agency but also an effect of social factors such as identity and power. The 
complex interplay between an influencer (in this case a NED) and an inner context creates a 
‘social reality’ unique to every board. This social reality—in effect, a psychosocial 
infrastructure shaped by identity and power effects—is invisible to those in a boardroom, but 
is critical in determining how influence is exercised. 
As members of a group develop an interactional history, mutual understandings and 
behavioural norms develop, as do expectations about their approach to process effectiveness. 
These understandings resemble a loose ‘social contract’ characterised by behavioural norms 
and expectations, which NEDs must negotiate through discourse to share power and 
influence with a collective awareness of and attentiveness to social cues and due exercise of 
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social competence. These relationships confirm research reviewed in Chapter 2, which 
showed that informal aspects of accountability are as critical as formal processes (Frink & 
Klimoski 2004; Robert 2001; Stiles & Taylor 2001). The social aspects that affect board 
function, as shown in Figure 4.4, appear to hold significant implications for understanding 
the processes by which accountability on boards is created. The findings suggest that 
accountability is contextual and relational and that the ‘social reality’ within a given board 
might affect how NEDs perform their duties, particularly by determining what NEDs choose 
to say, who listens to whom and the advice one chooses to heed. 
 
Figure 4.4. Accountability as a contextual and relational phenomenon. 
Source: Author. 
4.6.1 NED Use of Influence: What Triggers Influence Attempts and Types of Responses 
This section discusses what determines a NED’s capacity to influence and the conditions 
under which influence is used to shape strategy in discussion with other NEDs. First, the 
findings show that diversity in the cognitive history of a NED determines their capacity to 
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influence, although not necessarily their skill to influence. Importantly, this finding directly 
contrasts with the current norms concerning the selection of directors, largely driven by 
experience and accumulated reputation—often referred to as ‘human capital’ (Stevenson & 
Radin 2009). This study found that the diversity of social ties, connections and networks—
that is, a NED’s social capital—is equally important. The diversity and totality of a NED’s 
cognitive history (a combination of both human and social capital as ‘board capital’) is 
critical to a NED’s effectiveness and has implications for director recruitment. It raises 
questions concerning the narrow ‘professional and social gene pool’ from which directors are 
currently selected (Stevenson & Radin 2009). 
Second, the findings identified two processes of social identification common to small 
groups, which represent the psychosocial infrastructure within which processes of influence 
operate. Both these processes of group identification operate invisibly to act as a source of 
power that manifests itself in actions taken by NEDs, such as interrogation, advocacy and 
debate. Over-identification with a board group can result in silencing one’s doubts to be 
accepted and to belong. Under-identification with a board group can generate interpersonal 
friction, suspicion, low levels of trust and a lack of cohesion among board members. These 
findings suggest that group membership effects must be in equilibrium for a decision-making 
process to be effective. Therefore, if the psychosocial infrastructure in and around a 
boardroom is not fully understood, current theories of rational action (reviewed in Chapter 2) 
may not fully explain what goes on in a strategy-shaping process. 
The findings showed that NEDs mount influence attempts based on the subjective 
judgements about the level of social support they will receive or withhold from others. This 
decision is not based on rational considerations; instead, it relies on the often subconsciously 
held ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ categorisations to determine how safe, comfortable or 
confident they feel about their place in a group. NEDs were seen to make a conscious choice 
of whether to use their influence driven by the level of social support they feel they are likely 
to receive for their ideas, perspectives and views. Further, in making this choice, to overcome 
any subjectively validated shortcomings in their cognitive history—in terms of experience, 
reputation, connections and networks—relative to others, they will mount an influence 
attempt if they feel they have the appropriate social competence. Since power differentials in 
boardrooms are more common (given differences in directors’ sources of power), these 
findings hold important implications for the kinds of social competencies directors require to 
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be effective. It is also evident from the findings that one way of combating conformity 
behaviour may be to affirm an individual’s self-concept. In a board context, a Chair might 
play a role in this respect, as can other board members, by overtly showing respect for the 
experience and perspectives of their colleagues, even when they do not agree. 
Conversely, to determine whether a NED grants or withholds social support for the influence 
attempts of others, a subjective validation is undertaken based on whether a NED is perceived 
to be competent, have professional credibility, share the same views about the board role in 
strategy and hold similar values and beliefs. These perceptual themes influence how a NED 
reacts to the influences of others and ultimately affects the content, strength and direction of 
another’s attempt. That is, the choice a NED makes to mount an influence attempt or react to 
another NED’s influence attempt depends on social factors rather than purely rational 
considerations such as those proposed by rational action theorists. The practical implications 
of this finding challenge the approach taken by most board nominations committees. They 
tend to focus their efforts on hiring for commercial or functional skills. This study suggests 
that while commercial and functional skills are important, it is the social competence of 
directors that determines whether they are influential in an around a boardroom. 
The strength of the influence attempt by a NED is a function of the confidence they have in 
their own judgement or the level of comfort they have with decision complexity; for example, 
this incldues the personal tolerance for risk and the social support NEDs receive from each 
other. These factors combine to produce a unique level of engagement for each board and, in 
turn, determine the extent to which a final decision process will be enriched by robust and 
vibrant discourse. Thus, the style of confident engagement by socially skilled NEDs has 
important implications for how new NEDs are selected, socialised and developed in board 
work and, moreover, how the social skills and competence of current NEDs are developed. 
The findings also suggest that these processes are dynamic. Individual NEDs are not just 
passive recipients of social effects but are continually making subjective judgements and 
validations, modifying and adapting their original positions and influencing the positions of 
others during a decision-making process. Over time, NEDs become aware through a history 
of working with each other, discursive practices, the decision logic and ‘political positions’ 
that each of their peers is likely to adopt and use in influence attempts. That is, a board 
represents a dynamic social reality in which consensus can ebb and flow over a decision-
making process, as familiarity with the ‘workings’ of a group develops and as information, 
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perspectives and insights emerge. These factors provide an opportunity for NEDs to actively 
judge the merits of new information, learn from each other and adjust their positions. This 
form of intra-group learning is not fully explored by recent board studies. The dynamic 
environment of a board decision-making process challenges the faultline theory (Murninghan 
& Lau 1998, 2005) tested in experimental conditions, which suggests that fault lines are 
stable and persistent. The theory suggests that the differences within a group can align to 
create relatively stable and persistent fault lines. Where fault lines are weak, there is more 
collaboration and open debate of difficult issues. Where fault lines are strong, subgroups 
emerge with varying levels of power that members use to influence a debate when necessary, 
in some cases discounting or rationalising away perspectives different from their own. 
However, this theory does not acknowledge the existence of ‘soft’ permeable fault lines, of 
which this study found evidence. For example, only two of the 15 decision stories in this 
study exemplified entrenched subgroup views from the outset of a decision-making process. 
In both cases, the participating directors recounted that a Chair had, in their view, not played 
a constructive role. In one of these cases, the Chair was reported to be a member of the 
subgroup and failed to play an impartial role in working through dissenting views. The 
pivotal role a Chair plays is managing agreement and disagreement was described in Section 
4.5.2. In the remaining 13 cases, it was found that over the period of a transformative 
decision, there was a dynamic social structure within which trust and respect were 
continually being validated, earned and re-earned, and shaped by the social support given or 
received for one another’s influence attempts. Figure 4.5 captures these complex social 
effects at play. 
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Figure 4.5. The hidden social hierarchy and social context in which influence occurs. 
Source: Author. 
Further, the findings also showed that decision-making was not simply a battle of numbers. It 
was evident from the findings of NEDs on the larger boards in this study (those with 10 or 
more members) who reported that differences in viewpoints were more likely to emerge 
because of the likelihood of greater cognitive diversity. However, the differences that emerge 
in smaller groups that are generally tighter knit—such as the conflict described by Director E 
that occured with the Chair of the Audit Committee—can be catastrophic to the continued 
functioning of a board (see Section 4.4.1). It was also evident from this study that the number 
of NEDs with a majority view may not be salient to a decision dynamic. That is, even one 
NED, provided their cognitive history is regarded as highly credible, may sway a majority. 
This was exemplified by the case of Director C, whose deep experience of North Asia was 
relied on almost exclusively by other members of a board, including its Chair. The findings 
also showed that minorities (subgroups of directors with views that differ from the majority) 
Shared identity
Higher identification 
between members
“like me” – “not 
like me” self-
categorisation
Differentiated 
identities
Lower identification 
between members
Formation of 
more/less 
powerful sub-
groups
Subjective 
validation 
of 
legitimacy 
to influence
May lead members to 
over-confidence, 
silencing of doubt & 
legitimisation of view
Less powerful sub-
groups may engage in 
revisions of confidence, 
opinion conformity & 
self-censor divergent 
views
“who am I most like/ 
do I most affiliate 
with”
“whose 
influence will I 
pay most 
attention to”
“Could I be wrong…?”
“I am new in this group…”
“They have more experience in this...”
“I feel affirmed…”
“My views have been confirmed…”
“This must be right...”
Shared views of 
the world and 
expectations of 
agreement
Multiple views of 
the world and 
expectations of 
disagreement
NED’s Internalised guide
Board Group
		
166 
could exist at the margins, as found in the transcript of Director G. Moreover, even if they do 
not have the status or credibility accorded to by other NEDs because of their cognitive 
history, a subgroup can make a difference provided they have the social competence to 
engage with and debate the majority group perspective. This dynamic view of a board’s 
social reality supports and extends the findings of the dynamic social impact theory (Latane 
1996). 
Third, few board studies have considered the role that personalities and traits play in NED 
effectiveness, an aspect addressed by the findings of this study. For example, the findings 
showed that the approach and skill with which NEDs mount influence attempts depends on 
their dispositions, which, in turn, shapes the style and behavioural approach they adopt in the 
process. This includes their propensity to act and reflect with others, practice detachment in 
their involvement and concede or resist social pressure. Psychological aspects of NEDs such 
as motivational needs, personality type, propensities or social competence have rarely been 
studied in relation to boards (Bailey & Peck 2013). However, the findings of this study show 
these aspects are salient to board decision-making culture and processes. The findings reveal 
that NED dispositions brought a productive balance to the dilemma they faced in being open 
to the influence of others, while simultaneously retaining independent-mindedness. Their 
dispositions determine their tendencies or propensities to act in certain ways, often 
observable to others. 
As noted in Chapter 2, dispositions and associated propensities are driven by motives and 
needs (McClelland 1985; Schutz 1958). The stories NEDs told in this study showed that they 
observed the propensities of their peers on a board. These observations had implications on 
the use they made of other NEDs during the decision discourse. For example, the observation 
of Director A who valued the propensity to be independent-minded, recounted how they drew 
another NED into a conversation in an attempt to demonstrate and role model the importance 
of independent-mindedness to others. 
Additionally, NEDs demonstrated certain motives in their narratives, particularly when 
responding to questions posed by the researcher at the start of the semi-structured interviews, 
such as ‘how did you come to be on this board?’ and ‘what attracted you to join this board?’ 
There are several motive theories. However, as described in Chapter 2, the most heavily cited 
and regarded as the most robust is McClelland’s (1985) human motivation theory, which 
identifies the various configurations of emotional needs usually accompanied by a dominant 
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need. The theory purports the idea that dominant needs shape action and, therefore, it can be 
inferred that NED dispositions reported in this study shaped the social skills they exhibited. 
As behaviours are often the consequence of cognition (that is, how one thinks), the 
recounting by NEDs of their own thinking and the thinking of others (observed as more or 
less skilful than their own) was important in studying NED behaviour. The recounting of 
their thinking and the thinking of others reflected how their human and social capital 
combined in dynamic ways to produce what participating directors perceived as ‘practical 
wisdom’ (from the Greek phronesis) and sound judgement. However, the findings showed 
this ability was a double-edged sword for board groups. While it increased the diversity of 
cognitions at a board’s disposal, it also had the potential of creating interaction difficulties 
and lower levels of behavioural integration. The perception of practical wisdom only affected 
a decision-making process when a NED possessed sufficient social skills to coherently or 
convincingly articulate the wisdom and judgement variously gained and to sense the 
reactions of others and, thus, act on those reactions. 
The manifested identities of NEDs described in the findings led to various shared and 
differentiated ways of being in a board group (shared identity at one end of the scale and 
differentiated identities at the other, as depicted in Figure 4.5) and had cognitive and affective 
dimensions. For example, from a cognitive perspective, NEDs on a board developed a mutual 
understanding of the underlying logic of each member’s decision-making behaviour, their 
discursive practices and ‘political positions’. However, importantly, there was also an 
affective dimension. Depending on the credibility a NED accorded to an influencer’s 
cognitive history, in some cases the affective dimension led to self-censorship of one’s own 
view or its affirmation. 
In summary, this study suggests that unless this largely hidden social reality is fully 
understood, despite best intentions, the effectiveness of a NED’s influence attempts may not 
be fully understood. It also suggests that when identity and power effects are not in 
equilibrium, the processes of accountability may be compromised. Understanding the subtle 
working of emotions in board processes and the propensities required to engage frequently in 
reflection, becoming mindfully alert to important social cues, regularly taking a ‘balcony 
view’, being alert to subtle forms of social control, being vigilant about ‘group think’ and 
being comfortable with uncertainty and emergence are all crucial for NED effectiveness. 
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4.6.2 The Social Reality and Resulting ‘Character’ of a Board 
This section discusses findings concerning the social dynamics of a board. As noted in 
Chapter 2, recent years have been marked by a shift towards a more dynamic explanation of 
social influence (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004). Rather than mindless compliance with a group, 
members engage in conscious and deliberate attempts to gain the social approval of others to 
build rewarding relationships and, in the process, enhance one’s self-esteem. Moreover, this 
behaviour is enhanced or strengthened when threatened by the prospect (or actual 
occurrence) of not fitting within a group (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004; Reicher et al. 1995). 
This conscious and deliberate process was evident when NEDs described their early 
experience with new boards. It was also found to be true of NEDs with a shared history of 
working together. 
The interview data provided by individual NEDs highlighted how and why they believed 
contextual factors could influence the unique social character of a board and potentially 
influence the collective view of a board in decision-making processes. For example, NEDs 
with multiple directorships reported different levels of engagement on each of their boards. 
Some boards were reported to be more formal and reserved, largely because of the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few (evidence of differentiated identities) and others 
more open and engaged where power was more evenly shared (evidence of shared identity). 
The shared history of NEDs also appeared to be influential in director–decision behaviour 
through the mutual understanding and expectations of an agreement, not only due to board 
tenure but also through membership of the same boards. For example, NEDs who were on the 
same board and had a shared history on other boards had developed expectations either 
through their committee or board experience—a reflection of the mutual understanding of 
how the other NEDs would act under certain circumstances or in certain decision contexts—
and a familiarity with each other’s decision logic and cognition. The study also found 
evidence of how implicit expectations (referred to here as ‘socialisation tactics’) including 
routines and habits learned together increased the speed at which decisions were arrived at 
because of this shared mindset. On occasion, this familiarity resulted in a NED assuming a 
view or position of another director with shared history, without explicitly exploring this in a 
boardroom. Familiarity may, on occasion, result in the consequence of missing a nuance 
contained in another NED’s view or position and, in turn, lead to unwarranted assumptions 
without verification of a specific point or discussion at hand. Therefore, assumed 
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expectations derived from a shared history may have implications on director effectiveness 
and the enactment of accountability. 
The findings in this study suggest that in seeking a deeper appreciation of the character of a 
board, the notion of social equilibrium created by the effects of identity and power is 
relevant. Social equilibrium or disequilibrium exists within any given group, as the effects of 
identity and power play out between individuals within a group. Social equilibrium (or 
disequilibrium, in this sense) refers to the over-identification or under-identification in a 
group or real or perceived power differentials and distance that may exist among group 
members. NEDs in this study, through open-ended questioning, revealed whom they 
respected for their experience and why. The findings showed a strong relationship between 
their own experience and the experience of a NED who was the object of their praise. That is, 
being able to identify socially with those NEDs was relevant to where they directed their 
praise. The study further found that the experience, knowledge, connections and networks 
that each NED brought (as social and human capital) were judged as more or less valuable as 
their own, thus, creating a perception of power relativities in the mind of a participating 
NED. ‘Like me’ and ‘not like me’ categorisations made by participating NEDs reflected the 
degree to which shared or differentiated identities existed within a group. Differentiated 
identities along ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ categorisations resulted in the perception of 
subgroups and, hence, the encouragement of some and the marginalisation of others. When a 
group had a shared identity, there was an equilibrium because everyone felt ‘on the same 
page’. When differentiated identities existed, disequilibrium led to individual directors over-
identifying with a subgroup and under-identifying with a board group. Over-identification or 
under-identification had the effect of creating ‘constellations’ of power within a group—that 
is, personally construed subgroups divided along the lines of those that possessed less or 
more power than oneself. NEDs reported being able to overcome the effects of more 
powerful subgroups through demonstrating effective uses of social competencies (constituted 
by various social behaviours) to turn what limited power or social capital they had to carry 
out their preferred influence strategy. 
While research on exploring the effects of ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ categorisations exist 
(Oakes, Turner & Haslam 1991; Onorato & Turner 2004), studies of how these 
categorisations affect a decision-making in boards or TMT processes are sparse. Equally, 
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there has been little or no research on subgroup politics and how they might shape decision-
making outcomes. 
Given the decision selected for this study—one that carried significant complexity and 
uncertainty—conflicting views were inevitable and much more likely to emerge and these 
evolved dynamically through the decision-making process. When there was a disequilibrium, 
subgroups emerged whose agreement was greater than an overall group consensus; this had 
the potential of swaying a collective decision. However, the effects of identity and power 
were only salient when a director perceived there was no or little social support from other 
board members for his or her view. Therefore, social support can have a significant effect on 
the nature of agreement and contention in a group. Disequilibrium in identity and power 
effects may exert a disproportionate influence on a decision-making process and, in turn, 
undermine board effectiveness and accountability 
To balance tensions and achieve social equilibrium, the findings showed that the most 
effective boards may, in fact, need to operate some of their time collectively as if a ‘social 
contract’ existed between members; that is, they must negotiate as a unit to achieve this 
balance with collective awareness and coordination skills and share a common view about 
how to approach their work as a board. For example, Director L, who had deep expertise in 
technology, software, online businesses and a good understanding of the management’s 
proposal, felt the need to make this issue more comfortable for his peers—that is, to own up 
to their inability to understand the proposal. In this case, Director L told management, ‘if I 
don’t understand it then it is unlikely that others on this board would understand it’. 
As noted in Section 4.4.2, when relational themes were discussed in the context of a 
challenge process, collective ownership of that process was achieved through NEDs adopting 
the challenges of their peers as their own, thus, supporting these challenges by probing, 
clarifying and confirming questions delivered in a way that showed their support and respect 
for others’ challenges. There was evidence that a board’s collective influence became 
fragmented when NEDs did not own such challenges as a legitimate part of board process or 
the true nature of board work. Directors also reported that a resistant CEO who sees a board 
working in unison is more likely to take a challenge seriously. However, ownership of this 
process is not always easy. The findings revealed that some NEDs felt the pressure of process 
ownership may at times manifest in social pressure to conform to a majority view. Ownership 
of this process was more difficult to achieve than ownership of a decision because the former 
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involved making a personal challenge, and this required social competence to execute 
successfully. Some directors reported that when personal challenges were not skillfully 
executed, they were perceived as a personal attack or a challenge to a person’s professional 
expertise or experience. 
However, while a collective will (likened here to a social contract) was important, so was the 
need to draw distance from a group and remain independently minded through such 
processes. As noted in Chapter 2, this is one of several paradoxes identified by researchers as 
implicit in board work (Demb & Neubauer 1992; Hooghiemstra & van Manen 2004; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis 2003; Van Ees, Gabrielsson & Huse 2009). 
These tensions can pull NED behaviour in different directions. The findings of this study 
showed that the perceived need for NEDs to feel collective ownership for the process might 
mask the pressure to conform, and this is subtly achieved through a form of social 
sanctioning often invisible to those external to a group. That is, control in the processes of 
exercising accountability in a corporate governance sense can be viewed as a social 
phenomenon in which members perceived as having higher power may seek to prevent 
deviance from established collective norms. This was particularly evident in decisions in 
which the consensus of a full board was required, as is the case of an acquisition. Directors 
reconciled these social pressures through the social competencies they demonstrated, as 
described in Section 4.4.3. 
The findings showed that social identity could act as a source of power in a group. When 
subgroups were reported by participating directors to exist and when they perceived large 
power differentials in a group—and, therefore, less of a shared identity—directors observed 
that members of some subgroups became more vocal, in some cases swaying the direction 
and content of a debate and frustrating influence attempts of others. 
Powerful subgroups can persist. For example, the findings revealed that individuals or 
subgroups perceived (by the narrating NED) as having higher power were reported to have 
more stable identities and board personas less susceptible to social influence attempts of 
others. They were also perceived as less likely to demonstrate empathetic concern for 
another’s views. This finding supports the theory of perspective taking, tested empirically by 
Galinsky et al. (2006), who showed an inverse relationship between power and perspective 
taking. Therefore, views became resistant to change and were polarised, including, in one 
case, an entirely split board in which consensus was impossible to achieve. However, in cases 
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reporting the existence of subgroups, the effect was more subtle than a split board, thus, 
ensuring compliance with a subgroup view by operating a form of social sanctioning. This 
finding supported social distance theory (Magee & Smith 2013) applied to a board context. It 
also supports the similarity–attraction theory tested in a board context in relation to the 
desired characteristics applied in the selection of a new CEO by a board (Zajac & Westphal 
1996). Further, the finding suggests that ‘people like me’ is often the lens through which 
compatibility in values and beliefs is decided, thus, resulting all too often in a binary 
response: they do or do not think like me. When there was a strong shared identity in a group 
and when powerful subgroups were not reported to exist, NEDs recounted an open, robust 
and trust-driven dynamic and, more likely, that there was an open debate on difficult issues. 
However, directors reported that this shared mind was effective up to a point when it 
potentially became captured by groupthink, recounting their experiences on some boards in 
which there was very little contention. 
By focusing on a transformative decision on which organisational, board and individual 
reputations are at stake, the current study brought into play the complex cognitive and 
ideological differences faced by NEDs. That is, a decision presented an environment in which 
differences in perspective on and the position of a company’s strategic options were much 
more likely to emerge. This heightened potentially exacerbating tensions associated with 
existing differences based on the diversity of values, beliefs, preferences, personalities and 
skills within a board group concerning the strategic future of a corporation. Particularly, this 
study showed evidence that powerful subgroups, whose agreement is greater than the overall 
group agreement, have the potential of swaying a collective decision. Moreover, this outcome 
was more pronounced when a board was confronted by a transformative decision. The 
findings also support Eisenhardt (1990), who concluded that when information is poor and 
stakes are high, decision-makers must engage in ‘active coping’ rather than slow and 
deliberate choices, especially when faced with a market in which the economics of an 
acquisition are constantly shifting. This current study provided a deeper insight into NEDs’ 
active coping behaviours in which the contextual dynamic of critical decision cases that the 
social reality a director finds themselves in is constantly shifting due to invisible 
undercurrents of identity and power. 
This study showed that when subgroups existed with varying degrees of power they were 
willing to influence debates in how they thought was necessary, in some cases discounting 
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perspectives or rationalising perspectives different from their own. Board leadership 
(discussed in Section 4.5.1) was an important moderator of this delicate balance; particularly, 
a Chair’s role in creating psychological safety was pivotal when power was unevenly 
distributed across a board. In summary, a NED’s human and social capital contributed to the 
self-assessment of place in a group, which, in turn, determined how power was perceived to 
be distributed and the subsequent creation of subgroups, given these perceived power 
differentials between members. 
In summary, this study has contributed to social theory, showing how individuals and groups 
are affected by the social reality in which they find themselves. That is, the presence or 
actions of others (real, implied or imagined) can influence an individual’s feelings, thoughts 
or behaviours. These findings show the effects of group membership on the process of 
influence. When there is higher identification between members, shared views of the world 
emerge and expectations of agreement are greater. When there is lower identification 
between members, multiple views of the world emerge and expectations of disagreement are 
greater. However, it is in this latter case—in which differentiated identities and subgroups 
emerge so that social reality becomes more complex—that this study makes its major 
contribution. Essentially, social effect in a boardroom is a function of cognitive history, the 
size of a board and the skills of its members, and it makes a qualitative difference in the 
methods by which members made or received influence attempts. 
The invisible social reality in which the processes of influence occur can be compared to the 
metaphor of the water in which a fish swims. A fish is unable to perceive water, seemingly 
unconscious of its existence, despite it being essential to its life. Knowledge of the 
importance of the water only comes when a fish is removed from this environment. In this 
case, this invisible psychosocial infrastructure is impossible to see but is very much the 
vehicle through which influence is enacted. Directors’ knowledge of the workings of this 
infrastructure is essential, as is their skilful exercise of social competencies and associated 
behaviours if they are to remain influential in decision-making in and around a boardroom. 
As noted throughout this thesis, NED variations were reflected in the human and social 
capital they brought to a board, comprising a unique mix of experiences, reputations, 
connections and networks. These variations in the board capital of members led to director 
‘like me’ and ‘not like me’ comparisons, thus, creating, in effect, a construed social reality 
into which a NED must fit. These comparisons led to validations that acted as internalised 
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guides to a NED’s own and each other’s legitimacy and relevance in decision interactions—
that is, judging someone’s legitimacy to influence, including the decision regarding ‘whose 
opinion or viewpoint should I pay more attention to’. These internalised guides can be 
viewed as the ‘psychosocial infrastructure’ within which influence is enacted. As discussed in 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5, this social reality as experienced by a NED also potentially affected the 
direction and strength of his or her influence attempts and the way in which those attempts 
was perceived and responded to by others. 
4.6.3 Framework of Social Competence Required for Director Effectiveness 
This section builds on the response to research question 2, which concerned how the strength 
of identity of an individual director and their sense of shared identity with a group constructs 
a power dynamic that influences decision-making and the analysis of ‘codable moments’ 
(representing NED influence attempts), as discussed in Chapter 3. Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 
extracted and described the relational and dispositional themes and the role they played in 
how NEDs influenced strategy. Contained in these relational and dispositional themes were a 
variety of skills and behaviours that NEDs demonstrated. This section examines the skills and 
behaviours these themes imply and presents an emerging framework for defining the social 
competencies required to exercise boardroom influence. For example, in exercising influence 
through questioning and contention (one of the four relational themes), directors 
demonstrated the ability to sense that something needed more explanation and then engage in 
persistent but respectful questioning when required—a honed situational sensing. Similarly, 
in exercising the propensity to resist social pressure (one of the three dispositional themes), 
NEDs demonstrated alertness in the face of strong views of persuasive advocates. In this 
way, each of the four relational themes and three dispositional themes could be broken down 
into behavioural indicators, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: 
Emerging Framework Defining the Social Competence Required to Exercising 
Boardroom Influence 
Behavioural indicators	 Definition	
(of propensity/proficiency) 
Social 
competence 
clusters	
• ability to read social cues by Propensity to accurately Situational 
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sensing others’ internal states 
including unspoken concerns, 
meanings, intentions and 
motivations	
• intuitively sensing when 
something does not feel right and 
requires more exploration	
• knowing incisively what is 
relevant and what questions need 
to be asked to obtain this 
knowledge	
• checking regularly for (one’s 
own and other’s) understanding 
or appreciation of complexities	
• sensing tensions that require 
diffusing constructively to move 
things forward	
• vigilance in the face of strong 
views or positions by persuasive 
experts or advocates	
perceive the motives, traits 
and intentions of others and 
gauge their needs and 
emotions (a honed situational 
sensing skill) 
sensing (social 
perception) 
• desire to be seen supportive (of a 
deal), as well as challenging it 
simultaneously	
• desire to promote oneself as 
balanced in judgement and 
considered in approach	
• desire to make a material 
contribution to a debate rather 
than opining on every issue to 
demonstrate relevance	
• consciously avoids ‘offline 
huddles’ that may be 
misconstrued as political or 
lacking transparency	
• attentive use of language to 
convey openness and confidence 
Propensity (consciously or 
unconsciously) to manage 
how one comes across in 
social interactions with 
others to induce their 
positive perceptions 
Impression 
management 
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to others including management	
• attentive to the timing and pacing 
of one’s own contribution for 
maximum influential effect	
• persistent, purposeful but 
respectful questioning of peer 
and management intentions and 
assumptions	
• respectful engagement with 
others’ underlying beliefs and 
values for the position they take	
• build on the contributions of 
other NEDs—synthesising and 
extending the strategic 
contributions others make	
• preparedness to stand alone on a 
strongly held position, issue of 
principle or held value	
• presenting well-researched and 
well-rounded arguments 
coherently	
Propensity to express views, 
opinions and ideas clearly to 
generate enthusiasm in 
others to gain their support  
Articulacy 
• alert to emergent thinking—
quickly sensing shifts in the 
unfolding discussion and 
emerging perspectives	
• alert to how one’s own 
experience may bias a position 
and willingness to compensate 
that bias	
• routinely and deliberatively 
exploring what others see to 
calibrate, learn and adapt	
• candidly admitting to lack of 
knowledge or insight about a 
subject and an openness to learn	
• prepared to collectively own and 
Propensity to adapt to a wide 
range of new social 
situations, including 
adjusting one’s behaviour 
when required; feeling 
comfortable with individuals 
from diverse backgrounds; 
able to talk to anyone about 
anything 
Social 
adaptability 
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engage constructively with 
challenges by others	
• willing to allow conversations to 
emerge rather than feeling a need 
to control it	
Source: Author. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the behavioural indicators could be clustered into four groups for 
which the researcher uses the term ‘social competence’ required to influence a decision-
making process: situational sensing, impression management, articulacy and social 
adaptability. Social competence enables an influencer to understand what others want and 
how they perceive things so they can select an appropriate influence strategy to use and carry 
out that influence strategy more effectively. Significantly, the clusters appeared to map across 
to the well-cited Baron and Markman (2003) study, which was based on entreprenuers in the 
high-tech sector. This 2003 study itself was testing the seminal, extensively cited 5 factor 
personality model originally put forward by Barrick & Mount (1991).  
The social competencies described in this section and the behavioural indicators 
underpinning them, together with the influencing personae described in Section 4.4.5, goes 
some way to assist current boards in a practical sense with the selection and socialisation of 
new directors. Importantly, it recognises a board as a ‘social reality’ that requires behavioural 
skill, not just commercial and functional knowledge and the expertise to navigate when 
exercising strategy-shaping responsibilities. 
As the economic, business and social environment becomes more unpredictable, NEDs in 
this study acknowledged the need to become comfortable with more emergent forms of 
strategic decisioning. This included a preparedness to value frankness about uncertainty, to 
collectively acknowledge associated discomfort and to be more prepared to engage in 
disruptive thinking. Importantly, there are implications for how NEDs are selected and 
developed. The criteria include adaptive and agile thinkers who are comfortable with 
emergence and the use of intuition, multi-dimensional thinkers less binary in their 
approaches, those comfortable with ambiguity and those who demonstrate an ability to 
engage skillfully in collective rather than self-reflection. 
In summary, a NED’s social competence can help mitigate shortcomings in their cognitive 
history and contribute to their effective boardroom influence. Importantly, social competence 
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recognises a board as a ‘social reality’ that, in addition to commercial and functional 
knowledge and expertise, requires behavioural skills for NED and board effectiveness. It 
carries practical implications for director selection and for the development of new and 
existing directors. More broadly, social competence development also holds implications for 
succession planning and the renewal of current board members. Finally, this study goes 
beyond normative studies to describe actual behaviours that directors require to influence a 
decision-making process. 
4.6.4 Inferences and Insights into the Practices of Strategically Active Boards 
It never ceases to amaze me how many NEDs believe their role is to approve 
strategy rather than co-determine it in collaboration with management … [W]e 
should not simply be the approval step. (Director G) 
Despite this study being at director-level and the research questions pertaining to a NED as 
an individual, it was possible to infer from the data analysis some themes applicable to a 
board. In this section, some insights are offered into the requirements of a strategically active 
board—that is, boards that more actively engage in strategic matters and, therefore, make a 
material contribution to the shape and direction of a company’s strategic future. These 
insights are drawn from the findings presented in this chapter. 
The study suggests that a strategically active board has four important characteristics that 
provide predictive power in distinguishing effective and ineffective boards. The first regards 
cognitively diverse, experienced and well-networked NEDs with lively discursive and inquiry 
skills, who are both comfortable with robust contention and are skilled in constructive 
dissent. The second regards NEDs who operate collectively as a group with a single view 
about how the work of a board is to be approached and, rather than just arriving at a decision 
at the end of a decision process (which can lead to board fragmentation), collectively own the 
process of arriving at a decision. The third regards an alert and intuitive Chair who is skilled 
in facilitation, creates a discursive space for reflection to occur and is alert to unspoken 
concerns on the way to building a clear consensus. The final characteristic regards boardroom 
norms and routines that have less procedural rigidity, thus, allowing for open, emergent 
thinking and collective reflection; it is also where good agenda management is as important 
as the quality of debate. 
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4.7 Implications for Theory 
While theory has progressively recognised the complex and contextualised nature of 
decision-making processes, it has largely ignored the interactive social dynamic when 
individuals with emotions, creativity and memories come together in groups to make strategic 
decisions. The rational, normative and utility-maximising model (largely cerebral and 
economic in its assumptions) argues that a decision-maker examines a firm’s external 
environment and internal conditions and, using a set of objective criteria derived from this 
analysis, decides on a strategy. In this model, decision-making is seen as involving a series of 
sequential, rational and analytical processes to narrow strategic alternatives towards the best 
outcome (Boudon 2003; Goldthorpe 1998; Huff & Reger 1987; Hitt & Tyler 1991). 
However, this current study suggests that these models and associated theories do not reflect 
the actual processes by which directors and boards make potentially value-generating 
decisions. That is, the ‘social reality’ revealed in this inductive study paints a different 
picture—one that goes further than the suggestion that decision-making is a rational process 
and suggests that social identity and power play a pivotal role in how decision influence is 
exercised and how accountability is created. 
This study confirmed the SIT (Turner 1975) and its related SCT (Turner 1985) described in 
Chapter 2 in the context of how it relates to board life and in particular it explains the nature 
of NED influence in and around the boardroom and how the processes of decision-making 
are shaped. However, this study also extended these two seminal Turner theories to reveal 
that the study of power and social identity are indivisible, in that group identification and 
categorisation facilitates comparisons based on one’s perception of relative position in a 
ranking sense, which sets the scene for a power dynamic and for power-related behaviors to 
emerge. This study then proceeds to describe these behaviours, as recounted by participants 
in this study. The study also extended these theories to conclude that NED motivations in 
joining a board (and anticipation of securing future board appointments) mattered in 
understanding how potential allegiances and norms of reciprocity may emerge, which may 
then lead to behaviour that is less questioning, thus, affecting how strongly they argue a point 
or show preparedness to adopt minority positions while shaping strategy. This has 
implications for how accountability is exercised and the degree of independent-mindedness 
directors apply to a task. 
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The study also confirmed and extended the two major theories of power described in Chapter 
2: approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003) and the social distance 
theory (Magee & Smith 2013). While this study found that those with higher power (in the 
context of the board capital they possessed) were more prone to launch influence attempts 
(thus, confirming the approach/inhibition theory proposed by Keltner, Gruenfeld and 
Anderson (2003)), it went further and concluded that one’s subjective sense of power can 
have a material effect on NED behaviour; by implication, this may lead those with less power 
(board capital) or less powerful subgroups to engage in revisions of confidence, opinion 
conformity and self-censoring of divergent views from those held by higher-power directors. 
This can dilute the processes by which accountability is created. Further, this study also 
concluded that NEDs with a strong subjective sense of power were not only less likely to 
learn and adapt from others but were likely to contribute to a situation in which psychological 
safety was not experienced by less powerful individuals. This imbalance in power 
distribution and its effects play a significant role in how accountability is exercised at board 
level. The study also extended the social distance theory proposed by Magee and Smith 
(2013), which, as noted in Chapter 2, describes the phenomenon of how social distance 
emerges and operates in power relations to produce various interpersonal phenomena 
affecting attitudes, behaviour and perceptions. However, despite this theory making a link 
between power and identity, it was only ever tested in experimental conditions through 
manipulations of power that were not in a real-life context. This study was able to extend this 
theory to show, in a real-life context, how differences in social power and construed place in 
a social hierarchy can have significant effects on how open a NED was to others’ views. This 
openness led to over-confidence by those who perceived themselves to have a higher place in 
a social hierarchy, which then had the potential of silencing others’ doubts. This has a 
material influence in the processes by which independent directors exercise their 
independence and, therefore, their accountabilities in shaping strategy. That is to say that this 
study was able (in a board context) to confirm and extend the relevance of both these existing 
power theories. While the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003) 
explained NEDs’ subjective sense of power and propensity to influence (as seen in this 
study), the social distance theory explained openness to the influence of others, which, in 
effect, determined ‘who listened to whom’ in and around a boardroom (Magee & Smith 
2013). 
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None of these a priori theories of identity or power have contributed to understanding 
behaviours as those recounted by members of small groups such as boards (as in this study), 
in which power distances are relatively small and behavioural nunaces subtle. The social 
reality of a board is characterised by the effects of an invisible social hierarchy and calls for 
specific social competencies, traits and influencing styles that have not been previously 
explored in a board context. As noted in Chapter 2, previous process studies (McNulty & 
Pettigrew 1998) have also suggested that just because a NED possessed the power to 
influence, that did not mean they will apply it and, therefore, distinguish between skill and 
will to identify that context was critical in how power was used. However, these studies 
neither describe exactly how context might trigger or shape the use of power and influence 
nor do they describe the specific skills a director might use to mobilise power. Table 4.1 
summarises the social competencies recounted by NEDs, as captured in this study. Although 
qualitative board studies have increasingly been undertaken since the 1990s, they remain a 
small fraction of published work on corporate governance (McNulty, Florackis & Omrod 
2013). Therefore, research to date has not extended our understanding of what goes on in and 
around a boardroom from a psychosocial perspective. This current study addresses some of 
the gaps that have remained in published board studies. 
This study has also made a theoritical contributes to our understanding how social identity 
and power interact and, therefore, addresses the limitations of social psychology studies that 
have examined their effects in isolation. It demonstrates how power works through social 
identity in a board context; in doing so, it extends the two major power theories: 
approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003) and social distance theory 
(Magee & Smith 2013). Additionally, rather than treating group membership as something to 
overcome, or power as a constraint on an individual or group, it views a board (when at its 
best) as an open, living and learning social system that treats a group’s social identity as a 
source of power and, thus, facilitates the agency that allows NEDs to make a real difference 
to the strategic direction of a company. In this regard, it makes an important contribution by 
extending the dynamic social impact theory (Latane 1996a) and applying it to a board 
context. 
Based on a review of theories in the field and what was found in this study, a new model of 
decision-making is proposed, making a unique contribution to the extensive body of decision 
making scholarship (Martin & Parmar, 2012) and is described as a dynamic psychosocial 
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model of decision-making, as shown in Figure 4.6. In this model, power worked through 
social identity and determined the effectiveness or otherwise of a decision-making process. 
This model also acknowledges that power differentials exist on every board but only becomes 
salient through the task and role tensions that arise respectively from the complexity of a task 
and the varying views about a board’s role in strategy, as revealed through the decision case 
chosen for this study. As noted, NEDs engaged in an invisible but active coping process in 
which there was a propensity for higher-power NEDs to form subgroups based on ‘like me’ 
and ‘not like me’ divisions and make attempts to reduce deviance from their preferred view. 
That is, ‘one of us’ socialisation at times can be given more weight in boardrooms than good 
judgement. This can compromise the quality of collective decision-making, board 
effectiveness and ultimately board accountability. The findings also showed that when there 
was strong shared identity and when powerful subgroups were not reported to exist, NEDs 
recounted a healthier dynamic in which accountability was created and exercised. However, 
when social identity was fragmented because of the existence of large power differentials, 
social competencies, traits and influencing styles of a NED (captured in Table 4.1), as well as 
the astuteness of a skilled Chair (described in Section 4.5.2), acted as a moderator to prevent 
the undercurrents of identity and power to control the direction and pace of decision-making. 
Therefore, a productive balance (between member over-identification and under-
identification) was key to the decision-making effectiveness on boards. 
This current study also makes a theoretical contribution by extending the dynamic social 
impact theory (Latane 1996a) in two ways. As noted in Chapter 2, the dynamic social impact 
theory is a meta-theory that supports the social constructionist view that interpersonal 
communication is key; that is, a group’s culture is created by communication and suggests 
how individuals located in a social space influence each other to create higher order patterns 
and subcultures, which Latane (1996) describes as dynamic entities that feed on and evolve 
through communication. Group cultures and subcultures may appear to have an internal 
coherence but they are continually resisting categorisation because ‘individuals differ in their 
ability to influence each other and in their spatial location, affecting each other in a dynamic 
iterative process of reciprocal and recursive influence’ (Latane 1996, p. 13). This current 
study extends this theory by applying it to a board context (not previously attempted) and by 
linking it to a process of creating accountability in decision-making groups. In applying the 
dynamic social impact theory to a board context, this study describes the complex tripartite 
relationship between a director as sensemaker and an influencer, a decision-making process 
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and the inner social reality that results from group membership. Creating accountability in the 
context of Latane’s (1996) theory applied to a board describes a process that is perceived, 
evaluated, subjectively validated and acted upon by NEDs who find themselves in a social 
structure alive with identity politics that can materially control debate and contention. 
Accountability in this context can neither be fully explained by rational action theories nor 
can it rely on aspects and processes of formal and stable forms of accountability. Informal 
accountability—such as that implicit in the social contract between members about 
expectations and norms of behaviour—is just as important. 
This study concludes that a strategy-shaping process is a socially accomplished process. 
Although NEDs shared similar beliefs about board accountability for strategy, they differed 
in how they exercised their accountability. Identity politics (largely invisible) determined if, 
how and when influence attempts were made or responded to and who listened to whom. The 
success of a NED’s influence attempt was determined by their relational and dispositional 
skills, not just the sum of their human and social capital. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. A dynamic psychosocial model of boardroom influence. 
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The dynamic model of board influence derived from this study and shown in Figure 4.6 
contrasts with the undersocialised view of what goes on in a boardroom and contrary to 
conventional wisdom suggests that board accountability does not occur in a social vacuum. It 
also suggests that more cognitive effort will not ensure greater levels of accountability 
because people don't think and act in a social vacuum. A largely hidden social structure 
emerges when people become part of a decision making group. A social hierarchy develops, 
which results from power differentials between NEDs. How individual NEDs in this 
hierarchy use their power depends on where they see themselves in this hierarchy relative to 
others. Those perceived to be ranked higher in this social hierarchy will generally have more 
influence over decision deliberations. As shown in this study, subgroups may develop (driven 
by the processes of social identification and categorisation) and tip the balance of power one 
way or another, thus, generating action in favour of more powerful subgroups. This may have 
the effect of silencing or marginalising the contribution of those not part of such subgroups 
and, therefore, diminish the effectiveness of a board as a collective. 
How individuals within this group make sense of this social structure, their place in it and if 
and how they choose to mobilise their board capital by use of social competencies creates 
variations in director effectiveness and, hence, variations in how board accountability is 
created. First, effectiveness is affected by a NED’s fear of losing their place in a group or 
their desire to strengthen their place in a group, as influenced their behaviour. Such fears can 
potentially interfere with the quality of decision-making and, in several cases shown in this 
study, result in the acquiescence of NEDs in the face of powerful peers. Second, how 
competently an individual NED attends to the use of their power (board capital) to influence 
the processes of decision-making contributes to the effectiveness of a board. The way NEDs 
use this power and influence is a function of the social competencies they possessed and 
applied during board discourse. Therefore, an effective NED is one who uses their social 
competencies to navigate the effects of power differentials they encounter. Additionally, an 
effective board is one in which a Chair works to ensures a productive balance between the 
effects of over-identification and under-identification with a group to prevent the formation 
of subgroups that can render decision-making processes less effective. 
4.8 Summary 
In conclusion, the findings of this study challenge the undersocialised view that suggests it is 
specific decisions and rational thinking that determines how decisions are made, which 
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extends exsiting power and identity theories in a board context. These findings suggest that 
decision behaviour in and around a boardroom is as much influenced by its social 
hierarchy—created by the complex effects of both power differentials and social 
categorisation or identification—as they are by other inner-context factors such as how a 
board is led, the attitude of its CEO and board norms and practices. 
Further, this study suggests that the psychosocial structure of a board and its associated 
effects affect both NED effectiveness and the processes of accountability, and may diminish 
the potential contribution NEDs’ board capital can make. Rational action theories or 
rationalist views do not explain these findings. 
As revealed by this study’s findings, influence is a process and is largely dependent on the 
social structure that exists in every board—a social reality in the form of an invisible 
psychosocial infrastructure that directors must recognise, understand and navigate. The social 
structure of a board matter in the conduct of influence and director effectiveness and the 
granting and withholding of social support plays a vital role in the inner workings of a board. 
The findings suggest that to navigate this complex social reality effectively, NEDs need to be 
socially astute and skilled. An alert and intuitive Chair can proactively spot and manage 
instability in its social structure and provide a context in which a skilled NED can contribute 
effectively. Sound board protocols and practices, and a CEO open to and welcoming of the 
board capital available to management, also plays a part. 
These findings support the notion that influence is a complex interplay of actors, processes 
and contexts. Actors (skilled or unskilled) drive processes, but actors are embedded in and 
shaped by multiple layers of context. Therefore, in this reflexive dynamic process, both 
actors and context are continually being shaped and, in turn, shape the process by which 
directors seek to influence strategy. The context, as revealed in this study, required 
recognition of ‘invisible pools’ of identity and power that exist in every boardroom, which 
can taint a decision-making process and hinder director accountability. As noted, the role of a 
Chair (as the owner of a board process and a shaper of context) plays a critical part in 
ensuring that this tripartite dynamic of actor, process and context works effectively. This is 
achieved by an alert and intuitive Chair who creates the necessary space for constructive 
dissent by creating a sense of psychological safety. 
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However, the role of leadership is not exclusively the role of a Chair. Every NED plays a part 
in the processes of boardroom leadership. As the findings showed, an individual NED can 
make a difference. No matter how much board capital a NED possesses (experience, 
reputation, connections and networks), it is unlikely to be fully harnessed unless they possess 
the social competence required to carry out their chosen influencing strategy. This requires a 
director to be socially perceptive (aware and attentive to social cues and pressures), to show 
self-control and introspection when required, to adapt to fast-evolving changes and to have 
the ability to articulate clearly, confidently and compellingly their positions and concerns. 
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Chapter 5: Contributions, Conclusions and Opportunities for 
Future Research 
The aims of this study were to investigate if and how factors such as social identity and 
power play a role in how NEDs influenced the shaping of company strategy—a critical part 
of their advisory role. This study is critical to better understand how directors approach 
potentially value-creating decisions; it also challenges the ‘undersocialised’ view of board 
accountability that has dominated the literature. The current body of relevant research was 
reviewed to identify gaps in understanding NEDs’ accountability as a social phenomenon, 
therefore, making a contribution to process research in a board context. It builds on the prior 
institutionally contextualised streams of process research described in Chapter 2 (Maitlis & 
Lawrence 2003; Pettigrew 1992, 2001; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995; Pye 2002; Pye & 
Pettigrew 2005; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005; Samra-Fredericks 2003). This study 
adopted a unique methodology that explored this social phenomenon through the eyes of 
NEDs as expert informants—a methodology that is repeatable. 
This final chapter first summarises the major contributions the study findings make in 
answering the three questions posed by this study, discussed more in Chapter 4. Second, it 
describes the implications for theory and for practice. It concludes with a discussion of 
limitations and opportunities for further research. 
5.1 Contributions 
This study makes three important contributions. First, this study addresses the limitations of 
prior studies that have taken a rational and normative view of decision-making. To be 
effective, NEDs (who represent company interests) are required to discharge their 
responsibilities to the best of their abilities, particularly in relation to their advisory role in 
potentially value-creating decisions. The study of the processes by which accountability is 
created has historically been dominated by a narrow set of theoretical approaches, such as 
those described in agency theory and rational action theories. This research bias (of studying 
accountability as a structural construct rather than a social process) has diverted attention 
from relational considerations relevant in the study of any ‘social system’ and the micro-
behaviours of its actors, such as a board and its directors. 
		
188 
This study concludes that contrary to current perceptions, decision-makers do not simply 
make judgements on the basis of logic by using a set of objective criteria on which to analyse 
and evaluate a proposal. Instead, the effects of social identification and power differentials 
revealed by this study can enable or inhibit the valuable contribution NEDs make when 
shaping strategic decisions. The findings extend current studies by showing how NEDs’ 
identities, expectations, roles and accountabilities are socially constructed and accomplished 
as part of a complex dynamic in which power worked through group identification effects 
(such as categorisation and validation); this helped determine if and how influence was 
exercised when shaping strategy. In doing so, this study concludes that accountability in a 
board context is relational and is achieved through the processes of lively inquiry, engaged 
dialogue and attentive learning. However, the demonstration of these behaviours were shown 
to be influenced by which a NED construed themselves and others in the distribution of 
power within a board group. In turn, the resulting power dynamic shaped the extent to which 
the generation of alternatives, the debating of options, the modification of held positions and 
the pursuit of preferred strategies were encouraged. Essentially, this largely invisible power 
dynamic, unique across each of the 15 cases, was continually and reflexively shaping each 
other during the process by which influence was exercised. These findings support and 
extend the SIT (Turner 1975), the SCT (Turner 1985) and the two theories of power 
described in Chapter 2—the approach/inhibition theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 
2003) and the social distance theory (Magee & Smith 2013)—by showing exactly how power 
works through group identification effects, such as categorisation and self-validation, when 
members work together in small groups. The findings also extend the dynamic social impact 
theory (Latane 1996) by showing how power differentials create a dynamic ‘social reality’, 
which feeds on and evolves through interpersonal communication. 
Second, the researcher undertook this exploration through reconstructive narratives of a 
cohort of public company directors. The methodology and design of this investigation is 
unique and stands in contrast to other board studies that have been undertaken. It makes a 
valuable contribution to methodology in several ways. Board access is often provided as a 
reason for ‘arms-length’ studies. In this regard, the researcher’s professional networks and 
credibility earned over many years with board directors was relevant in securing the 
participation of NEDs from some of the largest public companies in Australia. Further, the 
researcher applied the snowballing approach, beginning with four NEDs who had significant 
standing in this community to pull the remaining participants, who were not known to the 
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researcher. Interpersonal trust is critical in these circles and meant that participants were 
more likely to agree to participate and be open with the researcher during data collection, 
particularly if the researcher were recommended by a peer that was trusted and respected in 
the director community. By using a behavioural event interviewing methodology, this study 
was able to access NED thoughts, feelings and motivations, which contrasts with ‘fly on the 
wall’ studies or ‘observational’ studies that do not provide direct access to thoughts, feelings 
and motivations, unless coupled with other methods. While these ‘fly on the wall’ or 
‘observational’ studies can observe actions taken and can infer the thoughts and motivations 
that were behind those actions, they do not necessarily tap into the richness that was revealed 
through more than 90 NED quotes and reflections of their decision experiences reported in 
this study. The multistage method of data collection added the robustness that qualitative 
studies may often lack. The multistaged process meant that time spent with the 15 
participating NEDs amounted to close to 50 hours of face-to-face time. Through this staged 
process, NEDs also had the opportunity to add further richness to their earlier recounts. The 
multistaged process of data collection allowed for pattern building and explanation building 
between and across the decision stories, thus, adding conceptual robustness to the study. 
Further, the care taken in selecting the 15 NEDs ensured that they held multiple directorships. 
The 15 directors were involved with some 35 public companies (through their multiple 
directorships), which gave the researcher confidence to suggest that these findings went 
beyond this cohort of 15—offering explanations beyond one NED, one board, one company 
or one sector. In summary, the design of this study is repeatable and, therefore, makes an 
important contribution to how future board studies may be designed to extend understanding 
of the inner workings of a board. 
Finally, the study makes a practical contribution. If boards wish to strengthen their processes 
of accountability, they will require more than governance codes, board charters, committee 
terms of references and procedures. Instead, boards may need to recognise that board capital 
is only valuable if it is accompanied by social competencies and socially alert dispositions. 
Board nominations committees responsible for hiring directors, onboarding and the 
development of existing directors may wish to consider these competencies and dispositions 
(not just relying on experience and reputations) in their efforts to strengthen the effectiveness 
of their boards. From the knowledge and experience of the researcher in working with 
boards, a skills matrix and the manner in which it is completed by board nominations 
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committees may be insufficient to establish the necessary balance or mix of board capital, 
skills and dispositions required to ensure that accountability and effectiveness are optimised. 
Boards will require a deep understanding of the unique dynamic that is created when they 
work together, thus, suggesting that NEDs need to acquire the social competencies to 
navigate the effects of social identification and power differentials to be effective. In 
particular, when putting boards together, consideration needs to provided to how adverse 
social effects might be neutralised through ensuring that power differentials are small and 
social identity effects are balanced. This has real implications in how boards are constructed, 
led and developed, in the composition of boards, in NED selection and in the development 
and quality of Chair facilitation and leadership. 
In summary, this study makes important contributions in a scholarly sense, as well as in a 
practical sense. It may be concluded that the more this invisible social hierarchy present in 
any board is acknowledged by NEDs, its effects fully understood and steps taken to create a 
‘level playing field’ in its capacity and skill to influence, the efforts of boards to strengthen 
decision processes and decision effectiveness may fail. As social effects are neutralised when 
power differentials are small and when social identity effects are balanced during decision-
making, boards may need to consider their compositions more thoughtfully. Boards will also 
need to prepare for ‘transformative’ decisions by undertaking post-decision reviews to derive 
insight about the process of arriving at a decision. While some boards undertake post-
implementation reviews, these are typically focused on a decision outcome, rather than the 
process of reaching a decision or the political landscape in which it occurred. Reviews may 
need to focus on the processes by which a decision was reached, acknowledge political 
factions and behaviour and, while recognising that political behaviour is a fact of board life, 
take steps to neutralise its adverse effects. Such reviews may need to consider process 
refinements to ensure there is sufficient room for all voices to be heard and for unspoken 
concerns to emerge. 
5.2 Study Conclusions 
This section summarises the findings described in Chapter 4 in relation to the three research 
questions posed by this study. It also highlights the theoretical implications of its findings. In 
relation to the first of the three research questions (what are the origins of and differences in 
an individual NED’s power?), it may be concluded that in the context of a NED role being 
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largely cognitive in nature (i.e., they are not responsible for execution) this study extends the 
current typologies of power (Finkelstein 1992) by putting forward a more nuanced construct 
of board capital, which is aligned around shared cognitive histories, to explain the sources of 
power that NEDs bring to their respective boards. Further, the task of ensuring effectiveness 
in exercising a board’s advisory accountability concerned more than simply assembling a 
group of individually experienced and expert NEDs. A board that collectively has more board 
capital (i.e., the sum total of board capital of all its members) may not be more effective in 
influencing outcomes or strengthening the processes of accountability than one that possesses 
collectively less, as proof of the value a NED brings to a board is only evident in how they 
choose to use influence and how it was perceived and supported by others. A novel finding of 
this study was the role that NED motivations in joining a board (and anticipation of securing 
future board appointments) plays in understanding the potential allegiances and norms of 
reciprocity that may develop on boards. This, in turn, may result in behaviour that is less 
questioning, which, thus, affects how strongly NEDs may argue a point or show a 
preparedness to stand alone on an issue while shaping strategy. This has important 
implications for how accountability is exercised and how effectiveness in decision-making 
processes is ensured. As the board capital construct aligns around shared cognitive histories 
and motivations, and because this differs from one NED to the next, it sets the context for a 
power dynamic to emerge in the form of ‘power constellations’ defined by differences in 
cognitive history and motivations. These conclusions lead to the second of the three research 
questions. 
In relation to the second research question (how does a NED’s sense of shared identity with 
the board group shape the process of decision-making?), it may be concluded that while 
board capital symbolises a director’s professional proficiency, it was not until their 
proficiency was proved in and around a board table through discourse that direct evidence of 
a NED’s value to the influence of a board (in strategy shaping) became evident. However, 
power worked through a social structure or hierarchy that acted as an internalised guide, 
which can have a pernicious effect on how NEDs choose to use their power or capacity to 
influence. Essentially, how strongly a NED identified with a board group shaped their 
thinking, perceptions and actions. When identification between members is strong (through 
board capital aligned around shared cognitive histories), there tended to be a greater 
expectation of agreement. Conversely, when there was lower identification between 
members, there were multiple views of the world that emerged and greater expectations of 
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disagreement. For example, it determined the vigour with which influence attempts were 
made, the extent to which contention was tolerated and the degree of acquiescence to 
directors or subgroups of directors was deemed more powerful in this invisible hierarchy. 
While participating NEDs did not speak openly about this hidden hierarchy, their recounting 
of their own and others’ decision behaviour showed varying levels of such awareness. The 
NED’s internalised guide to the social hierarchy (depicted in fig 4.6) was shown in this study 
to produce a power dynamic in which some directors may be heard over others; indeed, some 
may speak up more than others and some may choose to attach more importance to the more 
confident and strident views. When this occurs, independent-mindedness (the very role 
entrusted to NEDs) is lost and decision-making processes are compromised; in turn, this may 
affect a board’s effectiveness as a peak decision-making group. These conclusions not only 
elaborate and extend SIT (Turner 1975) and SCT (Turner 1985) within a board context, they 
also extend the social distance theory (Magee & Smith 2013), thus, confirming that power 
works through social-identity effects to produce various interpersonal phenomena, which 
affects attitudes, behaviour and perceptions. The psychosocial theory of board functioning 
that has emerged from this study addresses the current theoretical gap resulting from the 
separate research paths that social identity and power studies have tended to pursue. 
Finally, in relation to the third research question (how is the use of NED influence in 
decision-making shaped by the ‘social reality’ (of group identification and power 
distribution?), this study can conclude that the process of gaining and growing one’s 
influence on a board had to be continually negotiated and renegotiated between NEDs 
through discursive practices for which directors needed to demonstrate finely tuned social 
astuteness and competencies. This was a novel finding that emerged from this study, thus, 
suggesting that NEDs needed more than board capital. Given the challenges implicit in the 
‘social reality’ revealed by this study, it is ultimately the social competencies, traits and styles 
NEDs demonstrate that determined how influential they may become. This is in addition to 
board capital, ‘soft skills’ (particularly situational sensing, impression management, 
articulacy and adaptability, as described in Chapter 4) and certain dispositions NEDs needed 
to utilise such capital when shaping strategy and when exercising their accountabilities. 
These dispositions included the propensity to act and reflect with others, the propensity to 
practice detachment and distance themselves while involved and the propensity to concede to 
or resist social pressure. These micro-judgements NEDs made of each other and recounted in 
this study were in no way static but subject to continually negotiated and renegotiated 
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relations through the discursive practices accompanying each influence attempt. However, 
those with a strong subjective sense of power were less likely to engage in perspective taking, 
adapt their positions or learn from others. These findings extend the approach/inhibition 
theory (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003), a theory of power that has previously only 
been tested in experimental conditions to explain the regulation and control of behaviour and, 
in particular, the propensity to act, which those in power demonstrate. 
Additionally, NEDs perceived their boards to have a set of behavioural norms that evolved 
through the working history of a group, thus, exemplifying ‘what is acceptable around here’. 
These norms act as a constraint on ‘deviant’ behaviour. That is, a NED’s desire to fit in and 
retain the respect of their peers and a fear that they may lose social support acted as a 
constraint on deviance, thus, ensuring that efforts to establish one’s own legitimacy to 
influence must conform to what was generally accepted by a board. These findings elaborate 
the dynamic theory of social impact (Latane 1996a), which describes how a group’s culture is 
created by, feeds on and evolves through interpersonal communication. 
In summary, the study’s findings provide the answers to the three questions posed in this 
inductive study and, in doing so, confirms and extends the cited theories that have largely 
been posited under experimental conditions. These findings make a significant contribution 
to the emerging body of board process research, which, while describing the conditions under 
which power is used for influence, does not describe how this is done; in particular, this 
regards the specific social competencies and socially alert dispositions may be required of 
NEDs. 
5.3 Concluding Summary 
This study attempted to meet the double challenge that board scholars have in making an 
effect, not only in a scholarly sense but also in a practical sense. The social factors revealed 
in this study that affect the processes of accountability lay in sharp contrast to traditional 
corporate governance theory or rational action theorists. The effects of social identification 
and power differentials play an important part in how a director chooses to engage and 
influence, thus, suggesting that the processes of influence and the enacting of accountability 
in and around a boardroom are socially accomplished. This ‘socialised’ view of a board and 
its effects on individual decision behaviour needs to be acknowledged and addressed to 
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strengthen the processes of decision-making and ultimately the ongoing governance of our 
institutions. 
5.4 Opportunities for Future Research 
Research into the process by which accountability is achieved needs to acknowledge a board 
as a complex ‘social reality’ with its affective, emotional, relational and social aspects. This 
acknowledgment requires that board researchers undertake more venturesome research 
methods than are currently the norm in board studies—methods that go beyond large-scale 
surveys or analysis of board minutes and focus on directors as the subjects of study. Although 
this call for more qualitative research into board behaviour exists in current literature, there 
have been relatively few studies of this kind (McNulty, Florackis & Omrod 2013). 
Board life narratives employed in this study have made a good start in developing a practical 
understanding of how NEDs enact their advisory accountabilities. The study has successfully 
negotiated the difficulties of board access and revealed inductively rich ‘process constructs’ 
methods that rely on surveys and questionnaires are not able to accomplish. However, there 
are some limitations of this study. 
A criticism of the use of reconstructive case design pertains to the accuracy of post-event 
recall. The use of reconstructive case design, while allowing us to explore the board 
dynamic—a largely invisible phenomenon that is inaccessible to researchers because of 
access issues—has some limitations, such as participant recall issues. However, by focusing 
the decision case on a memorable event, such as a large transformative decision (e.g., an 
international acquisition, which is pivotal in any NED’s board life experience), by its very 
significance, would aid a NED’s recollection of detailed conversations. Combining a case 
approach with a sensemaking methodology focused this inquiry on what NEDs themselves 
made of their experiences and their recounts of how they acted on the meaning they made of 
those experiences. The influence of bias and good impression management was always 
possible during the interview process, although candour and authenticity was found in all 
NED accounts. Candour is generally thought to be facilitated when good rapport is developed 
early between the researcher and a director, an important precursor to undertaking similar 
research. 
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The validity of extrapolating the findings on the strength of 15 cases can also be debated. 
However, given that all the participating directors were members of two to three other ASX 
boards, their thinking and behavioural approach may act as a broader and more representative 
study reflecting the combined situation of more than 30 Australian boards in the top 100 
companies on the ASX. 
The multistaged data collection process was also particularly useful in addressing some 
concerns often levelled at inductive studies, such as the perception of lower credibility when 
compared to deductive studies that rely more on statistical analysis and less on understanding 
participants’ meanings. The five carefully designed stages (from pre-understanding to the 
second set of validation meetings) allowed the researcher to calibrate conclusions drawn from 
the interview transcripts during the project and helped inspire trust in the integrity of the 
outcomes. 
Future research may consider combining ‘fly on the wall’ studies (Brudin & Nordqvist 2004; 
Huse 2005; Huse & Zattoni 2008), such as, for example, observing board meetings, with 
behavioural event interviewing and narrative analysis (undertaken in this study). This 
combination while observing interactions in real time may also enable the tapping into deeper 
NED insights, beliefs and cognitive frameworks that influence their approach to board work, 
but of which they are not consciously aware. These beliefs and cognitive schemas would not 
be accessible if only a ‘fly on the wall’ approach were adopted alone. 
Future research might consider extending the psychosocial approach put forward in this 
thesis to the study of less high-risk and more routine board decisions to determine if the 
approach holds relevance for all decisions, not just high-risk decisions, such as was the focus 
of this study. This may be an important line of future research, given that even routine 
decisions at a board level may sometimes having dire consequences. 
While this study focused on power and social identity, variations in the perception of role 
identity was not studied. Role identity is regarded in literature as a relatively stable construct 
changing only in response to changes in role or position in a formal hierarchy. However, role 
confers a social identity (Hogg, Terry & White 1995). As such, future research may wish to 
study how (NED) role identity and social identity interact. 
Finally, the dynamic psychosocial model of boardroom influence that has emerged from this 
study suggests that NEDs have the potential to materially shape the strategy of a company, 
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given their possession and use of social competence, as well as certain conditions within a 
board context. However, NEDs may not be able to fulfil this potential in full because of 
factors beyond the inner context of a board. Outer context (such as sector convergence or 
disruption, systemic-sector risks and shareholder activism) may confer on a NED and a board 
a greater or lesser ability to exert their individual and collective influence. Therefore, future 
research may consider studying governance practices through the double lens of both inner 
context and outer context to map the role a NED plays in strategic change in different 
settings. 
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Appendix 1 
Interview Questions 
Warm-up questions (pertaining to the company from which a decision is drawn): 
1. How did you come to be involved with your board? What attracted you to join it? 
How long have you worked in this sector? How long have you been on this board? 
2. Are there some boards you enjoy more or by which you are more engaged? If so, 
why? 
3. When you came to your first meeting with this board, was there anything that 
struck you about it? (Requires recollection of your first meeting). Were there ways 
in which it (dynamic) was different from other boards you may have been exposed 
to? 
4. Are there some values or beliefs that you bring to your board work—what are 
these? 
The Chosen Decision 
Can you briefly situate the episode for me? What were you deciding about? We will explore 
details later, just give me the essence (briefly) of what the decision was about. 
Main Interview Questions 
1. Reflect for me generally first. Looking back, was there anything distinctive or 
memorable about this decision and the deliberations surrounding it? If so what 
was it? 
2. Were there aspects of this decision/deliberation that you felt were particularly 
important or of particular concern to you personally? Why? 
3. When you look back, was there anything you feel you contributed uniquely to the 
early shaping of this particular decision? What impact (did you think) that input 
had on the direction of the deliberations as they unfolded? 
4. Do you recall raising a challenging point during any of these meetings? What was 
going through your mind at the time (when you raised it)? Did you feel you were 
understood fully on this point? If you had not raised it, do you think it would have 
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been raised by another director? (Note: question designed to explore how 
interview subject perceived their point got built-on or expanded by others). 
5. Can you give me an example of a time (on this particular decision) when your input 
or advice was deliberately sought either during a formal board meeting or outside 
the board meeting? What was it and how was it utilised in the process (of arriving 
at the final decision)? 
6. Can you give me an example of a time you participated in a conversation (over the 
phone or in person) outside the regular board meetings (on this particular 
decision) that you recall as memorable? Was this or any other informal exchange 
brought back into the board meeting for further consideration of the full board? 
7. Is there a role you felt the others expected you to play in this decision, given your 
particular expertise and skill set? 
8. (It may be that for different types of decisions, some directors will play different 
roles) Did you think that some non-executive directors played certain roles with 
respect to this decision? Can you give examples of roles some had played in this 
particular decision? In your view did directors tend to contribute within their 
domain expertise? 
9. Can you recall a time when a difference in view emerged among the non-executive 
directors about the board’s role in strategy? How did it come about and how was it 
resolved?—new question. 
10. Was there a time during these deliberations that you reflected (privately) that not 
everyone was at the same point of this unfolding discussion as you were? What 
were you thinking? Why did you think those distinctions persisted at that point in 
time? 
11. As the deliberations unfolded did you arrive at a point when you felt that the 
conversation was not going in the way you had hoped? What were you thinking at 
that time? Where did you think the others were at? And what were you thinking at 
the time? 
12. What are your thoughts about the paradoxical position that directors have of 
having to be a critic as well as a supporter of the proposal vis-a-vis management? 
13. Did you feel there were directors on this board who spoke less or more than they 
should have? (Has this happened before on other boards you have been exposed to 
and what could/was done to encourage them to speak less or more than they 
should have?). 
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14. Are there some directors who have more influence than others on this board and 
prepared to use it from time to time. Can you give an example (related to these 
particular deliberations?). What is the source of their influence in your opinion? 
How did they use it in this decision? 
15. I am interested in the conventions or processes for voicing dissent or raising a 
challenge to such proposals (these may be things you do in your mind, or things 
that you notice other do). How did those conventions work this time? 
16. Can you recall a point at which you were persuaded otherwise by a compelling 
argument put forward by another director to cause you to adapt or modify your 
going in position? What was the point being made and can you describe your 
thinking at the time it was made? 
17. Do you recall a challenging point voiced by another director (other than you) that 
was memorable? Why did you feel those views were important enough for that 
director to raise? How did you feel the board responded to his or her point? Did 
you feel that director was heard on that point? Was there agreement on the point 
and if not why? If that director had not raised the point do you think someone else 
would have raised it? Why do you think that? (Note: identify the extent to which 
the interview subject recognised/appreciated or was familiar with the views, 
perspectives and predispositions of fellow directors). 
18. Do you recall how another director’s experience in IME (acquired previously with 
another company) was shared during discussions? What were you thinking at that 
time? What was the point they made and did you feel the point was heard? How 
did it shape the thinking of the group? 
19. Were there some directors you felt invested more time or less time (in considering 
this proposal) than you expected them to? (Point out that this is about their 
personal expectations) What reasons might you have attributed to this? 
20. One of the directors I spoke to from another board described a situation to me 
where there was an issue (relating to this decision) and he had an opinion about it 
that he thought was either not that important or urgent to raise and so he did not 
say much and then several meetings later it became clear that maybe he should 
have stuck to his instincts and have been more forceful with his own idea. Have 
you experienced anything like that and what was behind your original reluctance 
to raise the point? Can you describe that experience? 
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21. Are there some things you are not prepared to tolerate in the boardroom? During 
this particular decision-making process were there some things that you were 
uncomfortable or dissatisfied about? What was the source of your discomfort or 
dissatisfaction and how did you act on it (during or after this scenario)? 
We have finished the formal interview questions. Is there anything you would like to add in 
reflecting on the role of the board in strategy and the way in which the diversity of experience 
that NED’s bring is applied to the decision at hand? 
1. What you would like to see more of? 
2. What you would like to see less of? 
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Appendix 2 
Profiles of Participating Board Directors 
Director	 Company sector	 Tenure 
on board 
years	
Direct 
experience in 
sector	
Age Decision	
case	
Business/ 
functional 
background	
Past 
experience in 
acquisitions as 
NED	
Current 
directorships (in 
addition) 
public other Date 
appointed	
A Retail 2	 2	 63	 Acquisition in 
Asia 
Banking/ 
finance 
Yes	 2 3 2008 
B Banking 4	 4	 61	 Acquisition in 
Asia 
Consulting/gen 
mgmt 
Yes	 4 2 2006 
C Infrastructure 1	 28	 53	 Major project 
tender in China 
Proff’l 
services/ legal 
No (but 
extensive 
M&A 
experience) 
3 1 2011 
D Industrial 1	 35	 61	 Capital 
rationing  
Gen mgmt/ 
Eng 
No 1 3 2013 
E  Financial 
services 
8	 12	 61	 Acquisition in 
Australia 
Legal Yes	 1 3 2006 
G  Infrastructure 5	 25	 68	 ‘Hostile’ bid Banking/ econ Yes	 2 2 2009 
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H  Insurance 7	 50	 70	 Acquisition in 
Asia 
Gen mgmt/ 
insurance 
Yes	 nil 2 2004 
I  Retail 5	 7	 57	 Int’l acqn Consulting and 
gen mgmt/ 
technology 
No (but 
extensive 
M&A 
experience) 
1 2 2009 
J  Property 
development 
3	 nil	 59	 Acquisition Banking/ legal No 2 2 2011 
K Industrial 7	 Since 2007	 65	 Asian 
acquisition of 
French 
holdings 
Gen mgmt/ 
science 
Nil	 1 1 2007 
L Telco 5	 30	 57	 Acquisition in 
US 
Gen mgmt/ 
engineering 
Yes public  other 2009 
M Industrial 10	 30	 61	 Acquisition Oil and 
gas/financial 
Yes	 2 nil 2005 
N  Telco 6	 Since 2008	 59	 Acquistion Gen mgmt/ 
logistics/ 
Yes	 1 1 2008 
O  Telco 8	 Since 2001	 67	 Acquisition 
(local) 
Gen mgmt/ fin 
services 
Yes	 1 2 2001 
P  Financial 
services 
2000–
2012	
28	 67	 Asia acqn 
strategy 
Legal/ 
financial 
services 
Yes	 1 3 2000 
 
